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vEditorial Preface
In Prague, on 8 October 2004, a small gathering of academics met in a room off 
the main conference hall to explore the formation of an Academic Wing of INSOL 
Europe. With Professor Sebastian Kortmann (until recently Rector Magnificus of 
the Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) leading it, the group began life. From those 
modest beginnings, the Academic Forum (as it was re-baptised in 2007) has now 
reached its 10th Anniversary. Marking the occasion has been a logo redesign and 
a number of anniversary publications, including the present tome.
In the time since its foundation, the primary mission of the Academic Forum has 
been to represent members interested in insolvency law and research, to encourage 
and assist in the development of research and teaching initiatives in the insolvency 
field, particularly by younger members, and also to participate in the activities 
organised by INSOL Europe. The membership of the Academic Forum now 
includes insolvency academics, insolvency practitioners with recognised academic 
credentials as well as those more generally engaged in the research, study and 
teaching of insolvency.
A roll-call of meetings in the life of the Academic Forum could read like a road-
map of the Continent. Although normally following the parent organisation for 
its main conference annually, the Academic Forum has also held joint events 
with Law Schools and other research and teaching institutes in Europe. From the 
inception of the conference series, events have had a solidly international focus. 
They have attracted academics and the academically-minded from all across 
Europe and the World, the list of participants at each meeting never representing 
fewer than 15-20 jurisdictions. Conferences have always been thoughtful, though 
also convivial, occasions. The delivery of papers has always been punctuated by 
a reception and an Academic Dinner, often with a guest speaker, where over the 
table friendships are formed and renewed each year, while the discussions range 
over topics both serious and frivolous! The sense at these occasions is often that of 
a large community, who may meet each other only occasionally, but who always 
find a pleasure in catching up with news and re-forming old acquaintances.
Out of the conferences have come many things, principally the reports of 
conference proceedings, which have been published regularly since 2009. In that 
year, the Leiden and Barcelona 2008 papers appeared to join the earlier inaugural 
volumes in the Technical Series. By end-2014, publications included all conference 
papers given up to end-2013, making a grand total of 15 academic contributions 
to the series. As they are published, these texts contain the latest information and 
form a cogent documentation of papers given at Academic Forum events. They are 
also a good reflection of the state and quality of insolvency research and teaching in 
Europe and elsewhere, forming a handy library of the ideas and themes associated 
with each conference.
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They are not the only products of these occasions. Ideas have flowed with a vital 
part being played by the presentations that have stimulated many other research 
papers and projects. Some of these have also been authored through collaborations 
set up at conferences, while projects have often been undertaken by academic 
members relying heavily on input from colleagues met through Academic Forum 
activities. The networking at events has also led to consultations on formal and 
informal bases with many members of the group meeting at other national and 
international forums, colloquia and seminars. There are close links too between the 
Academic Forum and other academic bodies, including the INSOL International 
Academic Group, which holds its meetings under the aegis of the body of which 
INSOL Europe is also a part.
The Academic Forum was fortunate early on in being offered the opportunity 
of sponsorship by Edwin Coe LLP, a firm of insolvency practitioners based in 
London. This support has enabled a number of things to occur, chiefly the provision 
of research and travel grants, the latter to provide for younger academics as well as 
those from post-2004 accession countries and candidates to come present at events. 
In recent years, the provision of travel grants has seen up to 5 young scholars attend 
and deliver papers at each conference, in some cases speaking to an international 
audience for the very first time. Prizes have also been offered for outstanding legal 
scholarship awarded on the basis of monographs and publications. The funding 
has also permitted the inauguration of a series of lectures given by judges, 
practitioners and academics of international repute and eminence. These lectures 
have greatly added to the annual conferences, permitting an insight into the great 
themes of insolvency law existing today, as well as offering an eye towards future 
developments in the subject area. These are the lectures that are the subject of 
updating and re-publication in the present volume.
All this, though, would not have been achieved without the participation and 
assistance of a great number of people, not least the presenters and attendees at each 
of the conferences and events. The Academic Forum has been also fortunate in the 
men and women at its helm. After Professor Kortmann (2004-2007), Professor 
Bob Wessels (2007-2010) and Professor Stefania Bariatti (2010-2013) have in 
turn become Chair. Each has taken the organisation forward, offering a unique 
contribution to the workings of the group. Bob was instrumental in helping set up 
the Young Academics’ Network (YAN), which brings together doctoral candidates 
and post-doctoral early career researchers in a supportive environment. By this 
means, they are able to form collaborations and are supported in giving papers at the 
sessions devoted to YAN presentations at each of the annual conferences. Stefania 
helped lead the group through the early stages of responding to the consultation on 
and proposals for the reform of the European Insolvency Regulation. She also acted 
crucially in fostering links with the Academy of European Law in Trier, which led 
to a successful conference there in early 2013. Professor Christoph Paulus, who 
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took the reins of leadership in 2013, will take the Academic Forum through the 
next critical period, which will see the conclusion of the reform project. These are 
exciting times indeed!
Though the Chairs have been key in the life of the Academic Forum, others have 
played significant roles. Myriam Mailly and Emmanuelle Inacio became YAN 
Co-Chairs when the group was first founded and led it through till end-2013, when 
they ceded their place to Dr Rolef De Weijs. Of immense pleasure (and relief!) to 
the organisation, both will still be involved in Academic Forum activities, Myriam 
carrying on as YAN Secretary, while both she and Emmanuelle will continue as 
INSOL Europe Technical Officers, offering support at the conferences of both 
INSOL Europe and the Academic Forum. On the management side, the Academic 
Forum has had the advice and assistance of its Management Body, whose members 
include Florian Bruder, Jessica Schmidt and Michael Veder, as well as members of 
the Supervisory Body representing the wider academic community across Europe. 
As publications editor, mention must also go to Professor Rebecca Parry, who 
took over responsibility for the production of conference booklets at the Milan 
2011 event with impeccable discharge of her duties. Within the INSOL Europe 
parent body, wholly deserved mentions must go to Marc Udink, who first had 
the idea for what was to become the Academic Forum, and Caroline Taylor, who 
liaises with the group and, with her team, ensures that events always run smoothly 
and efficiently.
After ten years, the Academic Forum looks to be on firm foundations. What next 
though? Conferences and meetings apart, there is the challenge of seeing through 
the reform of the European Insolvency Regulation and its eventual implementation. 
Modifications are continuing to happen to domestic laws in many jurisdictions. 
Once concluded, the emphasis will shift to understanding how the new rules work 
and will be implemented, necessitating the sharing of ideas and best practices as 
well as the production of good quality commentary. There are also the changes 
happening to academia in many European jurisdictions, where the profession is 
in a state of flux as funding and regulatory models alter to adapt to a globalised 
world. There is also the way in which insolvency, as a subject of research and 
teaching, continues to fast mutate, requiring considerable ingenuity to keep up 
with its evolution. There is also the consequent need to ensure that the profession 
and the subject continue to attract a new generation of researchers and teachers, 
who will in turn assume the responsibility of leadership of the Academic Forum in 
times to come! It has been a good first ten years, but here’s to the next!
In summary, we would like to express our appreciation to all those who have 
assisted in making the project a success, not least the contributors themselves. 
If not otherwise noted by the contributors, the law is stated as at 8 October 2014.
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A Note on the Academic Forum
The INSOL Europe Academic Forum, founded in 2004, is a constituent body 
of INSOL Europe, a Europe-wide association of practitioners in insolvency. 
The Academic Forum’s primary mission is to engage in the representation of 
members interested in insolvency law and research, to encourage and assist in 
the development of research initiatives in the insolvency field and to participate 
in the activities organised by INSOL Europe. The membership of the Academic 
Forum includes insolvency academics, insolvency practitioners with recognised 
academic credentials as well as those engaged in the research and study of 
insolvency. The Academic Forum meets annually in conjunction with the main 
conference of INSOL Europe and also arranges half-yearly conferences around 
suitable themes of interest to the practice and academic communities. Previous 
meetings have taken place in Prague (2004), Amsterdam (2005), Monaco 
(2007), Leiden and Barcelona (2008), Brighton and Stockholm (2009), Leiden 
and Vienna (2010), Milan, Venice and Jersey (2011), Nottingham and Brussels 
(2012), Trier and Paris (2013) as well as Leiden and Istanbul (2014).
At Paris, Professor Christoph Paulus, of the Humboldt University Berlin, where 
he is the Chair of Civil, Civil Procedural, Insolvency and Roman Laws, was 
elected Chair of the Management Board for a three-year term. Paul Omar 
(Nottingham Trent University, the United Kingdom) serves as Secretary to the 
Board, while Florian Bruder (Max Planck Institute, Germany), Jessica Schmidt 
(University of Bayreuth, Germany), Rolef de Weijs (Chair of the Young 
Academics’ Network), Emmanuelle Inacio and Myriam Mailly (INSOL Europe 
Technical Officers) as well as Professor Michael Veder (Radboud University 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands) are ordinary members of the Board. Professor 
Rebecca Parry (Nottingham Trent University, the United Kingdom) is the Editor 
of the Conference Proceedings series and ex officio a member of the board. 
A Supervisory Committee has also been established as a consultative board 
for Academic Forum projects whose membership includes senior insolvency 
academics and practitioners.
With sponsorship made available by Edwin Coe LLP over a seven-year period 
from 2007-2014, the Academic Forum has been able to offer young scholars travel 
grants to attend its conferences, research grants for scholarly projects as well as 
prizes for outstanding legal scholarship awarded on the basis of monographs and 
publications. Edwin Coe LLP has also kindly sponsored an annual lecture to be 
given by a scholar of international repute. These have included Professor Jay 
Westbrook (University of Texas, the United States), Gabriel Moss QC (3/4 South 
Square, Gray’s Inn, the United Kingdom), The Hon Mr Justice Ian Kawaley 
(Supreme Court of Bermuda), Professor Dr. Karsten Schmidt (President of 
the Bucerius Law School, Germany), Professor Bob Wessels (Leiden Law 
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School, the Netherlands), Professor Ian Fletcher (University College London, 
United Kingdom) and Professor Rosalind Mason (Queensland University of 
Technology, Australia).
A series of publications arising from Academic Forum conferences was 
inaugurated in 2009 by reports from the 2008 Leiden and Barcelona events. 
These have now been joined by conference proceedings booklets from most of 
the conferences listed above with others yet to come. Overall, the publications 
are intended to form a comprehensive report of the conferences and contain 
accounts of recent research in the insolvency field useful for academics and 
practitioners alike. The series inaugurated by the Academic Forum has also 
served to stimulate debate and discussion in the academic arena and are a useful 
indicator of current themes and future developments in the subject area.
The Academic Forum’s next events are scheduled to take place in cooperation 
with the Academy of European Law on 19-20 March 2015 in Trier and the 
Nottingham Law School and Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on 25-26 June 
2015 in Nottingham. The Academic Forum will also have its annual meeting on 
30 September-1 October 2015 in conjunction with the INSOL Europe conference 
in Berlin. Further conferences are being planned for 2016 and beyond. Details of 
academic conferences will be posted at the Academic Forum website at: www.
insol-europe.org/academic/ as and when available. Further information about the 
work of the Academic Forum can also be obtained via the website as well as a 
dedicated Facebook page.
xiEdwin Coe LLP
A Note on Edwin Coe LLP
Edwin Coe LLP is a commercial law firm based in the heart of London’s 
historic legal district in Lincoln’s Inn. Founded in 1913, we have grown from 
our litigation origins to become a thriving and modern practice, providing a 
comprehensive range of legal services to meet the needs of a wide variety of 
businesses, individuals and organisations based throughout the UK and overseas. 
Our collegiate approach provides clients with efficiency and cross-disciplinary 
support where necessary to ensure that their needs and objectives are fully 
supported and met in a cost-effective manner. Legal advice is led by partners 
whose experience and expertise means that they are able to get to the heart 
of matters quickly and to come up with insightful, practical and commercial 
solutions in the shortest possible time frame. For most clients this is preferable 
and more cost-effective than if work is carried out by junior lawyers, however, 
we discuss this on an individual basis with clients to ensure the most suitable 
arrangements for them. Clients regularly rate us as “excellent” in terms of 
efficiency, understanding their business needs, and keeping them informed of 
progress and developments.
Many of our partners are involved at a high level in professional bodies and 
associations, or are contributors and authors of established legal texts. This 
gives us an invaluable practitioner’s standpoint and means that we are well 
placed to assist clients with forward-planning, helping them to avoid many legal 
problems altogether.
Further information about Edwin Coe LLP can be obtained via the website at: 
www.edwincoe.com
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1Chapter 1
The Present and Future 
of Multinational Insolvency
Professor Jay L. Westbrook
I – Current Issues* **
Among the multitude of issues currently being litigated in the field of multinational 
insolvency, the following five broad areas stand out as the most important 
to discuss:
• the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency;
• choice-of-law;
• discharge or enforcement of bankruptcy judgments;
• denationalized bankruptcy; and
• corporate groups.
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
Since the adoption of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, the most 
intense litigation has been with regard to recognition of a foreign proceeding as a 
main or non-main proceeding. A two-sided rule may be emerging: an insolvency 
proceeding will not receive recognition and assistance as a main proceeding, 
if it is brought in a jurisdiction with little or no economic relationship to the 
debtor, whereas a business that actually relocates its most important economic or 
administrative functions to a new jurisdiction may be allowed to enjoy whatever 
legal benefits that move might provide, if it then files for insolvency.
The Present and Future of Multinational Insolvency
* I am grateful to Jessica Bennett, Texas ‘09, for expert research assistance. I must claim any remaining errors.
** This is a re-edited version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 12 in B. Wessels and P. Omar 
(eds), The Intersection of Company and Insolvency Law (2009, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (111-125).
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The rule against recognition of proceedings from jurisdictions with minimum 
connections with the debtor is found in the In re Bear Stearns1 case from the 
United States and the Eurofood case2 from the European Court of Justice. 
Although the debtors in Bear were incorporated in the Cayman Islands, the court 
ruled that the Cayman proceedings could not be recognized as either main or 
non-main proceedings because the debtors had too little real contact with the 
islands for them to constitute the “centre of main interests” (“COMI”) and 
therefore the home of the primary insolvency proceedings. The court further ruled 
that naked incorporation was not enough even to permit recognition as a non-
main proceeding.3 In Eurofood, the European Court of Justice similarly stated 
that a “letter box” presence was insufficient to make a jurisdiction eligible for 
hosting a primary proceeding. Thus, it appears that remote jurisdictions will not 
be entitled to receive recognition under either the Model Law or the European 
Insolvency Regulation.
Recent articles have supported a “third way” process for recognition, beyond 
recognition as a main or non-main proceeding under the Model Law.4 Given 
that the fact that non-recognition as an insolvency proceeding merely precludes 
the granting of relief under the Model Law but does not preclude extension of 
cooperation short of that,5 it is not entirely clear what difficulty their authors seek 
to avoid.
On the other side of things, recent European decisions suggest that a company that 
actually relocates its principal office to another jurisdiction may thereby make that 
jurisdiction its COMI for a subsequent insolvency filing.6
1 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007).
2 Bondi v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.) [2006] ECR I-3813, at 18-19, ¶35, 2006 WL 1142304 
(ECJ 2 May 2006).
3 A similar result was reached by another Southern District judge. In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 
37, at 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2007): “In this case, genuine issues of material fact exist as to the location of Basis Yield’s 
COMI. While the Court does not in any way rule out the possibility that facts could be adduced at an evidentiary 
hearing sufficient to make a case for entitlement to recognition, the JPLs are not now entitled to recognition as a 
matter of law.”
4 A. Ranney-Marinelli, “Overview of Chapter 15 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases” (2008) 82 American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 269, at 303: “[A] third approach is to interpret §1509(f) broadly, permitting many 
types of relief to fall under the rubric of ‘collecting or recovering a claim which is property of the debtor,” so 
that Chapter 15 recognition is not required.”; D. Stromes, “The Extraterritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
Automatic Stay: Theory vs. Practice” (2007) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 277; J. Pottow, “The Myth 
(and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency” (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
785.
5 11 U.S.C. §§15, 25-27.
6 Official Receiver v. Eichler [2007] BPIR 1636, at [14], [16] (Ch. D.) (noting the right of a debtor to change his 
centre of main interests); Shierson v. Vlieland-Boddy [2005] EWCA Civ 974, at [55] (Ct. of App. Civ. Div.).
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Although the Model Law has been operating successfully in a number of countries,7 
it is disappointing that some jurisdictions, such as Germany8 and Spain,9 have 
recently reformed their laws without adopting the Model Law, resulting in only 
general provisions to guide their courts in cooperating with countries outside the 
“EU club”.
Choice-of-Law
Three elements in choice-of-law deserve special attention: the dichotomous 
analysis of insolvency and non-insolvency law; choice-of-law issues in application 
of the avoiding powers; and the interaction of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum.
Generally: Two Choices
The choice-of-law analysis in insolvency is two-sided. One part concerns the 
law that created and governed a contract or property right prior to bankruptcy 
(“non-insolvency law”), such as a counterparty’s entitlement to a contract claim 
against the insolvent business, while the other identifies the insolvency law that 
will govern its treatment in the insolvency proceeding, such as the enforceability 
of the contract claim and the fixing of the amount actually to be paid.
However, the cases often reflect a confusion of the two elements, as if the court 
believes that one law will govern both aspects of the claim. A classic example 
7 For United States Chapter 15 cases, see www.chapter15.com.
8 E. Braun, Commentary on the German Insolvency Code (2006, IDW-Verlag, Düsseldorf), at 69; N. Farid, “The 
Fate of Intellectual Property Assets in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings” (2008) 44 Gonzalo Law Review 
39; B. Wessels, “Mutual Trust, Comity, and Respect Among States in International Insolvency Matters”, Part II 
§ 1 ¶8 in W. Norton, Jr. and R. Lieb (eds), Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law (2005, Thomson West, New York 
NY); J. Greene, “Bankruptcy Beyond Borders: Recognizing Foreign Proceedings in Cross-Border Insolvencies” 
(2005) 30 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 685, at 724; C. Farley, “An Overview, Survey, and Critique 
of Administrating Cross-Border Insolvencies” (2004) 27 Houston Journal of International Law 181, at 206; 
A. Heidbrink, “The New German Rules on International Insolvency Law” (2003) 22(9) American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal 16; J. Goffman and E. Michael, “Cross Border Insolvencies: A Comparative Examination of 
Insolvency Laws of Industrialized Countries” (2003) 12 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 5, Art. 1.
9 J. Westbrook, “Chapter 15 At Last” (2005) 79 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 713, at 721: “The primary 
disappointment to date has been the failure of Germany and Spain to adopt the Model Law despite having enacted 
some new international provisions.”; but see E. Bruce Leonard, “The International Scene: The International 
Year in Review” (2003-2004) 22(10) American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 22, at 78: “Legislation also has 
been passed in Spain that is to become effective in 2004; it has international insolvency provisions that parallel, 
and in fact, may be more extensive than those in the model law, but that also reflect the EU Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings.”; A. Mechele Dickerson, “Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View 
from the Legal Academy: A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (2004) 53 Emory Law 
Journal 997, at 1041: “Only Mexico appears to have fully embraced and implemented principles contained in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in enacting domestic insolvency legislation [whereas]…Spain ha[s] adopted legislation 
that contains many of the principles of the Model Law.” The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) does not list Spain as an adopting country: www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
insolvency/1997Model_status.html.
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is the Lernout case in the United States and Belgium.10 The lower courts failed 
to see that two different choice-of-law questions were presented under the 
differing priority rules in the two countries: one of non-insolvency law and one 
of insolvency law.
Once an issue has been identified as governed by insolvency law, the next step 
is the identification of the applicable insolvency law. I suggest a general rule 
applying the law of the primary proceeding on a global basis, with exceptions for 
local claims of employees, suppliers, and tort claimants whose expectations of 
local law application should be vindicated.11
Avoidance (Paulian) Actions
Two considerations should dominate choice-of-law for avoidance: a realistic 
concern for predictability and the connection between avoidance and distribution.
Predictability is important where the substantial differences among national laws 
create expensive uncertainty in multinational transactions. On the other hand, there 
are real limits on the extent to which predictability is obtainable.12
The second element is the relationship between avoidance and distribution. All 
avoiding powers require a balance between two policy objectives. The avoidance 
of fraud and achievement of distribution equality among creditors of equal rank13 
10 Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. v. Stonington Partners, Inc., 268 B.R. 395 (D. Del. 2001), rev’d, 310 
F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2002), on remand In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V., 301 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2003). See J. Westbrook, “Universalism and Choice of Law” (2005) 23 Penn State International Law Review 625 
(discussing Lernout at length); J. Westbrook, “International Judicial Negotiation” (2003) 38 Texas International 
Law Journal 567 (referring to Lernout in footnotes); J. Pottow, “Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: 
The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to ‘Local Interests’” (2006) 104 Michigan Law Review 1899 (discussing 
Lernout); L. Salafia, “Cross-Border Insolvency in the United States and its Application to Multinational Corporate 
Groups” (2006) 21 Connecticut Journal of International Law 297, at 332 (discussing Lernout); K. Beckering, 
“United States Cross-Border Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal 
Environment” (2008) 14 Law and Business Review of America 281, at 308-309 (referring to Lernout in footnote); 
L. LoPucki, “Global and Out of Control?” (2005) 79 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 79, at 92 (discussing 
Lernout); J. Pottow, “Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy” (2005) 45 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 935 (2005) (discussing Lernout in footnotes).
11 As to choice of labour law, for example, see J. Westbrook, “Multinational Financial Distress: The Last Hurrah of 
Territorialism” (2006) 41 Texas International Law Journal 321, reviewing L. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How 
Competition for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (2005, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 
MI).
12 For example, in the COMI context, I have argued that “too exclusive a focus on predictability is…a mistake, 
especially if it leads to a rule that would choose legal ‘havens’ as COMIs.” J. Westbrook, “Locating the Eye of 
the Financial Storm” (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1019, at 1028.
13 This factor is further supported in some countries, like the United States, by a desire to provide comfort to 
creditors in a workout situation that an effort by other creditors to steal a march during negotiations will be set 
aside if an insolvency proceeding is brought. Thus the avoiding powers can serve as an important support for a 
stand still agreement, especially if not all creditors have agreed.
5must be balanced against the threat every avoidance poses to the stability of 
commercial transactions.14
Given countries’ differing avoidance policies and distribution priorities, the 
choice of applicable avoidance law should depend on which proceeding will be 
distributing the proceeds of an avoidance recovery.15 In a universalist system, that 
will mean the primary proceeding. In a territorialist system, that will mean each 
country that opens a proceeding and permits an attack on the transaction.16 Some 
might propose a middle solution where the choice-of-law rule would be the situs 
of the transaction. However, even if one can identify the place of the transaction, 
in many cases the situs chosen by the parties would be a law that would not 
permit avoidance.
The Interaction Between Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum
Finally, the HIH case exemplifies the third key to choice-of-law decisions.17 HIH, 
an Australian company with substantial assets in the United Kingdom, entered 
insolvency proceedings in Australia. A provisional liquidation was opened in 
England. The two jurisdictions had different priority rules.18 The lower courts 
decided they were bound by the English priority rules and therefore could not 
release the assets to Australia. The House of Lords held the assets could be 
released, but sharply split as to the rationale for the result.
The Australian court’s request enjoyed the benefit of the United Kingdom 
Insolvency Act 1986,19 which permits English courts to cooperate fully with 
courts from countries like Australia designated by the government under section 
426. On that basis, two of the five judges resolved the problem by holding that 
section 426 permitted them to choose to apply Australian law. However, Lord 
Hoffmann and another judge adopted a choice-of-forum approach, holding that 
English common law permitted the English court to act in an ancillary role and to 
turn over assets to the primary court as part of a long-standing commitment to a 
universalist approach, quite apart from the impact of section 426. The fifth judge 
14 The adverse effect on other commercial transactions is no doubt lower in avoiding a transaction that is fraudulent 
in fact, because parties know that such transactions are legally vulnerable.
15 J. Westbrook, “Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions in Multinational Bankruptcy Cases” (2007) 42 Texas 
International Law Journal 899.
16 One of the numerous difficulties with a territorialist system is that the transaction might be attacked by liquidators 
from several jurisdictions with plausible connections to the transaction, resulting in inconsistent results and 
perhaps multiple recoveries.
17 McGrath v. Riddell [2008] UKHL 21 (“HIH”).
18 Ibid., at [51].
19 Section 14, Insolvency Act 2000 (c. 39) (United Kingdom); section 426, Insolvency Act 1986 (c. 45) (United 
Kingdom).
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accepted section 426 as resolving the issue in the case, but did not take a position 
as to the universalism theory. Thus, in a case from a jurisdiction not covered by 
section 426 (for example, the United States) the vote of this panel would be two 
no, two yes, and one unknown.
Discharge and Enforcement
The effect of discharge becomes important in corporate cases where the 
effectiveness of a reorganization plan or scheme is dependent upon the recognition 
and enforcement of the court orders approving the plan by the courts in other 
jurisdictions.
According to the Principles adopted in the Transnational Insolvency Project of 
the American Law Institute (“ALI”),20 a party should be bound by the plan if it 
asserts a claim, if it otherwise seeks to benefit from a reorganization proceeding or 
to influence its outcome,21 or if it accepts payment under the plan.22 Furthermore, 
a judgment should be binding if the court had proper international jurisdiction 
and the claimant had notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.23 Otherwise, a 
reorganization plan should have no binding effect for a creditor that did not have 
sufficient connection with the jurisdiction approving the plan to justify jurisdiction 
in an ordinary civil suit involving the same or a closely related subject matter.
An example of discharge issues in multinational reorganizations is found in the 
cases where British insurance companies used the administration procedure in 
Britain to “run off” insurance obligations. Because these run offs often affect 
a large number of United States policyholders, these companies have come to 
20 American Law Institute, Principles of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (2003, ALI, Philadelphia PA), 
at 86-88 (“Principles”).
21 Ibid., at 84: “The key to reorganization law in each of the three NAFTA countries is the ability to bind interested 
parties to an agreed and approved plan. Not only must those who have agreed to be held to their agreement, 
but dissenters who have been outvoted by the legally required majorities must also be bound.”; American 
Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law: Foreign Judgments and Awards (1987, ALI, 
Philadelphia PA), at §481: “[A] final judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum 
of money, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining interests in property, is conclusive 
between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States.”; American Law Institute, 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: Recognition of Foreign Nation Judgments (1971, ALI, Philadelphia 
PA), at §98: “Judgments rendered in a foreign nation…will be accorded the same degree of recognition to which 
sister State judgments are entitled. This is because the public interest requires that there be an end of litigation.” 
See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). A foreign nation judgment 
will be recognized in the American court where “there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before 
a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895); C. A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure (4th ed) (2008, Thomson Reuters, New York NY), at §4404: “A res judicata ruling by 
a court in another country also commands respect as itself res judicata, although without the compulsion of full 
faith and credit or federal supremacy.”
22 Principles, above note 20, at 88 (specifically, illustration 2).
23 Idem (specifically, Procedural Principle 27).
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Despite a cogent attack on these schemes, at least four cases have already approved 
them under Chapter 15.25
Denationalized Insolvency Proceedings
A “denationalized” insolvency may result where a forum court has two 
characteristics: it is prepared to accept an insolvency filing from a corporation that 
has only a limited connection with the forum jurisdiction and it applies its own 
insolvency law to all insolvency issues.
Jurisdictions possessing these legal characteristics could attract filings, and the 
accompanying fees, by adopting insolvency laws pleasing to the debtors that decide 
where to file the proceedings.26 The result may be a “denationalized” bankruptcy 
that is not governed by the laws of any jurisdiction that has a real connection to the 
debtor and its creditors and that has been biased in favour of the debtor.
Two related lines of cases in the United States may influence the future of 
denaturalized proceedings, even though the United States is not itself a “haven” 
jurisdiction. One line permits the filing of cases in the United States purporting to 
affect assets worldwide even where the United States is not the COMI of the debtor. 
The second line refuses recognition to proceedings that do not qualify as main or 
24 See generally, S. Johnston, “Why U.S. Courts Should Deny or Severely Condition Recognition to Schemes of 
Arrangement for Solvent Insurance Companies” (2007) 16 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 6, Art. 2, 1.
25 See Lion City Run-Off Private Limited, Case No. 06-B-10461 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 13 April 2006); In re Gordian 
Run-Off (UK) Ltd., Case No. 06-11563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 28 August 2006); In re Europaische Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft in Zurich (European Reinsurance Company of Zurich), Case No. 06-13061 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 22 
January 2007); In re Lloyd, No. 05-60100, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2794 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 7 December 2005).
26 Professor LoPucki has argued strongly that a similar sort of management-favouring forum shopping has been 
rampant within the United States. LoPucki, above note 11, at 16: “Beginning in 1990, the bankruptcy forum 
shopping produced an unexpected dynamic…within six years, nearly 90 percent of all large public companies 
filing bankruptcy in the United States filed in Delaware.” While in my view Professor LoPucki’s rhetoric has gone 
too far, I have little doubt he is correct that a system that permits the parties great flexibility to choose the forum 
of an insolvency case will lead inevitably to selector-favourable legal rules, because the attraction of insolvency 
cases is a large economic incentive that legislators and judges are unlikely to resist, consciously or unconsciously. 
Attracting a really large case—say taking Enron from Texas to New York—is like getting a new Honda plant. 
See generally, In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (deciding to maintain venue in New York, not 
Texas). The professional fees in Enron have approached $1 billion and the case is not finished. B. Wysocki Jr., 
“Rising Fees Charged in Bankruptcy Cases Elicit a Backlash” (Wall Street Journal, 4 August 2007), at B1; M. 
Pacelle, “Enron Bankruptcy is Fee Bonanza—Lawyers’ Laundry and Bar Tabs Among $280 Million in Charges” 
(Wall Street Journal, 11 December 2002), at C1. Of course, certain powerful creditors may have effective control 
of management and may be the venue choosers, but in that case their interests and those of management will 
often coincide. See generally, H. Hu and J. Westbrook, “Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors” (2007) 107 
Columbia Law Review 1321, at 1372: “Under current bankruptcy law, the management of the debtor corporation 
in Chapter 11 controls the proceeding. If other parties – for example, secured creditors – control management, 
then they effectively control the corporation’s reorganization proceeding through management.”
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non-main under the Model Law, Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
The two lines of cases seem to be in some conflict.
The first line of cases includes two different types of situations. One type, typified 
by In re Cenargo,27 presents no substantial contacts with the United States except 
the presence of assets within its territorial boundaries. In Cenargo, the debtor 
filed Chapter 11 in the United States just before its creditors filed in the United 
Kingdom, the debtor’s home country. Although the judges in the two jurisdictions 
sorted out the matter, the United States court did claim worldwide jurisdiction on 
the basis of the debtor’s minimum contacts with the United States.28
The second type of case is In re Avianca,29 where the principal Colombian airline 
filed for a Chapter 11 reorganization in New York. The court refused dismissal 
sought by the aircraft lessors, arguing that the United States had a better law for 
the case than Columbia because the United States law would give the debtor more 
bargaining power with the lessors by not permitting “rejection” of the leases. 
Colombia’s legislature had recently adopted a new insolvency law and apparently 
decided not to advantage debtors in the relevant respects. The United States 
court’s ruling effectively overrode that decision. The United States case had a 
much stronger connection to the debtor in Avianca than in Cenargo. Nonetheless, 
Avianca was not a “main” proceeding in the sense used in the Model Law, yet the 
court approved a plan with global effect.
The other line of cases is lead by In re Bear Sterns.30 Most observers agree that 
these cases have established a rule that the United States will not recognize 
minimum-contact cases under Chapter 15. Insofar as a non-main proceeding 
is recognized, Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, enacting the 
Model Law, would permit relief only as to assets closely related to the non-main 
jurisdiction, rather than giving that court’s rulings global effect.31 It would seem 
anomalous that the United States would exercise global jurisdiction in either type 
of case when it would not recognize such jurisdiction exercised by other courts. 
27 In re Cenargo International, PLC, 294 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2003).
28 See also In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005), which upheld Cenargo-like technical 
jurisdiction, but was dismissed on the grounds of prudence rather than traditional bases like forum non conveniens 
or abstention.
29 In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. (In re Avianca), 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). My analysis of 
this case first appeared in M. Monti et al. (eds), Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation: Festschrift 
for Carl Baudenbacher (2007, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden), at 777.
30 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
31 Bankruptcy Code, §1521(c).
9However, the United States courts should take jurisdiction of either type of case 
where there is no other proceeding pending for the limited purpose of seizing and 
realizing upon United States assets for the benefit of creditors.32
Corporate Groups and the UNCITRAL Project
Great difficulties arise from the fact that most multinationals do business through 
subsidiaries incorporated, headquartered, and operating in many different 
jurisdictions.33 From the largest perspective, it is not justifiable either to ignore the 
corporate form or to treat these entities as entirely separate.
No jurisdiction has very good answers in their own domestic laws to the host 
of questions created by corporate groups, and therefore it is best to focus on the 
specifically international aspects of the problems.34 Solely for the purposes of 
international recognition and cooperation, it is possible to define a corporate group 
on a “one-way” basis, which describes a certain set of corporate relationships as 
a corporate group and identifies the parent in that group without attempting to 
resolve other situations that are less common or more controversial.
For example, we could define a parent corporation as one having an ownership 
interest when it legally controls the selection of the company’s board of directors. 
We could use that definition to define a corporate group. We could then adopt a 
limited set of rules for that instance. For example, where a parent of a corporate 
group files in the parent’s COMI jurisdiction, that jurisdiction could be the COMI 
for the whole group, as defined.
An approach like this would not address all instances but would act as the 
same sort of first-step approach as was taken with the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency.
II - The Future of Insolvency: Public or Private?
Insolvency law is nearing a global crossroads in determining whether proceedings 
will be primarily public or primarily private. While some advocate adoption of 
“contractualist bankruptcy,” which would permit parties to contract in advance 
32 J. Westbrook, “Multinational Insolvency: A First Analysis of Unilateral Jurisdiction”, in W. Norton, Jr. and R. 
Lieb (eds), 2008 Norton Annual Review of International Insolvency (2009, Thomson West, New York NY).
33 P. Blumberg et al., Blumberg on Corporate Groups (2nd ed, Supp. 2007) (2007, Aspen Publishers, Waltham 
MA), at §1.01.
34 A substantial caveat to that conclusion is that UNCITRAL Working Group V is working hard on suggestions 
for domestic reform, as well as international cooperation: www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/5Insolvency.html.
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for a legal scheme managing any future general default,35 others contend that 
public control is necessary both to protect important public interests implicated in 
a general default and to correct market failures.36
Legal systems around the world present these two choices. The United Kingdom 
and many common law countries have operated the insolvency system largely 
as a private one, with little or no attention to a public or third party interest. On 
the other hand, most civil law systems, such as the French system, have treated 
financial distress as implicating public and third party interests. While the rights 
of creditors were taken seriously in these systems, they were often subordinate to 
a number of other concerns.37
The United States system has been somewhere in between. While secured credit 
law in the United States has had greater scope and given more control to the 
secured party than in the French system, United States bankruptcy law has exerted 
strong control over the exercise of the secured party’s rights.
The Contractualist Position
A number of scholars have argued for privatizing the insolvency laws by 
proposing ex ante contractual arrangements.38 For example, Professor Robert 
Rasmussen proposed a “bankruptcy [insolvency] menu” consisting of a series of 
standard schemes for default management, where a firm picks a set of provisions 
it thinks best. The choice could not be changed without the agreement of all 
creditors, with some exceptions such as for involuntary creditors.39
35 See, e.g., D. Baird and R. Rasmussen, “The End of Bankruptcy” (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 751, at 754-55.
36 See, e.g., E. Warren, “Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World” (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 336; 
E. Warren and J. Westbrook, “Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention” (2005) 118 Harvard 
Law Review 1197; J. Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest, Restructuring Insolvent Corporations (2003, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto).
37 R. Blazy et al., “Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?” (2007) 
CREFI-LSF Research Working Paper, no. 0702, copy available at: ssrn.com/abstract=1116681.
38 See, e.g., R. Rasmussen, “Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy” (1992) 71 Texas Law 
Review 1.
39 For voluntary creditors, he argues as follows: “This problem is easily remedied. It is beyond peradventure that 
mandatory rules can be justified as protecting third parties. It is clear that non-consensual creditors need such 
protection. They do not, however, need the protection of a mandatory bankruptcy regime. The question of the 
appropriate treatment of non-consensual claimants when a firm is insolvent is the subject of a rich literature. 
This Article does not, and need not, enter this debate. Rather, once policymakers decide the optimal treatment of 
non-consensual creditors, this treatment should be unalterable by any debt contract. In other words, the priority 
status of tort claimants should not depend on which bankruptcy option a firm selects. Thus, a bankruptcy regime 
consisting primarily of default rules can readily accommodate the existence of non-consensual claimants.” Ibid., 
at 66-67.
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Professor Alan Schwartz proposes an insolvency contract that will pay management 
to choose the right alternative, because he believes “private” benefits to those 
controlling the firm acts as the main obstacle to efficient default management.40 
Other scholars, such as Professor Tracht,41 are content to leave insolvency law as it 
is, but want to give debtor and creditor freedom to waive the legal rules in advance.
Developments in the United States
The trend toward privatization of insolvency in the United States has three 
main  components:
• the increase in dominant security interests, granted after a company has 
become financially distressed;
• broad exemptions from bankruptcy for unregulated financial institutions; and
• the increasing use of privately appointed insolvency trustees.
The Rise of Secured Party Control of Chapter 11
Creditors have increased their control of United States reorganization cases 
through dominant security interests. In many cases the “bankruptcy veto” has 
transformed DIP control into secured party control. Because Chapter 11 may be 
used for liquidation and most companies file for Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7, 
the secured party controls both liquidations and reorganizations.
This development differs from the traditional common law practice and from the 
contractualists’ theories because the dominant security interest is granted after 
the company is in financial distress, often by larger businesses that had resisted 
granting broad security rights prior to their financial distress. Because the secured 
party will control any subsequent liquidation or reorganization, the grant of the 
dominant security interest is, in effect, a private bankruptcy.
40 This approach has been called a “bribe” to management. Note that this sort of solution is necessary, because 
these authors want to avoid any public official from making any important decisions in these matters, so that right 
conduct must be “incentivized”—that is, bought—rather than prescribed.
41 M. Tracht, “Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law” (1997) 82 Cornell Law 
Review 301. See also S. Schwarcz, “Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm” (1999) 77 Texas 
Law Review 515, at 517-18, explaining that scholars are debating not only whether debtors should be allowed to 
waive bankruptcy protections “but also whether parties should be allowed to contract for bankruptcy procedures 
that are different from those supplied by the state.”
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So far, there is no theory supporting the economic benefit of these post-distress 
security interests.42 Although post-distress priority permits financing that enables 
an out-of-court settlement, opaque resolution is not necessarily preferable in this 
age of greater financial transparency. Furthermore, one of the principal theoretical 
justifications for security interests is that they make default results predictable, thus 
lowering transaction costs. Yet post-default security interests make pre-distress 
credit extension by other creditors substantially riskier, because at any future time 
a secured creditor might obtain a priority over the pre-existing debt.
The Exemption of Financial Assets from Insolvency Proceedings
A second element of privatization in the United States has come from the recent 
expansion of an exemption from insolvency of certain types of financial assets, 
making insolvency proceedings irrelevant for quasi-financial companies whose 
balance sheets consist mostly of such assets. Because the moratorium of bankruptcy 
does not apply to these assets, the counterparties to the transactions represented 
by these assets may walk away with their value, leaving nothing for an insolvency 
administrator to administer.43
Privately Appointed Administrators 
“Turnaround managers” and “Chief Reorganization Officers” are privately 
appointed, often by influential insiders, even though they perform the duties of 
a publicly appointed insolvency administrator.44 It is not clear why the choice of 
an administrator to take over a struggling business should be made in the dark by 
insiders who have their own interests at stake in the proceeding.45
42 The theoretical justifications for security interests have focused on ex ante, pre-distress lowering of transaction 
costs and the development of long-term relationships with lenders. See J. Westbrook, “The Control of Wealth in 
Bankruptcy” (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 795, at 841-42; R. Scott, “A Relational Theory of Secured Financing” 
(1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 901, at 917-19.
43 Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan’s, and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Working?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Comm. and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of J. 
Westbrook, Professor, University of Texas School of Law).
44 One duty that is arguably neglected is that of investigation of pre-insolvency wrongdoing by insiders.
45 Although these appointments must be approved by the bankruptcy judge, they are presented as a change in the 
management of the DIP, so the tradition of DIP control in Chapter 11 leaves most courts prepared to accept any 
qualified person presented by the “DIP”. The nominee generally being highly qualified as a technical matter, 
there is little consideration of the source of his or her appointment. One of the abiding theoretical weaknesses 
of United States bankruptcy scholarship is the failure to figure out who this DIP entity really is and under what 
circumstances the DIP right to control has ceased to have a rationale.
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International Developments
Because dominant security interests are the key to privatization of insolvency, 
the international context seems more daunting for the contractualists than the 
United States domestic market. So far, secured credit law remains quite parochial, 
although substantial efforts are underway to make some security interests 
enforceable internationally.46
The Public Interest
These moves toward privatization implicitly assume that no great public interest is 
at stake in insolvency cases, beyond providing a mechanism for enforcing private 
rights. In general, free-market societies vary greatly as to what sorts of contract 
and property rights will be enforced, while adhering to the overall theme of party 
autonomy. On the other hand, insolvency law has been an area where mandatory 
rules exist in every jurisdiction, reflecting public interests that are seen to transcend 
bargains between private parties. In the case of private contracts overriding public 
insolvency rules, these externalities may be divided into two categories: effects on 
identifiable third parties and effects on society at large.
Third-Party Effects
An insolvency affects three categories of identifiable third parties: employees and 
suppliers, involuntary creditors, and quasi-involuntary creditors.
Employees and Suppliers
Employees have two distinct interests in their employer’s financial crisis, as 
creditors and as jobholders. Virtually all insolvency systems give some priority 
to employees as creditors whereas some insolvency systems give employees 
sufficient influence over the reorganization process that they may be able to protect 
their interests as jobholders.
In many systems, suppliers are given a priority as creditors through the device of 
a vendor’s lien, but they rarely have rights as to their interests in preserving an 
on-going customer.
46 A. Veneziano, “Uniform Law on Secured Transactions and Insolvency: The Approach of the Cape Town 
Convention and of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions”, in C. Andersen and U. 
Schroeter (eds), Sharing International Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert 
H. Kritzer (2008, Wildy, Simmonds and Hill, London), at 527. See www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
working_groups/6Security_Interests.html.
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Involuntary Creditors
The two most prominent types of involuntary creditors are tort victims and 
taxing authorities.
Virtually all commentators in the United States agree that tort creditors should be 
protected, although those committed to contractualism are more likely to believe 
the protection should come in some scheme outside the insolvency system with 
no effect on recoveries within that system.47 However, in almost all countries tort 
victims have been given no special priority in insolvency.48
Although taxing authorities have been far more successful than tort claimants 
in gaining priority treatment, there has been a recent retreat from granting tax 
priorities.49 Yet the public purse is an involuntary creditor that has no opportunity 
to bargain for its built-in extension of credit and failure to replenish the treasury 
has important ramifications for public policy.50
Quasi-Involuntary Creditors
Some creditors, such as public utilities and landlords, have a relationship with the 
debtor that is not entirely involuntary, but is so constrained by law and circumstance 
that they may be considered to fall into the category quasi-involuntary.51
47 Whether the notion that tort issues should be ignored in insolvency debates is sensible is a subject for another 
day. Suffice to say here that there are substantial objections to that notion, including the fact that the problem 
of fixing compensation for tort victims is fully resolved in tort law in most countries. It is precisely in the case 
of insolvency that the victims face the risk of non-payment, so it seems odd to think the solution to that risk lies 
somewhere outside the insolvency system.
48 Professor LoPucki proposed some years ago that tort victims be given a priority over secured parties. L.M. 
LoPucki, “The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1887, at 1896, crediting B. Adler, 
D. Leebron, M. Roe, C. Painter, R. Rasmussen and P. Shupack with writing on the subject of tort creditors’ 
priority over secured creditors. The idea was that a secured party would be careful to ensure that the debtor 
maintained adequate insurance to the benefit of all concerned. Idem, at 1906-1907. This idea was so sensible and 
fair that it has been completely ignored.
49 Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2007 (H.R. 3652): Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Comm. and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 61 (2008) (testimony of B. 
Ceccotti) (One lawyer testified that “while it may be appealing to say ‘we are giving a greater priority to employee 
benefit claims,’ it is important to keep in mind that by doing so, you are likely to be diminishing the recovery of other 
types of creditors, such as taxing authorities.”); M. Balz, “Equity Auctions and a New Concept of Priority: Two 
Bankruptcy Reform Proposals” (1 March 2001), available at: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264511 
(discussing the overall inefficiencies of granting priorities to certain creditors, including taxing authorities, as well 
its inconsistency with the notion of creditor equality); I. Fletcher, “UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments – 
Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements – The Insolvency 
Act 2000, The White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002” (2004) 5 European Business Organisation Law 
Review 148: “Section 251 [of the Enterprise Act] achieves a significant reform of the treatment of company assets in 
insolvency by eliminating the preferential status formerly conferred on Crown debts.”
50 E. Warren and J. Westbrook, “Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention” (2005) 118 Harvard 
Law Review 1197. Note that in most countries taxing authorities are granted special powers of collection under 
non-insolvency law.
51 Ibid., at 1216.
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Societal Interests
There seem to be three sorts of societal interests in insolvency cases separate from 
the interests of identifiable parties: effects on sectors of society; social process; and 
the risk of systemic economic crises.
Effects on Sectors of Society
Although rarely reflected in legislation, major justifications for reorganization 
rather than liquidation include protection of employment and the substantial 
interest communities have in the stability created by long-established economic 
activity.52 There are also certain sectors of private activity that have a strong 
direct connection to larger interests, as with financially distressed nursing homes 
and utilities.
Social Processes
In recent years there has been a powerful worldwide trend toward greater 
transparency in economic activity.53 Transparency in insolvency matters has 
several benefits, including the following:
52 E. Warren, “Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World” (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 336; J. Sarra, 
above note 36.
53 B. Biais et al., “European Corporate Bond Markets: transparency, liquidity, efficiency”, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (May 2006), copy available at: www.cepr.org/PRESS/TT_CorporateFULL.pdf (discusses 
the consequences and desirability of transparency in the European bond market.); P. Dunne et al., “European 
Government Bond Markets: transparency, liquidity, efficiency”, Centre for Economic Policy Research (May 
2006), copy available at: www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/TT%20GovernmentFULL.pdf (states that 
“transparency is a key attribute of a typical financial market.”); P. Geraats, “ECB Credibility and Transparency”, 
European and Financial Affairs (June 2008), copy available at: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publiations/
publication_summary12716_en.htm (argues that ECB credibility will be enhanced by embracing greater 
transparency about the ECB’s objectives, macroeconomic forecasts and decision-making.); European Commission: 
European Economy, Public Finances in EMU – 2008 (2008), copy available at: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/publication12832_en.pdf (transparency of budgetary projections is the ultimate goal for Member 
States of the European Commission.); European Commission: European Economy, Public Finances in EMU 
– 2007 (2007), copy available at: ec.europe.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication338_en.pdf (includes 
a budget transparency index and states that there has been a focus on results and budget transparency in OECD 
member countries.); Financial Stability Forum, “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market 
and Institutional Resilience” (April 2008), copy available at: www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf (analyzes 
the importance of transparency in increasing the resilience of markets and institutions.); U. Dadush and J. 
Nelson, “Governing Global Trade”, Finance & Development (December 2007), copy available at: www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/12/dadush.htm (credits the trading system’s transparency as one reason amongst 
others that the multilateral trade system is succeeding worldwide); D. Burton and A. Zanello, “Asia Ten Years 
After”, Finance & Development (June 2007), copy available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/06/
burton.htm (briefly mentions that the IMF has been involved in transparency initiatives throughout Asia); A. 
Eftimie and M. Stanley, “Pioneering New Approaches in Support of Sustainable Development in the Extractive 
Sector: Background Paper on Government Tools for Sector Sustainability” (December 2005), copy available 
at: www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/04/28/000090341_2006042
8104852/Rendered/PDF/359430Governme1d0to0ESM31001PUBLIC1.pdf (describes the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative which requires transparency in revenues from mining companies in Africa).
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• Improvement of public understanding of economic changes that often 
substantially disrupt the lives of people and communities;
• Reduction of corruption through institutional arrangements that provide 
independent scrutiny of the process;54
• Providing incentives for the major actors to act in socially responsible ways 
because of reputational concerns;
• Protection against political pressures, especially concerning necessary but 
unpopular economic decisions.
Systemic Crises
Financial distress may arise in two different contexts, “ordinary course” 
insolvency and systemic financial crisis. It may be necessary to provide distinct 
standards and processes for each context. Ordinary course insolvencies that come 
along in a stable and growing economy present a different balance of private and 
public interests than does a systemic crisis. In the latter case, the public interest 
becomes much more important, government involvement may be necessary as 
well as inevitable, and creditor interests may in some respects take a back seat to 
larger concerns.55 Recent economic difficulties may carry forward more focus on 
systemic crises and the public interest in insolvency proceedings.
54 For example, this element is provided in the United States by the United States Trustee system. 28 U.S.C. §581(a) 
(Oct. 27, 1986) (Duties of United States Trustee). See A. Resnick and H. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy (15th 
ed, revised 2008) (2008, LexisNexis, Dayton OH), in App. Pt. 4(d), at 95-98, 108-109, explaining that the creation 
of the United States trustee “will eliminate the cronyism that exists in many parts of the country in the appointment 
of trustees by bankruptcy judges” and “will go far toward reducing the appearance of the bankruptcy system as 
run by a ‘bankruptcy ring’.” See D. Skeel, Jr., Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (2001, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ), at 76.
55 J. Westbrook, “Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective”, in S. Claessens et al. (eds), Resolution of 
Financial Distress (2001, World Bank Institute, Washington DC).
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Chapter 2
New World and Old World: 
Symphony or Cacophony?
Gabriel Moss QC
Introduction
The concept of “centre of main interests”, or “COMI” as it is known even in 
non-English speaking countries, is perhaps the most important undefined central 
concept in European or international insolvency law.
The Virgos-Schmit Report tells us that:
“The concept of “centre of main interests” must be interpreted as the 
place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interest on 
a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”
The Virgos-Schmit Report was, of course, going to be the explanatory report on 
the draft convention which failed to come into effect. Nevertheless very similar 
words were incorporated into the Recitals to the European Insolvency Regulation 
(“EIR”) as Recital 13:
“The “centre of main interests” should correspond to the place where 
the debtor conducts the administration of his interest on a regular 
basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”
It is unlikely that any great difference was meant to be introduced by replacing 
“must” in paragraph 75 of the Virgos-Schmit Report with “should” in Recital 13 
to the EIR.
As previously explored in the case law, Recital 13 has simply lifted the introductory 
sub-paragraph of paragraph 75 of the Virgos-Schmit Report and the paragraph 
needs to be read as a whole.
Much of the national case law is well known and I will not go over it all again, but 
will simply take as my starting point recent cases which hopefully give us some 
clarity as to where we are in Europe. I will then contrast the position with the way 
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in which the concept of COMI has been interpreted under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in the United States and England.
The Current Position in European Case Law
Before dealing with the case law itself, it is important to establish the function 
of COMI in the EIR. The primary function of COMI is to establish international 
jurisdiction as between Member States of the European Union (except Denmark, 
which will not be mentioned again) to open main proceedings under Article 3(1). 
That is the direct function of COMI. However, there is also a critical indirect 
function in that a judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by 
a court of a Member State, which has jurisdiction under Article 3, has to be 
recognised in all other Member States under Article 16. Thus, the presence of 
COMI in one Member State, and the opening of main proceedings on that basis, is 
required to be recognised throughout the European Union.
Furthermore, under Article 17, the opening of a main proceeding pursuant to the 
presence of COMI in a Member State, produces the same effects in any other 
Member State as it does under the law of the State of the opening, subject to the 
exceptions set out in the EIR and as long as no proceedings under Article 3(2), i.e. 
territorial proceedings, are opened in that other Member State.
In addition, the liquidator appointed by a court which has jurisdiction under 
Article 3(1), i.e. on the basis of the presence of COMI, may exercise all the powers 
conferred on him by the law of the State of opening in any other Member State, 
subject to certain restrictions set out in Article 18 and elsewhere in the EIR.
Accordingly, as far as the EIR is concerned, COMI has a primary direct function 
of allocating international jurisdiction within the European Union as between 
different Member States, but also has a critical indirect function of providing the 
platform for main proceedings whose effects operate directly in other Member 
States and whose liquidator can exercise his powers in those other Member States, 
subject to the restrictions and exceptions set out in the EIR.
By a contrast, in the scheme of the UNCITRAL Model Law, COMI is not used, 
directly at least, to allocate international jurisdiction but has the function of 
providing a basis for recognition of foreign proceedings as main proceedings. 
The indirect effect here is that if one is planning upon one’s proceedings being 
recognised as a main proceeding under the Model Law, then one needs to ensure 
that the proceeding will be commenced in the place where COMI is located. 
Moreover, as a matter of planning, if COMI is not located in the jurisdiction where 
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a main proceeding is designed to take place, there may well be an opportunity to 
move COMI to that place before the opening.
The Interpretation of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)
The Eurofood case1 is rather too well known to require elaboration but, in the 
context of the other case law, it is important to note what it does and does not 
decide. Eurofood concerned a group of companies in the Parmalat Group and it 
emphasises the fact, which is clear from the wording and approach of the EIR, 
that each company in a group has to be looked at separately for the purposes of 
assessing COMI.
The only specific points of interpretation that the ECJ lays down in Eurofood are 
that facts which are sought to be used to displace the presumption based on the 
place of registered office have to be objective and, secondly, that they have to be 
ascertainable by third parties. Neither proposition was really in any doubt.
Specifically, in relation to the questions put to the ECJ in that case, the ECJ points 
out that the fact that the economic policy of a subsidiary is dictated by the parent 
does not mean that the COMI of the subsidiary located in the place of the COMI 
of the parent. Again, nothing really controversial there.
Although there is little specific guidance in the judgment as to when the COMI of 
a subsidiary will be held to be in the same place as its parent, one example given 
is that of a company which carries out no business in the place of registration.
It is important to note that the ECJ decision itself does not expressly say anything 
about the “head office functions” test. Again, the case law on this test is long 
standing, detailed and has been written about a great deal, so I will only deal with 
some recent cases. Before going to those, it is, however, necessary to remember 
that the “head office functions” test or approach was expressly endorsed by the 
Advocate-General in his Opinion2 at paragraphs 111-112.
Before leaving the ECJ, it also needs to be mentioned that outside the European 
Union, and in particular in the United States, there appears to be a widespread, 
although perhaps understandable, misunderstanding as to its role and as to the 
nature of its judgments. In particular, we need to emphasise that the ECJ does 
not hear appeals in EIR cases like Eurofood: it simply decides preliminary issues 
* This is a re-edited version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 10 in B. Wessels and P. Omar 
(eds), The European Insolvency Regulation: An Update (2010, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (145-165).
1 Eurofood IFSC Ltd (Case C–341/04) [2006] BCC 397.
2 [2005] BCC 1021.
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which are put to them by the final Court of Appeal of a Member State. Since the 
ECJ has to answer preliminary issues, it is very largely dependent on which issues 
are put to them by which courts and how the questions are framed.
Thus, in the Eurofood case, of the two rival sets of proceedings in Ireland and Italy, 
the shorter appellate structure and the relative speed of progress of Irish case law 
meant that the reference to the ECJ from Ireland long preceded any opportunity 
to make a similar reference from Italy. As a result, the ECJ ended up answering 
questions put by the Irish Supreme Court from the Irish point of view and very 
much designed to supply the answers which the Irish courts desired in order to 
protect their special tax privileges in relation to companies such as Eurofood. In 
particular, no question was asked about the “head office functions” test or about 
the rather nominal nature of Eurofood, given that it had no office or employees of 
its own and no business other than raising money for the Italian parent.
My understanding is that the ECJ, even though, strictly speaking, limited to the 
questions they are asked, can in practice give more comprehensive and helpful 
answers and can embarrass the requesting court by pointing out that the questions 
are somewhat loaded. It is a pity that this opportunity was not taken in the 
Eurofood case.
Despite the limitations of the process, the rulings in Eurofood in relation to COMI 
are binding throughout the European Union and have to be followed in national 
courts. Given that there was nothing new, surprising or really controversial about 
the very limited points decided by the ECJ in relation to COMI, it cannot be 
a surprise that the national courts have generally speaking continued with the 
previous case law, applying the head office function test, but ensuring that any 
factors used to rebut the presumption based on the location of the registered office 
are objective and ascertainable by third parties.
Re Lennox Holdings Plc3
This was another case of a group of companies. The holding company, Lennox, 
was listed on the Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”) in London and supplied 
food products to British people in Spain. It is well known that some British people 
preferred to eat unhealthy English food soaked in animal fat and containing large 
quantities of added sugar rather than eat the healthy Mediterranean diet to be found 
in Spain. Nevertheless the group had gotten into financial difficulties and Lennox’s 
shares were suspended on the AIM.
3 [2009] BCC 155.
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Lennox had a number of subsidiaries, including two companies which had their 
registered office in Spain. The issue arose as to whether the English court had 
jurisdiction in relation to Spanish registered companies to open administration 
proceedings as main proceedings. Mr Justice Lewison held that it had.
In doing so the judge applied the “head office functions” test as approved by 
the Advocate-General in his Opinion4 in the Eurofood case at paragraphs 111 
and 112.
Mr Justice Lewison also, unfortunately, quoted paragraph 113 of the Advocate-
General’s Opinion, in which he accepted a submission which I had put to the 
ECJ that “ascertainability by third parties” was not central to the concept of 
“centre of main interests”, since the terms of Recital 13 show that it is because 
the Corporation’s head office functions are exercised in a particular Member 
State that the centre of main interests is ascertainable there. Of course, if this 
is properly understood, it simply points out that the focus is on where the head 
office functions are exercised but does not deny the need for ascertainability by 
third parties. It simply emphasises the fact that ascertainability arises from the 
exercise of such functions in a particular place, i.e. in a way in which they can be 
ascertained and not for example covertly.
Mr Justice Lewison then cited the parts of the ECJ decision itself,5 which laid 
down that the presumption based on the location of the registered office could 
only be rebutted if factors which were both objective and ascertainable by third 
parties enabled it to be established that an actual situation exists which is different 
from the registered office.6 Mr Justice Lewison cited the example of the “letter 
box” company mentioned not carrying on business in the territory where the 
registered office is situated at paragraph 35. He also mentions the ruling that, 
where a company does carry on business in the territory of the Member State 
where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that its economic choices are 
or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not enough 
to rebut the presumption.7
At paragraph 9 of his own judgment, Mr Justice Lewison states that the two 
examples given by the ECJ are at two opposite and extreme ends of the spectrum. 
He considered that the facts of the case he was dealing with, like many others, lie 
somewhere between the two extremes. On that basis, he found the approach of 
4 [2005] BCC 1021.
5 Eurofood, above note 1.
6 Ibid., at paragraph 34.
7 Ibid., at paragraph 36.
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the Advocate-General particularly helpful and decided to concentrate on the head 
office functions of the two Spanish companies.8
Mr Justice Lewison then went on to consider the evidence that the head office 
functions of the two Spanish registered companies were in fact carried out in 
England. At paragraph 11 of his judgment, he was satisfied of these facts. The 
facts themselves, as listed by Mr Justice Lewison, were clearly open and known 
to creditors and were easily ascertainable by them, although this point is not 
specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, Mr Justice Lewison clearly had it in mind 
that the ECJ had set down a binding requirement that the facts which are used to 
rebut the presumption based on the place of registered office have to be objective 
and ascertainable by third parties.
Stanford International Bank Limited9
Mr Justice Lewison had to revisit the question of COMI and his judgment in the 
Lennox case when considering the dispute between the liquidators of Stanford 
International Bank Limited appointed by the High Court of Antigua and Barbuda 
on the one hand and the United States Receiver appointed by the United States 
Court in respect of that Bank.
Unlike the Lennox case, this hearing was fully contested by the two rival 
candidates for recognition in the United Kingdom and also, interestingly, on 
behalf of Mr Stanford himself! It was clearly very generous of him to contribute 
to the legal debate on this important subject at a time when he was facing such 
serious charges of fraud but, of course, under Anglo-American jurisprudence, he 
is presumed to be innocent unless and until he is found guilty.
The other difference from the Lennox case was that COMI was being considered 
here in the context of the enactment in Great Britain (i.e. England and Scotland) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law10 and the issue was not jurisdiction, as in Lennox, 
but recognition. Each of the United States and the Antiguan parties claimed that 
COMI was in its own jurisdiction.
Importantly, and in my view correctly, Mr Justice Lewison held that the undefined 
concept of COMI had the same meaning both under the EIR and under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. The United Kingdom at present appears to be in a 
8 Lennox, above note 3, at paragraph 9.
9 [2009] EWHC 1441 (Ch) (3 July 2009).
10 As the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030).
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unique position of having both the EIR and the Model Law in force, but with 
priority being given to the EIR in relation to the European Union.
Although the hearing was fully contested, the only evidence before the court 
was written evidence and none of it was tested by cross-examination. Mr Justice 
Lewison therefore asked himself how the court was going to resolve any disputed 
questions of fact. He held, at paragraph 10 of his judgment, that the court should 
apply by analogy the test that applies in deciding questions of jurisdiction under 
Regulation 44/2001 (the Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulation). The test used 
by the English Courts in this context is that the court must be satisfied, or as 
satisfied as it can be, having regard to the limitations which an interlocutory 
process imposes, of the necessary facts.11 Applied to COMI, that means being 
satisfied, or as satisfied as it can be, having regard to the limitations which an 
interlocutory process imposes, that the company’s COMI is not in the state in 
which its registered office is located.
It is not necessary in this lecture to go into all the factual detail of the Stanford case 
and why Mr Justice Lewison held that the Bank’s COMI was in Antigua rather 
than the United States. However, I need to mention sufficient of the facts to be able 
to understand why the question of ascertainability arose.
The Bank was incorporated in Antigua and had its registered office there. The 
Bank occupied a huge building, pictures of which many of us will have seen on 
television, which was leased from another Stanford company. Photographs of this 
magnificent building and its columned portico were used in the Bank’s marketing 
material. The Bank employed 93 members of staff, 88 of which worked in Antigua 
and the remaining 5 in Canada. The Bank had its own accounts department, human 
resources department, IT department, payroll department and operating software, 
all of which were based in Antigua. The Bank also held out its offices in this 
magnificent building as its “primary offices”. It also claimed that its “primary 
business” was the investment of funds deposited with it at the Bank. The Bank was 
only regulated in Antigua. Also in the marketing material, the Bank claimed to be 
domiciled in a “low tax jurisdiction”, which was obviously a reference to Antigua. 
Another brochure specifically stated that the Bank conducted its business with the 
world from its headquarters in Antigua. Pursuant to Antiguan legislation, the Bank 
was actually prohibited from accepting deposits from Antiguan citizens and only 
took deposits from outside.
11 Bols Distilleries BV v Superior Yacht Services Limited [2007] 1 WLR 12, at paragraph 28.
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Both the United States Receiver and the Antiguan liquidators agreed that Mr 
Stanford had engaged in a massive and fraudulent Ponzi scheme.12 Mr Stanford, 
unsurprisingly, did not agree. The United States Receiver relied on the fact that 
many strategic decisions were taken in the United States and that a majority of 
those taking them were domiciled and resident in the United States and carried 
out their work there. Stanford himself was a citizen both of the United States and 
Antigua, where he had been knighted, hence his title “Sir Alan”. Other connections 
with Antigua included building the Stanford Cricket Ground and ownership of 
Antigua’s largest newspaper.
At paragraph 43 of his judgment, Mr Justice Lewison refers to the fact that 
the concept of COMI was taken from the European Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings 1995 and that the report on the work of the 30th Session of 
UNCITRAL suggested that:
“…the interpretation of the term in the context of the Convention 
would be useful also in the context of the Model Provision.”
It was on this basis that Mr Justice Lewison held, at paragraph 45, that the concept 
in the Model Law was meant to have the same meaning as the concept in the EIR. 
At paragraph 46, he considered that the absence of any equivalent of Recital 13 
from the Model Law does not alter the position.
Having considered paragraphs 111 and 112 of the Advocate-General’s Opinion in 
Eurofood, which deal with the head office functions test, Mr Justice Lewison then 
revisited paragraph 113 and the statement that ascertainability was not central to 
the concept of COMI. He then looked at subsequent paragraphs, being paragraphs 
118, 121, 122 and 124, which refer to the requirement of ascertainability.
At paragraph 58 of his judgment, Mr Justice Lewison suggests that these 
later paragraphs:
“…take a rather different approach from his earlier acceptance of the 
submission that ascertainability by third parties is not central to the 
concept of COMI.”
I would respectfully suggest that there is no real inconsistency. At paragraph 113, 
the Advocate-General points out that the focus is on where head office functions are 
carried out and that they become ascertainable as a result of being carried out. This 
is plainly not dealing with cases of concealment or denying that ascertainability is 
12 In England, called a “pyramid” scheme, under which unrealistic returns are credited and/or paid out to early 
investors to draw in more and more subsequent investors, most of whom eventually lose all or most of their money.
25New World and Old World: Symphony or Cacophony?
necessary. The later paragraphs which emphasise the need for ascertainability are 
therefore not in reality “a rather different approach”.
In any event, the ECJ had, prior to Lennox, made clear the need for ascertainability 
and this requirement was never in doubt. As I have already suggested, in Lennox 
there was no issue as to ascertainability: the head office functions of the two 
Spanish registered companies were openly carried out in England to the knowledge 
of the creditors and no ascertainability issue arose.
In the context of Mr Stanford’s alleged frauds and the allegation that he was 
ostensibly running an international bank in Antigua, but in practice running a Ponzi 
fraud in the United States, and that in any event strategic decisions of the Bank 
were taken there, the issue of ascertainability in the Stanford case was clearly a 
controversial one. At paragraph 61 of his judgment, Mr Justice Lewison recites 
the argument of counsel for the Antiguan liquidators who criticised his approach 
in Lennox on the grounds that it failed to consider ascertainability. This was, in 
fact, a thoroughly unfair criticism, since on the facts set out in the judgment in 
Lennox and the evidence available to Mr Justice Lewison, the head office functions 
being carried out in England was ascertainable and there was no potential issue 
about ascertainability.
Unfortunately, Mr Justice Lewison allowed himself to be persuaded that he had 
been wrong in his approach in Lennox and went so far as to state:
“Pre-Eurofood decisions by English courts should no longer be 
followed in this respect. I accept Mr Zacaroli’s submissions that 
COMI must be identified by reference to factors are both objective 
and ascertainable by third parties.”
I am not myself aware that any pre-Eurofood decision by the English Courts had 
failed to take ascertainability into account or had not required it to be present. 
All the previous English cases, including Shierson v Vlieland-Boddy,13 concerned 
situations where COMI was only held to be in England because the head office 
functions were taking place in England and there was no doubt that the facts were 
ascertainable to third parties.
It seems to me to be entirely obscure why Mr Justice Lewison had to, as the 
Americans put it, “beat himself up” over his perfectly correct decision in Re 
Lennox case, where the facts were ascertainable and there was no dispute as to 
ascertainability. In short, Mr Justice Lewison’s argument with himself was in my 
13 [2005] 1 WLR 3966, at paragraph 55 (per Chadwick LJ).
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view what we call in England a “storm in a teacup” and does not in any way affect 
the legal position established by the case law. In particular, there is no effect on 
the “head office functions” test which has always been subject to “ascertainability” 
and since the ECJ decision, subject to the requirement in a binding way.
Mr Justice Lewison went on to consider the meaning of “ascertainable”, a 
discussion just as relevant to the EIR as to the Model Law.
At paragraph 62 of the judgment, Counsel for the United States Receiver is 
recorded as having argued that “ascertainability” applied even if a fact was not in 
the public domain but would have been disclosed as an honest answer to a question 
asked by a third party. Mr Justice Lewison refused to accept this on the basis that 
this would reduce the requirement of ascertainability “almost to vanishing point”. 
He held that:
“…what was ascertainable by a third party was what was in the 
public domain, and what a typical third party would learn as a result 
of dealing with the company.”
At paragraph 63 and following, Mr Justice Lewison dealt with the issue of the 
importance of the presumption in favour of the registered office. Mr Justice 
Lewison interpreted the ECJ’s emphasis on the need for objective facts 
ascertainable by third parties to be able to rebut the presumption as giving the 
presumption importance. He considered that the previous decision of Re Ci4net.
com Inc, which gave little weight to the presumption, was wrong and no longer 
should be followed. Ci4net was a pre-Eurofood decision. He pointed out that the 
Guide to Enactment in relation to the Model Law at paragraph 122 refers to the 
presumption. At paragraph 65 of his judgment, Mr Justice Lewison considered that 
the reference to the presumption in the Guide did not detract from the force of the 
decision in Eurofood.
Mr Justice Lewison was referred in the arguments of Counsel to the cases in the 
United States on the Model Law which gave little weight to the presumption.14 
Mr Justice Lewison considered that the American case law had diverged from the 
approach of the ECJ. He speculated that this was connected with the change of 
wording from “proof” to the contrary in the Model Law to the use in United States 
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code of “evidence” to the contrary. It seems to me 
that this change could not possibly have made any difference and the American 
interpretation is more to do with the Americans ignoring the international origins 
14 See Re Tri-Continental Exchange Limited 349 BR 629, 635 (per Judge Klein) and Re Bear Stearns High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Limited 374 BR 122 (per Judge Lifland).
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of the text and applying the general approach in Anglo-American jurisprudence of 
regarding presumptions as having little weight and disliking the idea of deciding 
any case on the basis of a presumption rather than full evidence.
At paragraph 66, Mr Justice Lewison recites some expert evidence from Professor 
Westbrook, who gave the first Edwin Coe lecture last year, and is undoubtedly 
one of the leading minds on the subject in the United States to the effect that 
United States case law regards COMI as lying in the jurisdiction where the most 
material “contacts” are to be found, especially management direction and control 
of assets. In my view the “contacts” approach, familiar in United States private 
international law, is alien both to United Kingdom and, as far as I know, European 
jurisprudence.
It is a great pity that the United States cases have failed to root themselves in the 
European concepts and case law from which the COMI concept originates. The 
Americans are, like everyone else who adopts the Model Law, required by the 
Model Law to interpret it in the light of its international origin.15
Mr Justice Lewison’s reading of the American case law at paragraph 67 was that 
it did not require ascertainability of these “contacts”. I am not at all sure that is 
a correct reading: it is rather more likely that, as in Mr Justice Lewison’s own 
case of Lennox, the question of ascertainability did not arise or was not called 
into question. Obviously, if the American jurisprudence had rejected the need for 
ascertainability, their approach would be inconsistent with the ECJ in Eurofood 
and their case law would have taken a wrong turning in this respect also.
The Stanford case raised the interesting issue as to whether a special approach 
needs to be taken in the case of an ostensibly legitimate business which is in 
fact used as a vehicle for fraud. At paragraph 68, Mr Justice Lewison recites the 
submission of Counsel for the United States Receiver that, when a company is used 
as a vehicle for fraud, the court should investigate the COMI, not of the company 
itself, but of the fraudsters pulling the strings of the company. Mr Justice Lewison 
rejected this submission, in my view quite rightly. To ignore the facts about the 
company and only look at facts relating to the fraudsters would be a plain departure 
from ascertainability, at least in the usual case where the fraudsters’ behaviour is 
concealed from creditors. As Mr Justice Lewison pointed out at paragraph 69, the 
very nature of the existence of the fraud behind the scenes makes it unlikely to be 
ascertainable by third parties.
15 Article 8, Model Law.
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The question of a debtor company being used for fraud had already arisen in the Tri-
Continental case,16 referred to by Mr Justice Lewison. The debtor companies were 
insurance companies registered under the laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
and became subject to winding up proceedings in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme 
Court. The debtor company’s only offices were in St. Vincent, where there were 
approximately twenty employees. However, by the time the question of recognition 
arose, there was neither a business nor employees. This was because the business 
of the debtor companies had been the unlawful sale of insurance policies in the 
United States and Canada without insurance licences, using false representations 
that the coverage was backed by licensed and rated insurers.
The “impresario” of the fraud was a United States individual on the run from 
different states for different financial offences.
No point appears to have been taken or argued in the case or discussed in the 
judgment with regard to the fact that the business had been fraudulent throughout. 
No suggestion appears to be have been made that this changed the COMI from an 
inquiry relating to the debtor company to an inquiry looking at the facts relating 
to the fraudster. The approach in Tri-Continental is therefore consistent with the 
approach taken by Mr Justice Lewison in Stanford.
Whilst on the subject of the Tri-Continental case, it is worth mentioning that the 
judgment exemplifies the United States case-law view that the presumption of 
registered office is a weak presumption:
“In effect, the registered office (or place of incorporation) is evidence 
that is probative and that may in the absence of other evidence be 
accepted as a proxy for, “center of main interest.” The registered 
office however does not otherwise have special evidentiary value 
and does not shift the risk of non-persuasion, i.e. the burden of proof, 
away from the foreign representative seeking recognition as a main 
proceeding.
Thus, if the foreign proceeding is not in the country of the registered 
office, then the foreign representative has the burden of proof on 
the question of “center of main interests.” Correlatively, the foreign 
proceeding is in the country of the registered office and if there is 
evidence that the center of main interests might be elsewhere, then 
16 Re Tri-Continental Exchange Limited 349 BR 629.
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the foreign representative must prove that the center of main interests 
is in the same country as the registered office.
It follows that the burden of proof as to the “center of main interests” 
is never on the party opposing “main” status and that such an 
opponent has only a burden of going forward to adduce some evidence 
inconsistent with the registered office warranting a conclusion of 
“main” status…”
In my view, this is a reflection of the approach of Anglo-American courts, as 
mentioned above, which does not like to decide any case simply on the basis of a 
presumption if there is evidence upon which a proper finding can be made. Although 
the quote here conforms to the classic Anglo-American views of procedural burden 
and evidence, it does suggest too weak a role for the presumption and thereby 
ignores the international origin of the presumption. The presumption, as is well 
known, reflects the compromise between the certainty of allocating jurisdiction 
to open main proceedings on the basis of the registered office as against the “real 
seat” theory of civil lawyers. To say that, once there is any evidence that might 
suggest that COMI is in a place other than the place of registration, this puts the 
onus on the liquidator to prove that COMI is in the place of registered office pays 
too little regard to the force of the presumption which arises from the desirability of 
certainty. The presumption based on the place of registered office should not lightly 
be upset and reliance upon, for example, the head office functions test should 
always involve detailed evidence of the carrying out of head office functions, of 
course in a way ascertainable to third parties, in the jurisdiction concerned.
The Stanford case also has interesting and relevant points about the nature of the 
Antiguan and United States proceedings and whether they qualify as “foreign 
proceedings” under the Model Law, but those interesting questions are beyond the 
scope of this talk.17
The Timing Issue
One of the features of the COMI enquiry, which is highlighted by the cases of 
fraudulent businesses such as Tri-Continental and Stanford, is the question of the 
relevant point at which COMI is to be judged. In particular, it is sometimes the case, 
17 Subsequently to the giving of this talk, the Court of Appeal ([2010] EWCA Civ 137) upheld Lewison J.’s approach 
to COMI, but, in effect, allowed the United States criminal confiscation order to be enforced in England, so as to 
leave it to the United States authorities (and not to either the Antiguan liquidators or the United States receiver) 
to distribute assets recovered in England to the victims of the alleged fraud.
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as in Tri-Continental, that the fraudulent business no longer exists and indeed may 
well have been closed down by the commencement of insolvency proceedings.
On this subject, it has to be recalled once again that the EIR uses COMI as a test 
of allocation of international jurisdiction between Member States. That in turn 
has indirect consequences as described above for recognition and enforcement. 
In the case of the Model Law, COMI in any direct sense only applies as a test for 
recognition as main proceedings. However, it should be noted that this has, in turn, 
implications for the question of jurisdiction. Unless jurisdiction is taken in a place 
which is going to be recognised to have the COMI by the court supplying the Model 
Law, recognition as a main proceeding will not be available, whatever the view 
of jurisdiction taken by the original court which opens insolvency proceedings. 
Thus where recognition is to be sought, as part of a reorganisation or insolvency 
procedure in a foreign jurisdiction which has the Model Law, and the success of 
the proceeding depends or may depend on recognition as a main proceeding, the 
requirements of the Model Law as understood in the relevant jurisdiction need to 
be anticipated.
This became particularly acute in the Bear Stearns case.18 In that case, Cayman 
Islands registered entities were put into liquidation proceedings there. The Cayman 
Islands law regarded the only place where main proceedings could be started as the 
Cayman Islands themselves. The investors moreover had contracted into Cayman 
law. Nevertheless, the United States courts refused to recognise the Cayman 
proceedings as main proceedings, because COMI was not in the Cayman Islands: 
the business was not really run from there.
I have chronicled and detailed elsewhere the problems caused by this approach 
and the sense of shock in the offshore jurisdiction world at the abrupt reversal 
of the previous very helpful attitude to recognition on the part of the United 
States courts.19
As I have pointed out elsewhere,20 the American U-turn results from a flawed 
transposition of the Model Law, which is expressly meant to provide an additional 
mode of judicial assistance,21 in a way which makes it substantially the sole 
18 Re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Limited 374 BR 122.
19 “Mystery of the Sphinx” (2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 4, “Beyond the Sphinx” (2007) 20 Insolvency 
Intelligence 55, “Death of the Sphinx” (2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 157, “Bear Necessities” (2008) 21 
Insolvency Intelligence 27, “Basis Yield” (2008) 21 Insolvency Intelligence 57, “Hawaiian Eye-Opener” (2008) 
21 Insolvency Intelligence 76, “Refusal of Recognition” Insol World (Second Quarter 2008) 14, “Bitter Pill” 
(2008) 21 Insolvency Intelligence 118.
20 Idem.
21 Article 7, Model Law.
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statutory mode of access to the United States courts for the purposes of judicial 
assistance for foreign proceedings. I have elsewhere argued,22 at some length, that 
the United States courts should hold that this mis-legislation can and should be 
supplemented by the use of a common law (i.e. judge made) discretionary mode 
of judicial assistance for cases such as Bear Stearns, at least in situations where 
there is no concern about the interests of local United States creditors, which in 
Bear Stearns there may well have been. Although this is not the time or place to 
explore my views in detail, I cannot help noting that a distinguished United States 
bankruptcy judge, Samuel L Bufford takes up my suggestion in his new book:23
“The United States common law of comity applies to such cases 
even though they fall outside the scope of Chapter 15 and its 
recognition provisions.”24
As far as the EIR is concerned, there has not been a great deal of discussion of 
the timing issue as far as I am aware in the cases. The express wording of the 
EIR suggests that the relevant time for the existence of COMI is the point at 
which proceedings are opened. This is expressly stated to be the position by the 
English Court of Appeal in the case of Shierson v Vlieland-Boddy.25 The Court 
of Appeal specifically holds that the facts have to be looked at the relevant time 
for determination.
The question of timing was critical in that case because the debtor had, as far 
as the untested evidence went, moved his COMI effectively to Spain before any 
bankruptcy proceedings were brought, but at a time when he could obviously see 
them coming.
The other well known case in which a timing issue arose is the ECJ’s decision in 
Staubitz-Schreiber.26 In this case, the ECJ agreed that the time for looking at COMI 
is the time when proceedings are opened but also held that if there was jurisdiction, 
i.e. COMI was in the place where main proceedings were begun, at the time of 
the “request” to open proceedings, then jurisdiction was not lost by a move of 
COMI between the time of the “request” and the time of the “opening”. This is the 
principle of perpetuatio fori.
22 Above note 19.
23 S. Bufford, United States International Insolvency Law 2008-2009 (2009, Oxford University Press, New York 
NY), at 45.
24 Citation omitted.
25 [2005] EWCA Civ 974, at paragraph 55.
26 [2006] BCC 639 (Case C-1/04).
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No case that I am aware of has so far considered head on the further possibility 
that COMI should be treated as still subsisting, for the purposes of the EIR, in 
a jurisdiction where the debtor has left behind assets and/or liabilities which 
still need to be the subject of insolvency proceedings. There is such a doctrine 
in English domestic law and it remains to be seen whether it is also the correct 
approach to the EIR.
The EIR does appear to have been interpreted in Germany, however, as meaning 
that a fraudulent move of COMI is not to be recognised. One must however be 
careful to distinguish fraudulent steps designed to defeat or delay creditors from 
a tactical move of COMI designed to facilitate reorganisation and to benefit 
creditors: see the views on forum shopping of Advocate-General Colomer in his 
Opinions both in the Staubitz-Schreiber27 and Seagon28 cases.
Terminated Activities
The question arises under the EIR, in relation to the taking of jurisdiction on the 
basis of COMI, as to the correct approach where the debtor has not moved COMI 
but has simply terminated its activities. The very helpful and intelligent suggestion 
has been made by Judge Andrea Csöke in her book on cross frontier insolvency 
proceedings.29 She suggests that an analogy can be drawn with the situation of a 
terminated establishment in the case of secondary proceedings.30 If the domestic 
insolvency law of the Member State allows for the opening of proceedings in such 
a situation, it would make sense to interpret the EIR so as to allow the opening of 
main proceedings where COMI has not moved but the relevant activity has ceased. 
The place where the terminated relevant activity used to be located and where 
COMI would have been found does seem to be the natural place from which to run 
a main insolvency proceeding in such a case.
With regard to the Model Law, the Tri-Continental case, without any discussion of 
the point, is perhaps some support for the idea that a proceeding where an activity 
has been discontinued can still be regarded as the COMI, although in that case 
COMI could have been found in the same place simply on the basis of the location 
of the registered office, even in the absence of any evidence of business activity.
27 Idem.
28 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] BCC 347.
29 A Hataron Atnyulo Fizeteskeptelensegi Eljarasok, hvgorac (2008, CompLex, Budapest).
30 See the judgment of the Tallinn District Court in RAB (14 June 2006).
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Timing and Planning
Given the extraordinary shift in the position in the United States as a result of 
their mis-enactment of the Model Law as the sole statutory means of judicial 
assistance for foreign proceedings, legal minds have had to work overtime to find 
ways in which to try and ensure that off shore proceedings are recognised in the 
United States.
Clearly the lesson of the Bear Stearns case31 and the subsequent Basis Yield 
case32 of Judge Gerber on 16 January 2008 is that the question of COMI has to be 
settled in the right direction before any application is made to the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for recognition.
On the assumption that COMI has to be in the right place at the time that the foreign 
insolvency proceeding is opened, it is possible to make sure that the relevant facts 
are in place by the time those proceedings are opened. The correct approach seems 
to me to ensure that as far as possible the filing takes place in the registered office, 
but in any event, it must be the case that the debtor company and its business is 
run from the place where proceedings are to be opened and in particular the “head 
office” functions are carried out there in a way which is ascertainable to third 
parties, particularly creditors. Just to make sure, in case there is any problem with 
COMI, it also makes sense to ensure that there is something which conforms to the 
definition of “establishment” in the relevant version of the Model Law and for this 
purpose it makes sense for there to be a functioning office of the debtor company 
in the jurisdiction of where proceedings are to be commenced. Assuming that 
these steps are put in place for the benefit of creditors and not in a fraudulent way, 
there should be jurisdiction to open proceedings under the EIR and there should 
be mandatory recognition under the Model Law.
I have myself advised on a successful process such as this which led to recognition 
in the United States under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. It is 
true, however, that in that case there was opposition and the matter would have 
been contested had there not been a settlement.
With regard to shifts of COMI for the purposes of founding jurisdiction under 
the EIR, there have been a number of successful cases and the well known 
unsuccessful case of Hans Brochier,33 which emphasises the need to get one’s 
facts right before filing.
31 Re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Limited 374 BR 122.
32 Judge Gerber, SDNY (16 Jan 2008).
33 Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd v Exner [2007] BCC 127.
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An example from personal insolvency can be found in the case of Official Receiver 
v Eichler.34 Dr Eichler had creditors in Germany. He also used to have a property 
in Germany but had transferred it into his wife’s name. The creditors were not 
very happy about this. German bankruptcy is of course notoriously unfriendly to 
debtors. Dr Eichler moved to England and lived in temporary accommodation, 
working as a locum radiologist. He had no creditors in the United Kingdom. 
Looking at the date of the filing of the request for bankruptcy, Registrar Baister 
concluded on the limited evidence available to him that Dr Eichler’s COMI was in 
the United Kingdom, on the basis that he had succeeded in changing his COMI from 
Germany. The United Kingdom was where, at the time of filing, he was conducting 
the administration of his interest on a regular basis, readily ascertainable by third 
parties. Registrar Baister pointed out that there was no minimum period required 
before it can be said that COMI has been established in a new Member State. He 
added, at paragraph 19:
“Common sense would seem to indicate that a few days (or even a 
few weeks) would be unlikely to suffice because that would be at 
odds with conducting the administration of ones interest in a place 
“on a regular basis” (as well as being at odds with the idea of an 
“habitual residence”).”
The situation under the Model Law is rather more complicated because one is 
looking directly at recognition and not jurisdiction and therefore the question arises 
as to whether for recognition purposes under the Model Law one should be looking 
at the place of COMI at the time the foreign proceedings were opened or at the time 
the question of recognition arises, or possibly at some other point.
As a matter of logic and common sense, and in line with the origin of the concept 
in the EIR, it seems to me that the relevant time for judging COMI must, under 
the Model Law, also be at the time that the foreign proceedings are opened. On 
the face of it, there needs to be certainty from the time of opening of the foreign 
proceedings whether they are to be regarded in countries affected by the Model 
Law as main proceedings, just as it is essential for European Union countries to 
know immediately whether a proceeding opened in another Member State is or is 
not a main proceeding. Incidentally, it is very regrettable that in some countries, 
unlike the United Kingdom, there is no requirement for the document opening 
proceedings to state whether or not they are “main” proceedings.
34 Registrar Baister, High Court of Justice, London (22 June 2007).
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As against this, taking a different date, such as the date when the question of 
recognition is considered, would allow liquidators in the foreign proceeding a great 
deal more flexibility to align COMI with the place of opening. This would be a 
useful tool in cases where it is designed to benefit creditors, as would normally 
be the case with liquidators, but of course could also facilitate manipulation and 
fraud in the rare case where the liquidator is in league with dishonest management 
or creditors.
Article 2 of the Model Law defines “foreign main proceeding” as:
“…a foreign proceeding taking place in the State where the debtor has 
a centre of its main interests.”
This is copied word-for-word into Article 2 of Schedule 1 to the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations 2006, being the implementation of the Model Law in Great 
Britain (i.e. England and Scotland). Section 1502 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code has a slight change of wording:
““Foreign main proceeding” means a foreign proceeding pending in 
the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests.”
The Model Law wording, as enacted both in Great Britain and the United States, 
uses the present tense in referring to “taking place” or “pending”. Each refers to 
the relevant State or country as the place where the debtor “has” its COMI. On 
a literal reading, therefore, it could be said that the time to assess COMI is not 
when proceedings were opened in the foreign jurisdiction, but at the time when the 
question of recognition is being considered.
There is an interesting discussion of this area in “The Unraised Issue in Re Bear 
Stearns: What is the Temporal Framework for Determining the Center of Main 
Interests?” by Mark Lightner, a law clerk in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
in New York.35 Mr Lightner in fact identifies the fact that there are no less than 
five different possible times which could be used for judging COMI. These 
include at “lookback” point prior to filing the foreign proceeding, the date of the 
commencement of the foreign proceeding, the date of filing the application for 
recognition, a “lookback” period prior to filing of the application for recognition 
and the date of hearing the application for recognition. Mr Lightner points out that 
the literal wording appears to favour either the time of filing of the application for 
recognition or the date when recognition is considered.
35 (2009) 6(4) International Corporate Rescue 230.
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Mr Lightner argues that European decisions are only of limited influence because 
they relate to the question of COMI for the purposes of jurisdiction. However, 
it should be remembered that the United States Courts are directed by their own 
legislation to look at the international origins of the Model Law and therefore 
European decisions on the meaning of COMI and the relevant time for ascertaining 
it under the EIR cannot be so easily devalued. Under the EIR itself, as we have 
seen, exactly the same relevant date must apply for looking at COMI both for 
the purposes of jurisdiction and recognition. It would be very odd if the Model 
Law took a different approach, although one could see the practicability of such 
an approach.
In the case of Re Yuval Ran,36 a prominent Israeli businessman emigrated from 
Israel to the United States in April 1997. In July 1997, the bank instituted 
receivership proceedings against him and a temporary receiver was appointed. 
Subsequently he was appointed a trustee of Mr Ran’s property. Mr Ran took 
up permanent residence in the United States on a legal basis and was employed 
there together with his wife. Although the facts as set out in the judgment are not 
entirely clear, it looks as if it may not have been until 28 October 1999, when the 
former temporary receiver was appointed trustee of the property of Mr Ran that 
an insolvency proceeding actually began, the order declaring that Mr Ran “went 
bankrupt”. The trustee was seeking recognition under the United States enactment 
of the Model Law in Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
The judge pointed out that to be recognised as a foreign main proceeding, the 
foreign proceeding had to be “pending” in the country where the debtor had his 
centre of main interests. He also referred to the presumption based on an individual 
debtor’s “habitual residence” under the Model Law. The judge found that Houston, 
Texas had been the centre of Mr Ran’s main interests since 1997. Accordingly, 
“the proceeding pending in Israel” was not a “foreign main proceeding” under 
section 1502(4). It was therefore not entitled to recognition under Chapter 15.
It can be seen from the above that, on these facts, it was only if the foreign 
insolvency proceedings could be said to have started with the bank’s appointment 
of a receiver in July 1997 and if, by that stage, Mr Ran had not changed his habitual 
residence to the United States that it could reasonably be argued that his centre of 
main interests was still in Israel. Given that footnote 1 to the judgment explains 
that Ran had left Israel after his car and his brother’s office had been firebombed, 
his brother’s car destroyed in an acid attack, his parents harassed and he and his 
36 Chief Bankruptcy Judge Brown, Southern District of Texas (22 May 2007).
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wife had received death threats as well as threats to kidnap their children, it would 
not have been a surprising conclusion to find that Mr Ran’s habitual residence 
actually changed in April 1997 when he arrived in the United States. Moreover, it 
must be very doubtful whether a bank instituted receivership was really the start 
of collective insolvency proceedings. The order of the District Court of Tel Aviv 
on 28 October 1999, when Mr. Lavie was appointed trustee of the property of Mr. 
Ran, seems to be a much more likely candidate. By that date, there could hardly 
be any doubt that Mr Ran’s habitual residence was in the United States. In these 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the judgment contains no discussion of 
the relevant date for looking at COMI and merely refers to the “pending” wording 
in the statute.
In the case of Betcorp Limited, Judge Markel in the District of Nevada produced 
a lengthy judgment on 3 December 2008, which was entered on the docket on 
9 February 2009. This covered a number of issues. Betcorp was an Australian 
registered company which had ceased operations after changes in United States 
law made its business model unworkable. The shareholders voted to liquidate 
the company through a members’ voluntary winding up under Australian law. 
This involved the appointment of at least one liquidator registered with the 
relevant regulator. The judge found that, although Betcorp was involved through 
subsidiaries in business operations in several countries, Australia remained its 
administrative and executive nerve centre. As a result of a change in United States 
law relating to internet gambling on 13 October 2006, Betcorp was prevented 
from receiving funds transfers relating to gaming activities from United States 
customers. Immediately after the passage of this statute, the company ceased 
operations in the United States and eventually ceased all operations completely. 
Thus, liquidators were appointed by the members at a time when the business of 
the company had ceased. A considerable part of the judgment concerns the finding 
that the members’ voluntary winding up is a foreign proceeding within the Model 
Law. At page 24 of the judgment begins the consideration of the question of the 
location of centre of main interests. In considering the location of COMI, the judge 
followed the approach in Bear Stearns and elsewhere in the American case law 
to the effect that the foreign liquidator could not simply rely on the presumption 
based on the place of incorporation.
The judge also refers to various views of Professor Westbrook including the use of 
substitute terms such as “principal place of business”, “chief executive offices” or 
“real seat” to be found in statutes in the United States and elsewhere. With respect 
to Judge Markel and Professor Westbrook, it can be dangerous to take terms other 
than the autonomous term invented for the purposes of the EIR and borrowed by 
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the Model Law. In particular, it is a misunderstanding to think, as the learned judge 
apparently thought, on the basis of Professor Westbrook’s views, that the adoption 
of the term centre of main interests in Chapter 15 was:
“…not intended to create a new concept of location but to build up 
on existing concepts.”
As must be clear from Eurofood and the Virgos-Schmit Report, “centre of main 
interests” was chosen as a new, autonomous concept providing a compromise 
between the Anglo-Scandinavian emphasis on the place of registered office as 
opposed to the other continental lawyers’ emphasis on “real seat”. Given that this 
is a new, autonomous term, its meaning needs to be understood from the wording, 
context and case law connected with the EIR. Otherwise, that other important point 
made by Professor Westbrook and quoted by Judge Markel, namely that:
“The drafters of Chapter 15 believed … that such a crucial 
jurisdictional test should be uniform around the world and hope that 
its adoption by the United States would encourage other countries to 
use it as well.”
would not be met. Of course, when Professor Westbrook refers to “jurisdictional 
test”, that is correct in the original context of the EIR, but in the context of 
recognition or judicial assistance should, as the Model Law intended, only be an 
additional basis for judicial assistance.
Unlike the Ran case, Betcorp does contain an express discussion of the issue of 
timing, starting at page 31 of the judgment. The objectors in that case argued 
that the COMI determination should be made with reference to a company’s 
operational history and not merely by assessing where COMI lies at the “petition 
date”. Judge Markel rejected this argument:
“To accept it would frustrate the goals of using COMI to “harmonise” 
insolvency proceeding recognition transnationally, and it would make 
the determination of COMI imprecise and often incorrect.”
Judge Markel cited the Ran case as:
“…a prime example as why the court cannot make the COMI 
determination with an eye toward a debtors operational history. 
Timing was a decisive issue in Ran because, in his past, Mr Ran 
had substantial interests in Israel, upon the date of the petition for 
recognition, he had effectively no interests in that country.”
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Judge Markel regarded Ran as an illustration of why looking to a debtor’s operational 
history would increase the likelihood of conflicting COMI determinations as court 
may tend to attach greater importance to activities in their own countries or may 
simply weigh the evidence differently. Judge Markel also stressed ascertainability 
by third parties at pages 32-33 of the judgment.
Judge Markel considered that the decision in Ran held that the appropriate time 
to determine COMI was when the Chapter 15 case commenced. As pointed 
out, however, it seems to me that in the Ran case even if one looked back to the 
probable start of the insolvency proceedings, the result would make no difference.
Judge Markel stated, at page 33, that looking to the time when the Chapter 15 case 
commenced was:
“…consistent with English cases interpreting the EU Regulation, 
which seemed to select a time linked to commencement or service 
to the relevant insolvency proceeding.” (citing Shierson v Vlieland-
Boddy and Collins & Ackman)
appears to be inexact, with the greatest of respect to Judge Markel. The English 
cases interpreting the EIR focus on the date of opening of the insolvency 
proceeding whereas Judge Markel was focusing on the date of the commencement 
of the recognition proceeding (“the Chapter 15 case”). On the facts of Betcorp, 
of course, there was no material difference between the two dates and the only 
argument was whether one should look back beyond the commencement of the 
Australian proceedings.
Interestingly, perhaps because the point does not appear to have been argued, 
there appears to be no discussion of the fact that Betcorp’s business had been 
terminated both by the time the liquidation proceedings started and also by the 
time the application was made for Chapter 15 recognition. It appears simply to 
have been assumed that, given that the members’ voluntary liquidation followed 
the termination of business, that one looked to the business that was being carried 
on immediately prior to termination.
In his article on timing, Mr Lightner makes an interesting point in relation to the 
Bear Stearns case which produced such an unsatisfactory result from the point 
of view of offshore jurisdictions. He points out that, after the appointment of 
liquidators, the companies were controlled from the Cayman Islands and, if the 
date of applying for Chapter 15 recognition or the date upon which recognition 
was being considered had been taken as the critical date for timing purposes, the 
result might have been different. As Mr Lightner points out:
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“The apparent inequity and practical problem of administering the 
Funds’ US assets, as identified in Re Bear Stearns 1 would also have 
disappeared. The creditors’ expectation (that an orderly insolvency 
proceeding would be forthcoming) would have been honoured 
and the goals of value maximisation, certainty, predictability, and 
harmonisation would have been furthered. The Bankruptcy Court 
could also have tailored relief based on the unique circumstances of 
the case if it felt that US interests were not being properly protected, 
and clearly would not have been bound to apply Cayman Island’s law 
to issues properly governed by US law [citation omitted].”
I entirely applaud the potential utility of such an approach, and as Mr Lightner 
points out it is consistent with a literal reading of the wording of the Model Law. 
However, it is difficult to believe that such an approach was intended or that it can 
properly reflect the origin of COMI and the approach to timing in the EIR.
Conclusion
Even a talk of this expanded length can only give you a taste of the richness and 
variety of European and Anglo-American case law on the concept of COMI as 
explored in relation to both the EIR and the Model Law.
To summarise the key points explored here, I can conclude that the concept of 
COMI was undoubtedly meant to be the same under the EIR and the Model Law. 
As far as English case law is concerned, subject to the appeal pending in Stanford, 
the concept has the same meaning in both places. A number of points follow.
Firstly, whilst the “head office functions” test remains in place, the requirement 
of ascertainability by third parties as laid down by the ECJ in Eurofood must 
be observed.
Secondly, the presumption based on the place of registered office is a strong one 
and the onus is on the party seeking to disprove it to do so: the United States 
approach is entirely mistaken in this regard and has failed to follow the European 
approach. The use of slightly different wording in the United States version of the 
Model Law is no basis for taking a different approach.
Thirdly, the concept of COMI cannot be substituted by other concepts such as 
“principal place of business”, however helpful those may be by way of explanatory 
analogy. Here again, the approach in the United States cases goes off on a false trail.
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Fourthly, none of the case law in Europe or in the United States has really faced 
up to the issue of discontinued businesses but it seems that, at least as long as the 
insolvency proceeding follows immediately or shortly after the discontinuance, 
the position will be treated as having continued in the State in which it was in at 
the last moment of the carrying on of business. The approach here in the European 
cases and American cases is consistent, albeit not spelt out in either.
Fifthly, it is clear that under the EIR the time for considering COMI is the time of 
opening of the proceedings, or, if COMI has moved since the time of the filing of 
the request, the date of the request.37
As far as the Model Law is concerned, the origin of COMI suggests that, although 
the Model Law is dealing with recognition and judicial assistance, and not (at 
least directly) with jurisdiction, consistency suggests COMI should be judged as 
at the time of the opening of the proceedings sought to be recognised (or possibly, 
incorporating the Staubitz-Schreiber decision into this), the time at which the 
request for the opening in the foreign jurisdiction was made. This would promote 
consistency and certainty, albeit at the price of flexibility and the ability to correct 
the chaos and injustice caused by the Bear Stearns decision. The reality is that 
the problem caused by Bear Stearns, which stems mainly from the wording of 
the United States version of the Model Law, results from the mis-legislation of 
the Model Law by making it the sole statutory mode of obtaining recognition 
or judicial assistance, whereas it was intended to be an additional ground by the 
express wording of the Model Law, as explained by the Guide to Enactment. The 
best way to cure the statutory deficiency is to accept that:
“US common law of comity applies to such cases, even though they 
fall outside the scope of Chapter 15 and its recognition provisions.”38
Sixthly, there is no objection to jurisdiction being taken on the basis of a move 
of COMI or recognition being granted on the basis of such a move if the move 
is genuinely in the interests of creditors and not a fraudulent move designed to 
frustrate creditors. This is clear from the opinions of Advocate-General Colomer39 
in relation to the EIR but remains to be explored by the United States case law.
37 That is, at least, if one is considering the jurisdiction of the requested court: it is not clear whether, if the requested 
court fails to open the proceedings, it is open to the court of the place where COMI has shifted to open main 
proceedings instead.
38 Judge Bufford (above note 23).
39 See above notes 27 and 28.
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Chapter 3
Cross-Border Insolvency in the British 
Atlantic and Caribbean World: 
Challenges and Opportunities
Mr Justice Ian Kawaley
Introduction
“The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men 
by showing them facts amidst appearances. He plies the slow, 
unhonored, and unpaid task of observation. He is the world’s eye.” 
(Ralph Waldo Emerson)
Bermuda may be said to be part of the British Atlantic and Caribbean world, 
if one defines this regional construct as encompassing those eighteen formerly 
and currently British territories located in the Caribbean and adjacent Atlantic 
and South/Central American areas (Belize and Guyana).1 This regional grouping 
cumulatively has a combined population of approximately 6.5 million.2 While 
Bermuda itself has a population of less than 70,000 people, the other British 
Overseas Territories (Anguilla, British Virgin Islands (“BVI”), the Cayman 
Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands) are even smaller in population 
terms. What binds them together as a coherent group in legal terms is that they are 
almost all common law jurisdictions with company and insolvency law regimes 
heavily influenced by British antecedents. Save for the larger agro-industrial 
countries of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the remaining fifteen 
sovereign states and dependencies all depend to greater or lesser extents on 
offshore financial services and are home to insolvencies with strong cross-border 
elements, linked to either each other or the United States, Europe and the Far 
1 The independent, formerly British, states are in fact usually referred to as the Commonwealth Caribbean. The 
“British” nomenclature assigned to them in this paper is partly for linguistic convenience, but also because of the 
enduring historical British influence on the insolvency regimes throughout almost all the region.
2 While some in modern Bermuda seek to distinguish Bermuda from the Caribbean region, there are longstanding 
historical grounds for viewing Bermuda and the Caribbean territories as part of a linked Atlantic world, as the 
title of the following recent publication suggests: M. Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians and 
the Maritime Atlantic World (2010, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC).
* This is a re-edited and updated version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 14 in B. Wessels 
and P. Omar (eds), Insolvency and Groups of Companies (2011, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (167-212).
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East (principally Hong Kong and Singapore). The present paper will focus on 
Bermuda with passing references to the other offshore financial centres (“OFCs”) 
for comparative purposes and will seek to identify a few unique cross-border 
insolvency law challenges and opportunities.
The main narrow and pragmatic point which will be made is that, when considering 
the question of the extent of cross-border judicial cooperation powers enjoyed 
by common law courts in jurisdictions lacking modern statutory international 
cooperation and/or corporate rescue regimes, the bare statutory position will 
often be of limited significance. This enquiry will be pursued with a view to 
more consciously reflecting on what the primary function of insolvency law is. 
At the coalface of most insolvency proceedings and constituting the main focus 
of companies, liquidators and creditors alike, the following question demands an 
answer: how much precious value can be eked out of the ruins of the venture 
which was intended to guarantee prosperity? Preservation of assets, claims against 
directors and officers, debt restructurings and distribution rules are areas typically 
addressed with all concerned using the goal of “maximizing the return to creditors” 
as a mantra. According to the Cork Committee Report 1982, which preceded the 
enactment of the United Kingdom Insolvency Act 1986:
“It is a basic objective of the law to support the maintenance 
of commercial morality and encourage the fulfilment of 
financial obligations.”
Insolvency law, then, claims for itself a very elevated role as the moral face of 
commercial law, while other fields, such as mainstream corporate law and the law 
of obligations, the context of remedies apart, are very much the material face of 
commercial law. To what extent this role appears to be served by the insolvency 
law frameworks of the region will also be considered, somewhat tentatively, below.
The British Atlantic and Caribbean World Defined
The Jurisdictions Identified
Looking at a typical map of the Caribbean (see Figure 3.1.), one could narrowly 
construe Bermuda as an isolated mid-Atlantic territory closer to North America than 
any Caribbean island and meriting attention in its own right. Such a view would be 
subject to strong accusations of chauvinism, perhaps, despite strong geographical 
justifications. But, more critically, such an approach would be philosophically 
incongruous for the writer to take in the context of a paper prepared for the 
regional division of an international body, the INSOL Europe Academic Forum. 
The European Union is the mother of modern regional cooperation in cross-border 
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insolvency cases. It seems logical to seek to place Bermuda, with less than 70,000 
residents and land-space of little more than 35 square kilometres, into some kind 
of regional perspective. Belize is geographically in Central America (but bordering 
the Caribbean Sea), while Guyana, in South America, is also omitted from many 
typical Caribbean maps.
The logical grouping for most legal purposes is the (British) Commonwealth 
Caribbean broadly defined: eighteen territories embracing both the now independent 
former British colonies and the remaining British Overseas territories. This is 
reflective of the Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”) region’s membership 
(excluding Surinam, the former Dutch dependency), which also includes nine 
members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (“OECS”). The subject 
territories are set out in Table 3.2. below.
Table 3.2. Insolvency Law Profiles I
Source: Author’s Own.
Territory
Statutory 
International 
Cooperation 
Powers
Statutory  
Corporate 
Rescue 
Provisions
Modern 
Insolvency 
Law 
Statute
Anguilla * ** No No No
Antigua and Barbuda ** Yes Yes Yes
Bahamas No No No
Barbados Yes Yes Yes
Belize No No No
Bermuda * No No No
Figure 3.1. Map of the Caribbean
Source: www.theodora.com
Contd...
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British Virgin Islands * ** Yes (but not in force) Yes Yes
Cayman Islands * Yes Yes Yes
Dominica ** (Civil Code) No No No
Grenada ** No No No
Guyana No No No
Jamaica No No No
Montserrat * ** No No No
St. Kitts-Nevis ** No No No
St. Lucia ** (Civil Code) No No No
St. Vincent & Grenadines ** No No No
Trinidad and Tobago Yes No No
Turks and Caicos Islands * No No No
* British Overseas Territories    ** OECS members
Of the eighteen subject territories, a substantial minority of six are still British 
Overseas territories, albeit with their own autonomous legal systems, while twelve 
are sovereign nations which are fully fledged members of CARICOM. While all 
of the six British territories are to some extent reliant on offshore business as 
a major industry, 75% of the independent states are as well. Only three of the 
twelve (Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, representing more than 
75% of the whole group’s population) could obviously be described as primarily 
agricultural and/or industrial countries. The smaller independent territories rely 
on varying mixes of tourism, offshore finance and agriculture as well. It has been 
argued elsewhere that offshore financial centres provide a useful field of study for 
cross-border commercial legal purposes because of the highly internationalised 
nature of their legal transactions.3 Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are 
regional economic giants, home to banks and other entities which operate on a 
regional basis.
So all of the subject territories are likely to be involved, albeit to varying extents, in 
private international commercial relationships which, when insolvency supervenes, 
will bring into play the need for cross-border judicial cooperation frameworks as 
well. The common British legal flavour which runs through the legal systems of all 
jurisdictions also adds coherence to the group and enables a native of Bermuda to 
make not wholly uninformed observations about what the law of other jurisdictions 
is likely to be. Nothing said here about any jurisdiction is intended in any way to 
be a substitute for formal legal advice. The grouping collectively will be referred 
to as the British Atlantic and Caribbean world (“BACW”).
3 I. Kawaley, A. Bolton and R. Mayor (eds), Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation in Offshore Litigation: The British 
Offshore World (2009, Wildy Simmonds and Hill, London), Chapter 1.
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Insolvency Law Profiles
On the insolvency law front, most BACW jurisdictions appear to have company 
legislation based on the Companies Act 1948 (United Kingdom) (or earlier 
equivalents in insolvency law terms); that is the position in Bermuda. However, 
at least two jurisdictions have moved forward to the United Kingdom Insolvency 
Act 1986 regime (BVI, the Cayman Islands). Two others appear to have followed 
the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago).4 
These jurisdictions all have explicit statutory frameworks for international 
cooperation and corporate rescue; however, BVI has yet to bring its international 
cooperation provisions into force. The overwhelming majority of the selected 
territories have no express statutory powers relating to judicial cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency cases at all. Although most have company law provisions 
relating to schemes of arrangement, which can be deployed in the insolvency 
context, they have no statutory provisions which explicitly empower the court to 
supervise a debtor-in-possession financing. However, this challenge is matched by 
the opportunity to utilize common law powers of judicial cooperation. It is beyond 
the scope of the present inquiry to explore the scope of operation of the common 
law in those two jurisdictions which are believed to possess Napoleonic-derived 
Civil Codes.5
The applicable legislation in each jurisdiction is believed to be as follows:
Table 3.3. Insolvency Law Profiles II
Source: Author’s Own.
Territory Insolvency Law Statute
Anguilla Companies Act (2000 revision), Part 5
Antigua and Barbuda The Companies Act 1995, Part IV 
Bahamas Companies Act 1992 (2001 revision), Part VII
Barbados Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2002
Belize Companies Act, Chapter 250 (2003 revision), Part IV
Bermuda Companies Act 1981, Part XIII
BVI Insolvency Act 2003
Cayman Islands Companies Law 2007, as amended by Companies (Amendment)  Law 2007, Part V 
4 See the Americas Restructuring and Insolvency Guide (2008/09, Price Waterhouse Coopers), copy available at: 
www.americanrestructuring.com/08, noting the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2002, 1 L.R.O. 2002, Cap 303 
(Barbados) and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2007, No. 26:2007 (Trinidad and Tobago).
5 In the case of Dominica, the question seems to turn on the construction of the provisions of the Eastern Caribbean 
Supreme Court (Dominica) Act, Chapter 4:02. On the face of these provisions, it appears that the rules of common 
law and equity do in fact apply save as modified by statute. In Saint Lucia, it is clear that the common law applies 
to some extent: see e.g. Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal, HCVAP 2009:006, Wilson v James et al., Judgment 
dated 6 July 2009, where the common law rules on fresh evidence were applied in relation to a Civil Code claim. 
Regretfully, the Saint Lucian Supreme Court Act has not been reviewed.
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Dominica (Civil Code) Companies Act 1994, Part IV
Grenada Companies Act 19946
Guyana Companies Act, Cap 89:01 (1998 revision), Part V
Jamaica Companies Act 2004, Part V
Montserrat Companies Act, Chapter 11:12 (2002 revision), Part IV
St. Kitts-Nevis Companies Act 1996, Parts XXI-XXIV
St. Lucia (Civil Code)7 International Business Companies Act, (2001 revision), Part 98
St. Vincent and Grenadines Companies Act 1994, Part IV
Trinidad and Tobago Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 2007
Turks and Caicos Companies Ordinance, Cap 122 (1998 revision), Part V
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The most obvious challenge in relation to an international insolvency case involving 
a BACW jurisdiction with no modern international insolvency provisions is to 
determine whether or not international cooperation is possible. The most obvious 
opportunities are the flexible nature of the common law discretionary powers of 
cooperation with foreign insolvency courts, which will be discussed in further 
detail below.
A less obvious challenge, but potentially a more daunting one, is the need for 
a statutory regime conceptually similar to the European Insolvency Regulation 
within the new Caribbean Single Market Economy (“CSME”). The intent of 
the CSME is to lower national boundaries for commercial purposes which will 
render the traditional national insolvency law regime approach, even supported by 
modern international cooperation provisions, largely obsolete (at worst) and not fit 
for purpose (at best). As the present writer has noted in an earlier paper:
“Why the Common Law Approach is likely to be Inadequate
In these circumstances, the case of Surinam apart (legislation to 
support recognition may be required there), the common law might 
appear to be sufficiently flexible to deal meet the needs of the CSME 
in a more consumer-oriented manner than the more rigid and highly 
formal EU Insolvency Law regime, at least on an interim basis. But 
serious weaknesses will exist if cross-border judicial cooperation 
in insolvency cases is to operate more smoothly than would be 
6 The Act itself has not been reviewed. However, it clearly applies to local and international business companies 
incorporated in Grenada: Supreme Court of Grenada, Claim No. GDAHCV2008/0361, In the Matter of Bank 
Crozier Limited (in liquidation), Margaret Findlay J, Judgment dated 9 June 2010, copy available at: www.
eccourts.org/judgments.html.
7 The Civil Code of Saint Lucia was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in National 
Insurance Corporation v Winmark Ltd [2008] UKPC 36.
8 The local companies’ legislation has not been reviewed.
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expected in relation to cases involving two or more foreign and 
unconnected States.
The main weaknesses of the common law regime appear to be 
practical and commercial problems flowing from: (a) the lack of an 
automatic recognition elsewhere of main proceedings commenced in 
the COMI forum, (b) the lack of an automatic recognition elsewhere of 
a liquidator appointed in the COMI or secondary proceeding, and (c) 
the absence of common law rules providing for automatic recognition 
of foreign non-money judgments, such as orders made in a foreign 
winding-up proceeding. Cross-border insolvency proceedings in the 
CSME are likely to be excessively costly and slow, and subject to 
jurisdictional disputes, absent some form of legislative action.
A CARICOM Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency?
One solution for the problems of cross-border insolvency within the 
new CSME may be for the Legal Committee in consultation with 
the Associate Institutions to draft a Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency. This instrument could borrow from the experience of 
the EU Insolvency Law, and seek to improve upon its weaknesses. 
The COMI concept could perhaps be formally defined, and financial 
services not excluded. Because most CSME jurisdictions are common 
law jurisdictions, the adoption of a Model Law could, before formal 
implementation in the domestic law of Member States, furnish the 
common law courts with a coherent set of persuasive principles to be 
applied in the interim. 
Another approach would be to adopt a treaty which could then be 
implemented directly in domestic law. The drafting process might 
be problematic because of the local legal idiosyncrasies which might 
have to be addressed by individual Member States. A Model Law 
could be implemented by local legislatures with such modifications as 
might be required to bring it into conformity with local law.
These are all matters for the regional institutions (in consultation with 
insolvency practitioners and other key stakeholders) to decide.”9
9 “Tackling the Problems of Judicial Cooperation in Cross-border Corporate Insolvency Cases: is Common Law 
Fluidity or Statutory Solidity the Better Solution?” (Paper presented at UWI Faculty of Law Commercial Law 
Workshop, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18-19 August 2008), at 28-29.
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If one focuses solely on improving traditional international cooperation between 
different national insolvency systems, however, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme 
Court, which links the nine OECS territories, offers a unique and interesting 
opportunity for developing both common law and statutory judicial cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency cases between those territories. This unique regional court 
structure embracing legally separate national Magistrates Courts, High Courts and 
a single composite regional Court of Appeal links six sovereign States and three 
British Overseas Territories. Its administrative base is in Saint Lucia. All judges 
are appointed by a regional Judicial Service Commission, and may potentially be 
assigned to any territory. However, each territory continues to be governed by 
its own national laws.10 Presently, appeals lie to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in London, although recourse may in the fullness of time be had 
instead to the CARICOM-inspired Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”).11 To date, 
only Belize, Guyana and Barbados have amended their constitutions to replace the 
Privy Council with the CCJ as their highest appellate courts.
The President of the new British Supreme Court has strongly hinted, extra-
judicially, that independent Commonwealth countries should relinquish their 
historic ties to the Judicial Committee in London and utilize final appellate courts of 
their own.12 Chief Justice Ivor Archie of Trinidad and Tobago, in his 16 September 
2010 speech on the opening of the new Law Term, also implicitly speaking of the 
independent Commonwealth Caribbean, made the following eloquent plea:
“After 48 years of supposed independence, it astonishes me that there 
is even a debate about whether the Caribbean Court of Justice – the 
CCJ - should be our final Appellate Court. If we have the moral and 
intellectual capacity to run our own countries in the region, why can 
we not judge ourselves? This region has produced many intellectual 
giants including world class legal luminaries who sit on international 
courts, so the notion that somehow we will receive a superior form 
of justice from London bespeaks a self-doubt and an unwillingness 
to take responsibility for our jurisprudential self-determination. The 
irony is that, when we have had the courage to do so and to articulate 
our position, the Privy Council acknowledges that local judges are 
best placed to understand the context in which laws and regulations 
are passed and should be applied…
10 See generally: www.eccourts.org.
11 See: www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org.
12 See M. Peel and J. Croft, “Privy Council hampers Supreme Court” (Financial Times, 20 September 2009), copy 
available at: caribbeancourtofjustice.blogspot.com/2009/09/privy-council-hampers-supreme-court.html.
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We have, located in this jurisdiction, the Caribbean Court of Justice, 
comprising some of our best legal minds. We already subscribe to it by 
reason of our obligations under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
Contrary to some perceptions conveyed in the media, it is not a big 
drain on our resources. The running expenses of the Court are paid 
out of the income from a trust fund that was established several 
years ago. It is already paid for! Accessing the appellate jurisdiction 
will not cost us any more and it will certainly be more affordable 
for litigants. What is more, the procedures for the appointment of 
its Judges and the financing of the CCJ are being studied and hailed 
internationally as models for assuring judicial independence. Those 
who resist the adoption of the CCJ as our final appellate Court owe us 
better explanations than the ones that have been proffered thus far.”13
The Availability of Remedies for Creditors of Debtors Based “Offshore”: 
Separating Fact from Fiction 
“Safely in harbour is the king’s ship; in the deep nook, where once 
Thou callest me up at midnight to fetch dew from the still-vex’d 
Bermoothes, there she’s hid…” (Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act 1, 
Scene II)
By the early 21st century, nearly 400 years after Shakespeare first projected 
Bermuda onto the imaginative screen of the English-speaking world, the growth of 
international business in a global sense has impacted on these “offshore”/”onshore” 
tensions in two significant ways. More broadly, the significance of private 
international law has increased in exponential terms, in line with the mushrooming 
of commercial and personal transactions with an international element. More 
narrowly, however, as regards the traditionally clearly-defined jurisdictional 
boundaries between the “onshore” and “offshore” worlds, leading low-tax 
jurisdictions are becoming increasingly interconnected with the wider world in legal 
terms. This may be illustrated by examining the extent to which legal mechanisms 
exist in Bermuda, a prominent example of an “offshore” jurisdiction, to facilitate 
judicial cooperation with other forums in insolvency matters. Bermuda’s Chief 
Justice Richard Ground, writing extra-judicially, has observed:
13 Copy available at: www.ttlawcourts.org. For a more detailed analysis of the importance of the CCJ for 
independent members of the Commonwealth Caribbean, see Hon. Justice A. Saunders, “The Fear of cutting the 
Umbilical Cord… The Relevance of the Privy Council in Post Independent West Indian States” (2nd Annual 
Eugene Dupuch Annual Lecture, Nassau, the Bahamas, 28 January 2010), copy available at: www.edls.edu.bs.
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“Modern Bermuda is a thriving financial centre, with all the physical 
trappings of success. In particular, Hamilton, the capital and business 
centre, has undergone its own sea-change into something rich and 
strange, and the haunted islands of the imagination where Shakespeare 
set his Tempest are long gone…”14
In the early years of the evolution of OFCs such as Bermuda, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
such jurisdictions were widely perceived as debtor-friendly and “tax havens”. The 
suggestion that creditor remedies are non-existent or seriously deficient does not 
withstand even a cursory review of Bermuda’s modern insolvency law history. 
Substantial and effective relief has also doubtless been obtained by international 
creditors of entities elsewhere in the BACW, most notably in BVI and the Cayman 
Islands. This is not to suggest that the substantive law and procedural remedies 
are flawless; rather, it is contended that, in very broad and general terms, offshore 
jurisdictions such as Bermuda are no less creditor-friendly than major metropolitan 
countries which are home to leading international financial centres. In the case of 
the subject territories, the substantive and procedural law relating to commercial 
creditors’ rights is very similar to the law of England and Wales.15 While this point 
may well be advanced by some for purely promotional purposes, it is a point which 
finds support in objective data.
Sources of Data on Insolvency Law and Creditors’ Rights in the BACW
An important source of legal data on Bermuda and the OFCs is what might be 
described as commercial or promotional writing. Such material aims to promote 
the legal or other services provided by the authors or their firms for commercial 
purposes and might be said to lack the objectivity and critical dimension expected 
of academic writing. Such writing, typically in the form of short articles, is in 
reality simply a modern and more user-friendly version of the more academically 
rigorous and respected practitioner’s text. This very practical material stands or 
falls on its ability to accurately portray legal developments in the relevant field 
in a manner which will assist international practitioners to effectively serve 
their clients. There appears to have been a substantial growth in international 
practitioner legal scholarship in recent decades commensurate with both the huge 
growth of the practising legal profession globally and the related massive growth 
in volume and dollar value of international legal transactions. Some of this has 
14 Foreword in P. O’Neill and J. Woloniecki, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda (2nd ed) (2004, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London), at xi.
15 The focus of the present enquiry is the commercial creditor, not the ordinary consumer. The international creditor 
of a Bermuda insolvent company will invariably be a corporate entity or a sophisticated individual investor.
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been more academic in that it is designed to prepare students of law for legal 
practice; some has been both academic and practical designed for use by both 
practitioners and the courts. The short commercial article is more designed for 
commercial consumption alone.
An Australian writer, who had the privilege of working as a full-time legal scholar, 
as a full-time legal practitioner and as a full-time judge, is perhaps uniquely 
qualified to characterise, on an experiential basis, the various species of legal 
writing. Justice Robert Austin has noted the low light in which “trade writing” is 
viewed by academics:
“Legal scholarship in fields such as jurisprudence, criminology, 
international law or comparative law has a function and purpose that 
is self-evident. Reflection about the province and function of law, the 
causes and effects of, and ways of dealing with crime, the role of law 
in the resolution of international disputes, and the insights that can be 
gained by understanding and comparing different national solutions 
to legal problems, are not only fundamentally important enterprises. 
They are enterprises to be undertaken principally within an academic 
institution. Those who do that work ‘belong’ to the community 
of scholars whose ranks include philosophers, anthropologists, 
psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists and 
historians. They are occasionally heard to say (quite wrongly, in my 
experience) that their work is insufficiently appreciated by the legal 
profession and the wider community, but their security within the 
academic community is enviable. 
In comparison with those subjects, the academic pursuit of company 
law and equity necessarily involves exposition and analysis of legal 
principles, activities that some might regard as having a questionable 
claim to scholarly status. Even Professor Tilbury, who takes a 
catholic approach to the province of legal scholarship, draws a 
contrast between ‘scholarly’ and ‘trade’ material. In the eyes of some 
academics other than him (including, in my experience as a head of 
department, many of the non-lawyers on promotions committees), any 
expository and analytical writing on, say, company law, that might be 
useful to judges and legal practitioners is likely to be discounted as 
merely ‘trade’ material.”16
16 R. Austin, “Academics, Practitioners and Judges” (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 463, copy available at: sydney.
edu.au/law/slr/docs_pdfs/editions/slr_v26_n4.pdf.
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In the same paper, he went on to distinguish the role of the academic lawyer from 
that of the legal practitioner and judge, concluding as follows:
“Endeavours of all these kinds have in common the element of placing 
the products of our legislative, judicial and practitioner colleagues, 
and the academics and practitioners of other disciplines, within a 
wider pattern, with a focus on the identification and evaluation of 
the pattern. In this way, law becomes for academic lawyers a cultural 
phenomenon rather than simply a process of dispute resolution. The 
academic does not, qua academic, marshal arguments to advance a 
particular factual case.”
Justice Robert Austin then went on to reflect upon his commercial practice and the 
distinctive approach to legal scholarship in that domain:
“My practice as a commercial solicitor was focused almost entirely 
on transactions and events involving large corporations. While I 
continued my teaching, research and writing, my main enterprise 
was to steer corporate clients through the legal thicket towards their 
commercial objectives. There was no need to justify this activity, 
whose purpose was self-evident. There was no sense of insecurity. 
I adopted, of necessity, a utilitarian approach to relevant legal 
scholarship, except during the limited part of my working week when 
I could slip again into my comfortable academic cardigan. I found, 
however, that there was a certain kind of legal academic writing that 
was of great assistance. Interestingly, I was not much assisted by 
expository or even analytical writing. I was forced in my daily role 
to be completely abreast of the relevant legal materials, and to think 
about them long and hard, in their practical application. The practical 
application helped me to understand how the legal principles worked, 
and ultimately to gain a better understanding of the scope and the 
impact of legal rules than had been possible through pure academic 
reflection. While I paid attention to expository and analytical writing, 
I used it principally to make sure that there were no gaps in my 
perception of the legal landscape.
What proved to be more important was the academic writing on 
regulatory policy… The principal issue for the regulators is to 
ascertain the policy parameters of the problem. Where, on novel 
issues, is policy to be found? In my experience, the policy debate in 
these areas is conducted primarily in the academic literature of law, 
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economics and finance. Work in those fields is a resource of great 
value to the practitioner.”
Finally, he identified the main value of legal scholarship from the perspective of 
the judge:
“It follows that, without subscribing to any form of judicial activism, 
a judge at first instance in a superior court in Australia may be asked to 
determine uncertain points of law fairly often, and will need to obtain 
such assistance as is available. Occasionally, but infrequently, there 
will be competing lines of authority. More often, the question will 
be whether to distinguish a proposition formulated in the course of 
solving an arguably different problem. Sometimes, not as infrequently 
as one might imagine, new problems arise for decision because of 
legislative change, or because developing commercial activity tests 
the scope of a law or the principle upon which it is based.
In my experience over the last five years, such as it is, I have noticed 
that some kinds of academic work are distinctly more helpful than 
others. Mere exposition of a line of cases is, as you would expect, 
less helpful than analysis. Professor Tilbury aptly cites Lord Goff’s 
observation that a crumb of analysis is worth more than a loaf of 
opinion. But even good analytical work tends to be superseded by 
counsel’s submissions, which are likely to adopt what is pertinent 
from the academic analysis.
I find that three kinds of academic work are particularly useful. 
The first is academic work that places the issue for determination 
in its wider social and economic context. One can see, again and 
again, the influence of such work in the important judgments of 
appellate courts…
The second kind of academic work takes up a categorically new 
legal development, and explores its implications and outworkings. 
This is particularly helpful for the judge who is required to make a 
decision in the new area. The judge must always beware of making a 
determination which may have unforeseen consequences. Rigorous 
academic literature will assist to identify the pitfalls.
Thirdly, I value academic writing that brings into focus legal 
developments in other countries, particularly the United Kingdom, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States, countries whose judicial 
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experience is most likely to be helpful to judges here. The pressure 
of judicial work is such that we cannot keep abreast of overseas 
academic developments in all of the areas in which we are required 
to make decisions...”
The present paper is informed in general terms by all the three strands of legal 
scholarship identified by Justice Robert Austin in “Academics, Practitioners 
and Judges”, his 20 November 2003 address to the Sydney Law Review 50th 
Anniversary Dinner. It draws on practitioner as well as more rigorous academic 
scholarship, seeks to hint at points of theoretical interest as well and also (in 
discussing developments in several countries) hopefully collates data which may 
be of interest to judges as well as practitioners and scholars.
The law relating to winding-up and restructuring is described in the reinsurance 
context in the first scholarly practitioner’s text to deal extensively with Bermuda 
law.17 The civil and commercial law and procedure of Bermuda is also described 
in a text first published in loose-leaf and online in 2009 with Bermuda the only 
member of the BACW to be initially included.18 Insolvency and other creditor 
remedies available under the law of both Bermuda and some other regional 
jurisdictions are discussed in other more practical books and numerous shorter 
articles all written by practitioners.19 There is another important body of legal 
scholarship which must not be overlooked.
Most BACW territories have neither law faculties nor law schools. However, 
the Commonwealth Caribbean is served by a regional university, the University 
of the West Indies (“UWI”), with a Law Faculty based in Barbados and Law 
Schools based in Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and (more recently) the 
Bahamas. In addition, the Cayman Islands boast the Cayman Islands Law School, 
which is linked to the University of Liverpool for academic purposes, but which 
issues its own vocational qualifications. An invaluable online summary guide to 
Commonwealth Caribbean legal research listing relevant books and regional law 
17 P. O’Neill and J. Woloniecki, The Law of Reinsurance in England and Bermuda (3rd ed) (2010, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London), Chapters 17-18.
18 See N. Hargun and B. Adamson, “Bermuda” in A. Colman (ed), Encyclopaedia of International Commercial 
Litigation (2008, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn), copy available at: www.kluwerlawonline.com.
19 See e.g. G. Moss, I. Kawaley, H. Seife and N. Montgomery (eds), Cross-Frontier Insolvency of Insurance 
Companies (2011, Sweet & Maxwell, London), Chapter 3 (Bermuda), Chapter 5 (Barbados) and Chapter 7 
(Cayman Islands); C. Bickley, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands Company Law (2nd ed) 
(2007, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong), Chapter 17; Kawaley et al. (eds), above note 3, Chapters 3-5, 
10-12 and 17-19 on Bermuda, BVI and the Cayman Islands respectively; J. Fraser, “Bermuda” in P. Smale and 
C. Jennings (eds), The International Comparative Legal Guide to Corporate Recovery & Insolvency 2008: A 
Practical Insight to Corporate Recovery & Insolvency (2008, Global Legal Group, London); K. George and P. 
Mitchell, “Bermuda” in Americas Restructuring and Insolvency Guide, above note 4.
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journals published by the New York University Law School is the “Globalex-Guide 
to Caribbean Law Research”.20 This website interestingly defines the Caribbean 
legal region as including all members of the BACW, and gives an overview of the 
various legal systems. While a number of texts appear to be of general interest, 
none appear to deal with creditors’ rights and remedies or insolvency law in detail.21 
However, the most comprehensive source of actual Commonwealth Caribbean 
legal materials appears to be the UWI Cave Hill Barbados Law Faculty Library, 
which actually retains regional periodicals and books as well as provides links 
to various websites for legislation and judgments.22 Most courts have websites 
affording free access to electronic copies of judgments.
An initial review of those sources which can readily be identified by means of 
internet research suggests that the primary sources of legal materials considering 
the law of BACW territories relating to creditors remedies and insolvency in 
any detail are practitioners’ articles or texts of one form or another, principally 
focussing on the leading OFCs. To the extent that insolvency law is studied at the 
postgraduate level, one can imagine that primary reliance in the academic context 
would be placed on British or other Commonwealth texts. This would merely be 
consistent with the legislative schemes in the Commonwealth Caribbean being 
heavily influenced by British or Canadian precedents. Should this speculation be 
correct, this would also suggest that the insolvency law of the subject jurisdictions 
will potentially either:
(a) remain subject to higher level and non-self-interested academic analysis by 
academics in major metropolitan centres beyond the region; or
(b) be at risk of arrested development in the absence of fertilisation by purely 
theoretical academic analysis.
In the field of cross-border insolvency, it might be argued, an internationalist 
approach would be welcome, embracing a philosophical approach which has 
gained international rather than merely local acceptance in any event.
20 Copy available at: www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Caribbean1.htm.
21 An exception is A. Burgess, Law of Corporate Receivers and Receiver-Managers (2002, Caribbean Law Publishing 
Company, Kingston). However, books of general interest in this regard include W. Anderson, Elements of Private 
International Law (2003, Caribbean Law Publishing Company, Kingston) (Professor Anderson is now Justice 
Anderson of the Caribbean Court of Justice); R-M. Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems 
(2008, Routledge Cavendish, London); C. Denbow, Life Insurance Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean (2nd 
ed) (2009, Bloomsbury Professional, London); D. di Mambro, A. Saunders and L. di Mambro, The Caribbean 
Civil Court Practice (2nd ed) (2011, Lexis-Nexis, London) (forthcoming publication); R. Ramlogan and N. 
Persadie, Commonwealth Caribbean Business Law (2nd ed) (2010, Routledge–Cavendish, London).
22 See: lawlibrary.cavehill.uwi.edu. Libraries are obviously maintained at the three UWI Law Schools as well.
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But if legal academics are not focussing on the policy merits of adopting such 
a legislative approach (in a region where most territories lack modern statutory 
international cooperation provisions) and the various legal subtleties which 
inevitably arise from the distinctive local commercial and public policy contexts, 
the vacuum may have to be filled by practitioner scholars, who may well be 
required to stretch the traditional parameters of practical legal scholarship.
Are the OFCs Creditor-Averse Debtor Havens?
It is submitted that an abundance of credible legal data exists to rebut the 
uninformed negative stereotype which suggests that OFCs like Bermuda are fora 
where creditors’ rights are either diluted or non-existent. A recent study, which 
only directly considered three of the eighteen subject territories, reached the 
following conclusions:
“Overall, the position of the British offshore world23 in relation to 
judicial cooperation may be summarised as follows. With respect 
to obtaining evidence for use in foreign proceedings, the subject 
territories’ domestic law is consistent with the applicable international 
law rules. With respect to enforcing foreign judgments, there is 
scope for further legislative improvements even though there are 
no globally adopted reciprocal enforcement rules. As far as cross-
border insolvency is concerned, the subject territories have adopted 
varying statutory approaches but have a demonstrated track-record 
of providing common law assistance to foreign insolvency courts. 
The externally-focused nature of the commercial environment in the 
offshore domain could over time result in these British jurisdictions 
generating a distinctive body of jurisprudence dealing with cross-
border legal concerns. And with their economies heavily dependent on 
international business, and commercial litigation with an international 
element enjoying a high profile, the courts in the subject territories 
appear to be firmly committed to an internationalist rather than a 
protectionist approach.”24
Although the position in the BACW generally has not been actually considered 
here, it is possible to make the following tentative suggestions. The law relating to 
obtaining evidence in support of civil proceedings abroad is likely to be similar, 
in most of the region, to the Bermuda, BVI and the Cayman Islands positions. 
23 The term “British offshore world” was restricted to six British Overseas Territories in this text.
24 Kawaley et al. (eds), above note 3, at 309.
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The 1965 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial 
Documents applies to all six subject territories and five independent states 
(Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) as well. The 1970 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil and Commercial Matters only formally extends to Anguilla and the Cayman 
Islands, but the substantive law of Bermuda and BVI has been shown to comply 
with this Convention in any event.25 Only Barbados is further formally bound 
by this Convention.26 It is possible that domestic legislation giving effect to this 
Convention exists in other subject jurisdictions which are not bound at the public 
international law level.27 The Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) adopted throughout 
most of the region, substantially based on their English equivalent, are believed to 
contain provisions facilitating obtaining evidence for use in foreign courts.
As far as the enforcement of foreign judgments is concerned, all of the independent 
Commonwealth Caribbean attained independence after Britain oversaw the 
enactment of reciprocal enforcement of judgment legislation in various colonial 
territories in the late 1950s. In Bermuda, the Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act 1958 applies to United Kingdom money judgments and money judgments 
from, inter alia, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, BVI, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Beyond the BACW, the Bermuda Act applies 
to judgments from the Australian states and territories and Nigeria as well.28 It is 
reasonable to infer that reciprocal legislation does exist in the territories to which 
the Bermuda Act applies. This regime provides for automatic registration which 
results in the domestication of the foreign judgment, not unlike the European 
Union judgment enforcement regime. However, the common law position, which 
probably appertains throughout the BACW, is that all foreign money judgments 
(and non-money judgments as well) can be enforced by means of an action on the 
judgment, following (subject to local statutory modifications) the same principles 
which would be followed by the English courts.
As far as international cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases is concerned, 
operative statutory powers only appear to exist in three (Barbados, the Cayman 
Islands and Trinidad and Tobago) of the eighteen subject territories. The scope of 
common law judicial cooperation will be considered in further detail below. What 
25 Ibid., at 306.
26 See: www.hcch.net.
27 See e.g. the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, Ch 5:07 (Dominica).
28 Kawaley et al. (eds), above note 3, at 137-139 (Bermuda), 142-143 (BVI) and 154 (the Cayman islands, the 
relevant legislation of which only applies to Australia).
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remains to consider by way of background is the general legal framework within 
which creditors may seek relief.
It has already been mentioned that much of the region has adopted procedural 
rules based on the English CPR model. The operation of the CPR regime for 
commercial litigation has been modified in England and Wales for the Commercial 
Court.29 Bermuda has adopted the overriding objective of the English CPR regime 
but retained rules substantially based on the pre-Woolf reforms Supreme Court 
Practice 1999.30 Throughout the BACW, therefore, the position is likely to be 
that civil procedure has a distinctly British (but not Scottish!) flavour.31 More 
importantly still, and the Civil Code jurisdictions of Dominica and St. Lucia 
apart, the substantive common law and equitable remedies for breach of contract, 
torts, breaches of fiduciary duty and fraud will reflect principles developed in 
England and Wales and elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, independent and 
dependent. While local statutory idiosyncrasies, public policy interests and judge-
made law refinements will undoubtedly exist, in the international commercial 
context it is reasonable to expect an internationalist approach to be adopted in the 
context of the adjudication of creditors’ claims.
Offshore Challenges to Creditors’ Rights
The countries of the BACW may all broadly be characterised as emerging 
jurisdictions which have either comparatively recently (within the last 50 years) 
attained statehood or which remain British dependencies. Those which would 
claim developed country status are geographically small with economies heavily 
dependent on potentially volatile externally driven engines. In competing with each 
other and global financial centres for lucrative business, the OFCs in particular 
invariably promote a “light-touch” regulatory approach, while at the same time 
seeking to satisfy international regulatory bodies that local regulation meets 
international standards. As far as insolvency law in the mature OFCs is concerned, 
there is a distinct trend towards ample protection of creditors’ rights despite the 
obvious public policy need to attract new potential debtors. Nevertheless, where to 
draw the legislative policy line will always be potentially controversial.
29 A. Colman, V. Lyon and P. Hopkins, The Practice and Procedure of the Commercial Court (6th ed) (2008, 
Informa Law, London), at 18.
30 Rules of the Supreme Court 1985; Rules of the Supreme Court Amendment Rules 2005.
31 The adoption of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Procedure Rules 2000 and the Trinidad and Tobago CPR is discussed 
by Justice A. Saunders in “Witness Statements and the New Civil Procedure Rules: The OECS Experience”, copy 
available at: www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/papersandarticles.
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Although Bermuda is generally regarded one of the top two (or three) reinsurance 
centres in the world, its regulatory regime has often been criticised, often for political 
or commercial reasons. The suggestion by an anonymous United States insurance 
broker that Bermuda reinsurers are “almost-pirates of the almost-Caribbean”32 
can only sensibly be construed as partly rhetorical and partly made in jest. It is 
true that Bermuda’s regulatory system relies heavily on industry self-regulation, 
but corporate self-regulation is increasingly recognized as an important tool in 
promoting responsible corporate behaviour.33 Yet, while the principal challenges 
to creditors’ rights are perceptual, the need for scholars to look critically and not 
solely commercially at legal frameworks is ironically more likely to promote the 
long-term commercial interests of the jurisdictions concerned. In this regard, the 
following critique of Bermuda’s current director liability law is significant:
“It is now open to a company incorporated in Bermuda to enter into a 
contract exempting its directors, officers and auditors from all liability 
(including the liability which previously existed in cases of wilful 
default and wilful neglect), save in cases of fraud and dishonesty. 
The amendment appears to allow directors of Bermuda com panies to 
be lazy, incompetent and stupid. But they must not be dishonest.”34
Section 98 of the Bermuda Companies Act 1981 was amended in 199635 to delete 
the bracketed words from the following provisions:
“Exemption, indemnification and liability of officers, etc.
98 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a company may in its bye-laws 
or in any contract or arrangement between the company 
and any officer, or any person employed by the company 
as auditor, exempt such officer or person from, or 
indemnify him in respect of, any loss arising or liability 
attaching to him by virtue of any rule of law in respect of 
any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust 
of which the officer or person may be guilty in relation to 
the company or any subsidiary thereof.
32 See: www.theledger.com/Article/20101024.
33 O. Dilling, M. Herberg and G. Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and Law in Transnational 
Economic Transactions (2008, Hart Publishing, Portland OR).
34 O’Neill and Woloniecki, above note 17, at paragraph 16-036.
35 Companies Amendment Act 1996, 1996:21.
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 (2) Any provision, whether contained in the bye-laws of a 
company or in any contract or arrangement between the 
company and any officer, or any person employed by the 
company as auditor, exempting such officer or person 
from, or indemnifying him against any liability which by 
virtue of any rule of law would otherwise attach to him 
in respect of any [wilful negligence, wilful default,] fraud 
or dishonesty of which he may be guilty in relation to the 
company shall be void…”
The effect of the original indemnity provisions in practical terms was that under 
the indemnity provisions contained in standard Bermuda bye-laws, if a liquidator 
wished to sue a former director or officer, a claim would be liable to be struck-
out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action if it alleged simple negligence 
or ordinary breach of duty. The claim would have to particularize allegations of 
wilful negligence or wilful breach of duty.36 The 1996 amendment had the effect 
of permitting Bermuda companies to indemnify their directors and officers not just 
in respect of simple negligence but in respect of deliberate breach of duty (falling 
short of fraud and dishonesty as well). It is unclear what international standards 
exist (if any) with respect to such indemnity provisions, but section 98(2) on its 
face is not easy to justify.
If it were to be the case that the scope of indemnity could be shown to be 
inconsistent with the preponderance of international legislative practice in this 
regard, creditors aggrieved with having to meet such a high standard of liability 
to recover compensation from an insolvent company’s former officers might be 
able to contend that section 98(2) is invalid because it compulsorily acquires their 
property rights in breach of section 13 of the Bermuda Constitution. Section 13 
prohibits the compulsory acquisition of property save:
(a) in the public interest, provided compensation is payable and its assessment by 
the Crown can be appealed to the Court (section 13(1)); and
(b) in specified cases including “as an incident of… a contract” (section 13(2)
(a) (iii)).
The relevant indemnity permitted by section 98(2) is arguably an incident of 
a contract between the company and its directors. And section 98(2) might be 
construed as permitting contracts which take away the right of creditors to sue 
36 See e.g. Focus Insurance Co. (in liquidation) v Hardy et al. [1992] Bda LR 25; [1992] Bda LR 47.
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(through a liquidator) former officers whose deliberate breach of duty contributed 
to a company’s insolvency. Savings provisions of section 13(2)(a) are not absolute; 
each provision applies:
“…except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing 
done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society.”
So domestic legislative policy considerations notwithstanding, the extent of 
director liability exemptions Bermudian companies can provide, a matter of some 
import to the moral efficacy of insolvency law, may ultimately be subject to any 
international best practice standards which may be established in any event. Most 
territories in the BACW are ahead of Britain in having written constitutions with 
entrenched fundamental rights and freedoms provisions, which the legislative arm 
of Government may not depart from save by way of a constitutional amendment.
The lack of modern insolvency law frameworks may, it must be admitted, adversely 
impact on creditors’ rights in a variety of ways, particularly in jurisdictions which 
do not have a wealth of insolvency law expertise or experience. One example 
may helpfully be cited because it also provides a potential solution to the problem 
concerned. Bermuda’s insolvency law framework (and likely the counterpart 
schemes in most of the BACW region) only explicitly recognises the right to 
petition to wind up:
“…either by the company or by any creditor or creditors, including 
any contingent or prospective creditor or creditors, contributory or 
contributories, or by all of those parties, together or separately.” 
(section 163(1)).
In England, the counterpart provision had been held by the High Court to require 
a company petition to be authorised by the shareholders unless the bye-laws or 
articles of association expressly authorised the directors to file a petition.37 The 
effect of this decision was reversed by statute in the United Kingdom when section 
124(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provided that a petition could be presented:
“…either by the company, or the directors, or by any creditor 
or creditors, including any contingent or prospective creditor or 
creditors, contributory or contributories, or by all of those parties, 
together or separately.” (emphasis added)
37 Re Emmadart [1979] Ch 540.
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It was seemingly not commonplace for the directors to be authorised by the bye-
laws to present a winding-up petition and problematic for directors advised to 
urgently file to be required to obtain shareholder approval. In Re First Virginia,38 
the Bermuda Supreme Court, faced with a winding-up petition presented by a 
company on the authority of the directors in circumstances where the bye-laws were 
silent on the authority to petition issue, declined to follow Re Emmadart. Instead, 
the Court preferred the contrary decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court 
in Re Inkerman Grazing39 and made the appointment of the provisional liquidator 
sought on the company petition presented on the authority of the directors alone. 
This case offers a solution to the question of whether directors may determine to 
present a winding-up petition when neither the bye-laws of the company nor the 
insolvency statute expressly confers such authority on them. It implies (without 
deciding) that the position would be different if the bye-laws of the company had 
expressly required shareholder approval. The decision was based on two main 
grounds.
Firstly, and operatively, the need for shareholder approval for the presentation of 
the petition by the insolvent company was dispensed with on the ground that once 
insolvency supervenes, the management is required to act in the interests of the 
unsecured creditors rather than the shareholders:
“52. If it be right that directors in carrying out their general 
management duties are required, after the onset of insolvency, to 
have primary regard to the welfare of the company’s creditors, why 
should their powers be construed as excluding the right to take what 
may be the most important steps towards achieving that goal, absent 
shareholder approval? The primary duties of directors are set out in 
section 97(1) of the Companies Act in provisions which are generally 
accepted as reflecting the common law.
“DUTY OF CARE OF OFFICERS
97 (1) Every officer of a company in exercising his powers and 
discharging his duties shall–
38 Re First Virginia Reinsurance Ltd (2003) 66 WIR 133; [2003] Bda LR 47.
39 Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd [1972] ACLR 102. The learned authors of the Bermuda chapter in the Encyclopaedia 
of International Commercial Litigation, above note 18, at paragraph A1.2, assert that English decisions are not 
only highly persuasive but also “are invariably followed in practice”, based on Remington v Remington, Civil 
Appeal 1977:1. This statement must be read as implying, by necessary implication, that there is no cogent reason 
not to follow the relevant English decision.
65Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean World: Challenges and Opportunities
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of 
the company; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and shall that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise in comparable circumstances.”
53. Does the duty to act in the “best interests of the company” not 
mean, in the insolvency context, the “best interests of the creditors”? 
If the interests of creditors dictate that a winding up petition should 
be filed and shareholders (who may wish to improperly extract 
funds from the company or recklessly incur further credit in the 
vain hope that a recovery may be achieved) consider this course is 
undesirable, does the Act intend that the company drift, in limbo, 
until an informed creditor or an enlightened shareholder presents a 
third party petition? This construction of the Act is both illogical and 
absurd. If the interests of the insolvent company are synonymous with 
the interests of creditors, the wishes of shareholders become all but 
irrelevant and it should not be legally possible for shareholders to 
approve action contrary to the company (and its creditors’) interests. 
On this fundamental ground of principle, shareholder approval cannot 
be required for a bona fide decision by directors of a company which 
appears to be insolvent to present a petition for its winding-up in 
the name of the company. This analysis has the greatest force in 
circumstances where the bye-laws of a company do not mandate 
shareholder approval, even though it must be doubted whether bye-
laws can validly deprive directors of an insolvent company of the 
right to present a petition without shareholder approval.
54. Support for this reasoning may be found in the following passage 
from Palmer’s Company Law, Vol 1 25th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: 
London, 1992, R, 86: July 2002) at paragraph 8.506:
‘There is now a growing body of dicta in the English courts to the 
effect, that, when the company becomes insolvent or is nearly so, then 
the interests of the company include the interests of the creditors as 
well as, perhaps in some cases instead of, those of the shareholders. 
This view is supported by a number of Commonwealth authorities. 
An important consequence of this change in the definition of the 
company for the purposes of directors’ duties is that actions of the 
directors which have adversely affected the value of the company’s 
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assets but which, whilst the company was solvent, could have been 
ratified by the shareholders, may no longer be so ratified.’
55. While this analysis of directors duties, and re-casting of the identity 
of a company, may only have been articulated in reasoned judgments 
with the growth of complex cross-jurisdictional insolvency in 
comparatively modern times, it is entirely consistent with the United 
Kingdom practice before Emmadart, and the New South Wales 
practice before and after Emmadart. This practice did not develop in 
a vacuum; it can only have been inspired by the textual framework 
of statutory insolvency law, which once considered makes it obvious 
that shareholder approval for a company winding-up petition based on 
insolvency cannot sensibly be required. Indeed, the principle that on 
a creditor’s petition little weight will ordinarily be given to the views 
of contributories (shareholders) has been established since the mid-
19th century (see, e.g., Re Camburn Petroleum Products Ltd. [1979] 
3 All ER 297 at 303c-d). This practice flows from the umbrella core 
principle of both corporate and personal insolvency law, that neither 
shareholders nor the bankrupt may participate in distributions from 
the estate until creditors are paid in full. This principle is embodied 
in section 72 of the Bankruptcy Act (“Right of bankrupt to surplus”) 
and section 225 as read with section 158(g) of the Companies Act. 
Where creditors cannot be paid in full, the shareholders in practical 
terms have no recognizable interest in the administration of the 
insolvent estate.
56. In addition, in interpreting the scope of directors powers to authorize 
winding- up proceedings based on insolvency under the Bermudian 
Companies Act, regard must be had to the policy of the Act and the 
commercial context in which it operates. In this regard, I unreservedly 
adopt the reasoning of Street, J. in Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd., in 
the above-cited passage on which Mr. Hargun relied. In cases such as 
the present, it is important that directors be able to take prompt action 
to preserve assets for the benefit of creditors. In the modern context, 
particularly in a domicile such as Bermuda where many insolvencies 
involve far flung creditors and assets, with potentially huge sums at 
risk, shareholders would not in the insolvency context expect to be 
consulted on winding-up proceedings. They would probably not be 
consulted (with a view to giving them a veto power) in the United 
States or the United Kingdom, the jurisdictions with which we have 
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the closest commercial and legal ties. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the traditional notion of shareholder control of litigation is dead: 
Derek French, ‘Applications to Wind up Companies’ (Blackstone 
Press: London, 1993), at page 387.”
Secondly, and alternatively, the Court held that any implied statutory requirement 
for shareholders to approve the presentation of a petition in the name of an 
insolvent company should be rejected as a matter of construction since it would 
be an impermissible procedural impediment to the constitutional right of access 
to the Court, protected by section 6(8) of the Bermuda Constitution construed in 
accordance with European Court of Human Rights case law on Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights:
“65. The legal character of shareholder approval, procedural or 
substantive, is relevant for the following reason. It is probably 
true that the right of access to the Court can only be infringed by 
procedural impediments, and is not infringed by substantive law 
requirements: Re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Group Litigation 
[2003] 1 All ER 935 at 971. For the reasons just stated above, it 
seems to me that where shareholder approval has no substantive 
significance in the determination by an insolvent company that a 
winding-up petition should be presented, any statutory requirement 
that such approval be obtained would be merely procedural. The 
position would be otherwise in the case of a solvent company, the 
vital interests of which cannot be determined without reference to the 
shareholders. The general rule, that the interests of the company are 
synonymous with those of the shareholders and on whose behalf all 
major decisions are taken, would then come into play.
66. For this additional reason, should the statutory position be 
considered ambiguous, I would resolve any doubts in favour of the 
conclusion that no shareholder approval was, in the circumstances of 
this case, required.”
This illustrates that while statutory frameworks may not explicitly provide for 
matters impacting on creditors’ rights, there are often corresponding opportunities 
through the deployment of creative “lawyering” to fill the apparent statutory gaps. 
This is perhaps modern law at its best: construing rules that have been codified 
based on the civil law tradition in a pragmatic way focused on doing justice in 
the case at hand, following the spirit of the common law tradition. Is this perhaps 
also an example of what Professor Bob Wessels has described as the “creeping 
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convergence of civil procedural law and common procedural law”?40 It is the 
application of this legal technique which is involved in adapting pre-corporate 
rescue insolvency frameworks for use in corporate rescue proceedings. As far as 
judicial cooperation is concerned, however, the application of substantive common 
law principles to supply rules which can neither expressly nor impliedly be found 
in statutory rules is required.
Common Law Judicial Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases
“Even though it is possible to discover an underlying concurrence 
between domestic insolvency laws with regard to some of the 
most fundamental matters of principle, it must be acknowledged 
that the dissimilarities are so numerous, and so substantial, as to 
oblige the realist to accept that the world essentially consists of 
separate, self-contained systems. When confronted by a case of 
insolvency containing international elements, national systems 
have responded by developing their rules of private international 
law, employing traditional techniques and concepts, to determine 
issues of jurisdiction, choice of law, and international recognition 
in conformity with locally accepted norms of decision. The ensuing 
diversity has been unusually intense, even by the standards of private 
international law, with the result that the quest for unifying principles 
has so far proved to be elusive. What can be discerned is an historic 
struggle between opposing principles, espoused at various times by 
different schools of thought whose global influence has fluctuated. 
In so far as a prevalent tendency seems to be emerging at the current 
time, the rate of progress is slow and the results uneven.”41
The Origins of Common Law Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation
The modern common law rules on judicial cooperation are built on rules 
developed in the context of personal bankruptcy in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
An internationalist approach developed in response to Britain’s internationalist 
commercial and political interests of the period. As Lord Hoffman, writing extra-
judicially, has put it:
40 B. Wessels, “A Break Through for Judicial Cross-Border Communication in Europe?” (October 2010), at 2, copy 
available at: bobwessels.nl/wordpress-content/wp/uploads.
41 I. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd ed) (2005, Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 
paragraph 1.11.
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“British attitudes to cross-border insolvency are a product of 
its history and its legal and commercial culture… First, British 
bankruptcy law was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when Britain was the foremost trading nation in the world. 
The law therefore developed to reflect the needs of a mercantile 
community in which the assets of an insolvent trader might be 
situated in any part of the world. Secondly, Britain was an Empire, 
composed of many countries with widely different legal systems but 
all subjects of the British Crown. Notwithstanding the differences in 
legal systems, courts of the Empire were expected to cooperate with 
other courts and particularly with the courts of the United Kingdom. 
The right to claim assistance from courts in other jurisdictions and 
the duty to render assistance to those courts has long been a part of 
the British system…”42
However, it seems clear that the English courts initially developed common law 
rules of private international law through citing the texts of Continental European 
scholars.43 It has been suggested that a 14th century Italian scholar, Bartolus of 
Saxoferrato, first conceived of the notion of the courts of one forum applying 
the laws of another forum. However, Dutch theorists appear to have dominated 
the 16th century, with Hugo Grotius now recognised as the father of public 
international law. In the 17th century, the most influential text for the two centuries 
which followed is said to have been written by a Roman-Dutch scholar Ulrich 
Huber, “De Conflictu Legum”, which contributed to:
(a)  the notion of comity as a rationale for giving effect to foreign law; and
(b)  the idea that when one forum is said to be applying foreign law, it is merely 
recognising vested rights acquired under foreign law.44
Against this background, it is quite apposite that Professor Ian Fletcher45 identifies 
as one of the earliest British cases to articulate the universalist approach to 
personal bankruptcy in an early 19th century cross-border case which came from 
British Guiana (now Guyana, part of the BACW region), then a Roman-Dutch 
42 L. Hoffmann, “Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective” (1996) 64 Fordham Law Review 2507, at 2507-2508.
43 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 1.20.
44 K. Barnes, “The Role of the European Union in the Harmonisation of International Private Law: A Theoretical 
Perspective” [2009] Cambridge Student Law Review 124, at 126-127.
45 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 1.24.
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law jurisdiction,46 and which was decided at first instance by a judge who made 
extensive reference to Dutch and other civil law treatises.47 It has been noted of 
the trial judge:
“Although… Jabez Henry, was common-law trained, he was equally 
at home in Roman-Dutch law, having served as President (ie Chief 
Justice) of Essequibo-Demerara from 1813-1816 and authored a ten-
volume translation (published in 1828) of van der Linden’s Institutes 
of the Laws of Holland…”48
This historical legacy suggests that common lawyers can only fairly boast of 
creating a more flexible case by case means of deciding what substantive law rules 
apply in the context of judicial cooperation in individual cross-border insolvency 
cases, while owing a heavy debt in terms of legal content to civil lawyers generally 
and Dutch lawyers in particular. And the case of Odwin v Forbes itself provides 
an helpful illustration of common law judicial cooperation at play. The continuing 
significance of this early 19th century judgment is amply demonstrated by the 
recent re-publication of Jabez Henry’s own subsequent post-retirement book 
commenting on the principles articulated in the decision.49
Odwin v Forbes reports the Privy Council decision affirming the first instance 
decision three years earlier of the court of Demerara, with the bulk of the report 
summarizing the judgment in the court below. It describes the key facts as being 
that the Plaintiffs were planters in Demerara, British Guiana, who shipped sugar 
to a firm in London (Turnbull, Forbes & Co.), of which the Defendant was a 
partner. For payment, the Plaintiffs drew bills on the firm until its bankruptcy, 
after which the bills were not honoured. Having obtained a certificate of discharge 
from his bankruptcy, in which the Plaintiffs did not prove, the Defendant migrated 
to Demerara where he was sued for the pre-discharge debt. The Defendant 
successfully contended that the English discharge order should be recognised 
by the Demerara Court as discharging his liability to the Plaintiffs under British 
Guiana law. The first instance decision is fully set out in Jabez Henry’s recently re-
published book and runs to almost 90 typed pages, only one of which summarises 
the facts.
46 The Civil Law of Guyana Act, Cap 6:01, enacted on 1 January 1917, seems to have effectively abrogated Roman-
Dutch law for most purposes and introduced the rules of common law and equity in its place.
47 Odwin v Forbes (1817) 1 Buck 57 (PC).
48 J. Glenn, “Mixed Jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Mixing, Unmixing, Remixing” (2008) 12(1) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, at 13 (note 57), copy available at: www.ejcl.org/121/art121-10.doc.
49 J. Henry, The Judgment of the Court of Demerara, in the Case of Odwin v. Forbes (1823) (1823, S. Sweet, 
London) (reprinted 2010, Kessinger Publishing LLC, Whitefish MT).
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The court of Demerara (chaired by Henry but also comprised of six other panel 
members) firstly analysed the extent to which certain laws, such as those relating 
to bankruptcy, lunacy, marriage, wills and estates, were generally regarded (in 
various European countries) as having universal effect based on the domicile of 
the person concerned. The judgment stated:
“Having now considered the general principles, as they bear upon 
this subject, and shewn how far, according to the third proposition 
of Huber, one country gives effect to the laws of another, from a 
principle of comity and mutual convenience, we shall proceed to the 
second part of the question, which is to consider the nature and effect 
of the English bankrupt laws, and whether the admission of them 
would be within the principles we have just considered...”50
The first instance judgment notes that English bankruptcy statutes, dating back to 
34 and 35 Henry VIII, chapter 4, had consistently provided that an assignment of 
the bankrupt’s assets for the benefit of his creditors took place upon bankruptcy 
creating a fund over which the debtor neither had title nor control. 5 George II, 
chapter 30 provided that:
(a) the issue of a certificate to the bankrupt operated as a release and discharge 
from all debts due under the bankruptcy commission; and
(b) in dealing with property located abroad, the statute was clearly intended to 
have universal operation.
The Demerara court then went on to consider: 
“…how far other independent states have admitted this ubiquity, 
either in principle, by assuming the same power and right in their 
own bankrupt laws; or in practice, by giving effect to those of 
Great Britain.”51
This was a very sophisticated analysis. The court, having concluded that foreign 
laws were only recognised and given effect to on the basis of “comity and mutual 
convenience”, tested the contention that the bankrupt’s discharge in England 
should be given effect to under British Guiana colonial law by reference to:
(a)  how far other nations asserted universality for their bankruptcy laws; and
50 Ibid., at 99-100.
51 Ibid., at 100.
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(b)  how far other nations recognised British bankruptcy law as having extra-
territorial effect.
This approach indicates that in 1814, long before the late 20th century advent of 
internal self-government for British Overseas Territories, colonial legal systems 
were (to some extent at least) wholly independent legal systems which dealt with 
conflict of law issues within the Empire in the same manner as conflicts between 
the law of the colony and an entirely foreign state.
However, in Odwin v Forbes, there was the further distinction that the formerly 
Dutch territory had retained Dutch civil law; the court concluded that the issue 
before it:
“…being a casus omissus in our laws, must be regulated by the laws 
of Holland, or our customs; and in failure the civil law, so far as those 
laws can guide us...”
The court’s decision, which instrumentally fed the well of “English” common law 
principles relating to the discretion to recognise foreign insolvency proceedings 
and their effects, was primarily based on an analysis of Dutch conflict of law 
principles! The Court concluded:
“It is therefore only upon the question, how far on the general principle 
of mutual comity between independent and foreign tribunals, we can 
give effect to the certificate without prejudice to our own citizens, 
that this court can take notice of it as a defence, and give it equitable 
consideration. There are many cases in which this court could not, 
without great prejudice and injustice to its own citizens, give effect 
to English bankruptcy laws; but in this case, as no such prejudice 
appears, as no positive law or statute intervenes, and the question 
is perfectly res integra, we may give equitable circumstances and 
general principles their due weight in our decision.
The court therefore, considering that the assignment under the English 
commission is compulsory on the part of the bankrupt; that it divests 
all his property out of him wheresoever situate; that by its universal 
and penal effect it deprives him of the means of compounding with 
his foreign creditors; and further considering that the laws of Holland 
give effect to this assignment: that this court also does it, and has done 
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it under this commission; we think it but equitable that we should give 
equal effect to the certificate...”52
It is a testimony to the breadth and depth of the analysis to be found in the first 
instance judgment of the Court of Demerara that the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council affirmed the decision and saw no need to furnish additional 
reasons.53 The fact that the case was reported demonstrates that the principles 
enunciated by the Caribbean Court were considered to be of general application. 
Almost 200 years later, the judgment, undoubtedly written substantially by Jabez 
Henry himself, is still relevant in explaining the otherwise hidden and mysterious 
roots of the modern common law discretion to recognise the effects of foreign 
bankruptcy and insolvency orders and the proceedings in which they are made. It 
is based on the concept that most countries intend their bankruptcy laws to have 
universal effects and recognise the common intent of other countries in this regard, 
but is subject to a reservation of the right to decline recognition where recognition 
would conflict with compelling countervailing local interests.
Recognition of Foreign Winding-Up Orders and the Status of Foreign Liquidators
The oldest and most fundamental common law power in the field of cross-border 
judicial cooperation in the insolvency field, therefore, is the recognition of foreign 
winding-up orders and the recognition of the right of liquidators appointed by a 
court in the company’s place of incorporation to act on behalf of the insolvent 
company. This marries two conflict of law rules; the first, and arguably, most 
important concerns what law is regarded as governing matters of corporate status, 
while the second and subsidiary rule concerns the rules governing the recognition 
of foreign judgments. In describing the content of these rules, it is helpful to 
remember what the relevant legal sources are. The leading practitioners’ text in 
this field, Dicey and Morris, describes the three sources as statutes, case law and 
the writings of jurists and 17 years ago regarded statute law as increasingly the 
primary source.54 However, the learned authors go on to acknowledge:
“There remain large areas of conflict of laws where case law is still 
the most important source, and the courts still have a creative part 
to play.”55
52 Ibid., at 100.
53 Odwin v Forbes (1817) 1 Buck 57, at 64.
54 L. Collins (ed), The Conflict of Laws (Volume 1) (12th ed) (1993, Sweet & Maxwell, London) (“Dicey and 
Morris”), at 7-8.
55 Ibid., at 8.
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In Bermuda and much of the BACW region, conflict of law rules relating to the 
insolvency of companies incorporated abroad is not dealt with by statute. The 
relevant case law is distilled into various concise rules in Dicey and Morris, which 
is routinely relied upon in the courts of Bermuda as highly persuasive authority as 
to the relevant common law rules.
Dicey and Morris Rule 154 states as follows:
“(1) The domicile of a corporation is the country under whose law it 
is incorporated.
(2) A corporation is resident in the country where its central 
management and control is exercised. If the exercise of central 
management and control is divided between two or more countries 
then the corporation is resident in each of these countries.”
Rule 155 states as follows:
“The existence or dissolution of a foreign corporation duly created 
or dissolved under the law of a foreign country is recognised 
in England.”
Rule 156(2) provides as follows:
“All matters concerning the constitution of a corporation are governed 
by the law of the place of incorporation.”
So, before one considers the specific context of insolvency, it is apparent that the 
common law conflict of law rules would apply the law of a company’s place of 
incorporation to:
(a)  questions relating to the existence or dissolution of a foreign company; and
(b)  questions relating to its constitution, however such issues arise in proceedings 
before the local court.
Within this conceptual framework, it is only logical that Rule 160 provides 
as follows:
“The authority of a liquidator appointed under the law of the place of 
incorporation is recognised in England.”
Although Dicey and Morris acknowledge that recognition may also be given to a 
liquidator appointed by some other competent court, Rule 160 states the normal 
75Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean World: Challenges and Opportunities
rule as clearly established by judicial authority.56 As Professor Fletcher points 
out, this approach is strongly reflective of the position in personal bankruptcy.57 
That these principles form part of the common law not just in England, but in the 
BACW region as well, is illustrated by the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal 
Anguillan decision in Re Globe-X,58 where Gordon JA opined as follows:
“[13] In Smart’s ‘Cross Border Insolvency’ at Chapter 6, a large 
number of examples are given of the practice of courts, both common 
law and non-common law, recognizing the effect of a winding-up 
order made in the country of domicile of the company being wound 
up. As learned Queen’s Counsel for the Respondent put it in his 
argument, it is a necessary concomitant of the recognition accorded 
to a body corporate established under a foreign legal system. I am 
therefore satisfied that the High Court of Anguilla has the necessary 
jurisdiction to recognize the Winding-up Order made by the 
Bahamian court.”
The previous year in BVI, the Eastern Caribbean High Court recognised a German 
insolvency representative without statutory authority. In Autland,59 Rawlins J 
(now Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court) held in his 16 April 
2004 judgment:
“International Recognition
[11] According to the evidence of Mr. Fritz, by virtue of the principle 
of universality, every German insolvency proceeding is entitled to 
international recognition. There is reciprocity and comity. He said 
that the principle of universality also extends to foreign insolvency 
proceedings where assets are located within the German jurisdiction. 
He cited Article 102 of the Introduction Act to the Insolvency Code 
as authority for this. According to the deponent, this Article mandates 
that foreign insolvency proceedings must be recognized in Germany. 
He said that, in particular, the assets of a foreign company that is 
the subject of such proceedings outside of Germany are part of the 
foreign proceedings. Additionally, foreign insolvency proceedings 
56 Dicey and Morris, in the absence of clear authority, suggest a similar rule applies to the recognition of foreign 
receivers (Rule 161(2)).
57 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 3.91.
58 Re Globe-X, Civil Appeal 2003:No. 4, Judgment dated 23 May 2005.
59 Autland Heavy Equipment & Construction v Holzmann International (by Ottmar Hermann, as the Insolvency 
Trustee appointed by the District Court of Frankfurt/Main, Germany), BVIHCV: 2002/0111.
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are enforced in Germany in relation to the assets of insolvent foreign 
companies that have assets in Germany.
[12] In passing, Mr. Fritz afforded an insight into the recent regime for 
reciprocity within the European Community. This, he said, falls under 
the European Community Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings that 
came into effect on 1st June 2003. The effect of it is that insolvency 
proceedings that are instituted within any member state of the 
Community are automatically recognized in all Community States.
Findings and Order
[13] No evidence was presented by or on behalf of Autland on the 
issue that is for consideration on this further hearing. The evidence 
that was presented on behalf of Holzmann is unchallenged. It is 
cogent and convincing. I accept that Holzmann is in the process of 
insolvency proceedings in Germany, and that from 1st June 2002, 
when the insolvency trustee was appointed, Holzmann’s assets vested 
in the insolvency trustee. This is under German law. I also accept 
that under German law, this applies to the assets of Holzmann in 
foreign countries.
[14] Whether this Court would recognize the insolvency proceedings 
in Germany is a matter of our law. We have no provisions for the 
reciprocal recognition and/or enforcement of Orders that issue from 
a German Court. I am not aware of any relevant Treaty provisions 
that Her Majesty’s Government extended to this Territory. This Court 
recognizes the importance of extending and accepting recognition of 
Judgments by comity, particularly in commercial cases. I indicated in 
the Judgment that was delivered in this case that I would be willing to 
extend it, once there was sufficient evidence to satisfy me that, under 
German law, the assets of Holzmann, including its foreign assets, 
vested in the insolvency trustee prior to the institution of the claim 
in this case.” 
Conversely, liquidators appointed by a foreign court over a local company cannot 
ordinarily expect to be recognised in the company’s domicile, especially if 
liquidators have already been appointed there. In such a case, the Cayman Grand 
Court (Henderson J) was nevertheless willing to confer the status of amicus curiae 
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on Singapore liquidators and to give them limited recognition.60 Recognition of 
the appointment in a third forum (the Bahamas) of liquidators, whose status in the 
company’s place of incorporation (Minnesota) was unclear, was also declined by 
the Cayman Grand Court (Levers J).61
To be contrasted with this settled position is the somewhat fluid question of whether 
or not a foreign liquidator appointed in a forum other than the company’s domicile 
will be recognised. The Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal recently declined to 
recognise the appointment in the United States of receivers over a Nevis company 
on the grounds that there was, on the evidence, insufficient connection between the 
company and the United States.62
A significant practical limitation on common law recognition of foreign 
winding-up proceedings, to be contrasted with modern statutory international 
recognition provisions, is the view the English common law takes on the impact of 
a foreign liquidation on assets within the jurisdiction. The position is that, until an 
ancillary winding-up is commenced before the local court, the assets of the foreign 
insolvent company neither vest in the foreign liquidator nor receive the benefit of a 
liquidation stay.63 This unsatisfactory situation creates challenges which can only 
probably be resolved through statutory solutions. The restrictive English view may 
not necessarily be followed elsewhere. The BVI High Court in Autland appears, 
albeit in a case where the point does not appear to have received the benefit of full 
argument, to have recognised both:
(a)  the appointment of the foreign liquidator; and
(b)  the vesting of the assets of the company in the liquidator under foreign law.
If this was a conscious departure from the English rule that a foreign liquidation 
may be recognised but the effects on the status of the company’s foreign assets may 
not be, the approach adopted by Rawlins J finds broad support in the analogous 
approach taken by Lord Hoffman and the Judicial Committee two years later in 
Cambridge Gas.64 In the latter case, where this nice conflict of laws point was also 
not expressly addressed, share rights governed by Manx law were held to have been 
validly extinguished by United States corporate rescue proceedings involving an Isle 
of Man company, which the Manx Court recognised. While the latter case did not 
60 Re Orient Networks Holding Ltd [2004-2005] CILR 540.
61 Re Univest Multi-Strategy Fund II Ltd [2006] CILR 452.
62 Millennium Financial Ltd v Thomas McNamara et al., HCVAP 2008:012, Judgment dated 15 March 2010.
63 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 3.95.
64 Cambridge Gas Transport Corp. v Official Unsecured Creditors Committee (of Navigator Holdings PLC and 
others) [2006] 3 All ER 829.
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deal with the specific question of the title to company assets, it did effectively decide 
that a foreign insolvency order could be recognised even if it affected rights under 
property located in the jurisdiction of the local court and governed by local law.
Also problematic, at the end of a foreign liquidation proceeding, is the fact that the 
discharge of debts in that proceeding will only clearly be recognised at common 
law if the relevant debts are governed by the law of the overseas liquidation 
forum, but not otherwise. As Professor Fletcher has pointed out, this rule is 
inconsistent with the generous approach of recognising the foreign winding-up 
proceedings generally:
“Therefore the paradox is sustained whereby English law, acting 
in one mode, can recognize the foreign liquidation in the general 
sense and also recognize the standing of the foreign liquidator, while 
conducting those proceedings, to claim English assets. In contrary 
mode, however, if the foreign proceedings have concluded with the 
supposed discharge of all provable claims, any that happen to be 
governed by a law other than the lex concursus are not considered to 
be discharged in the eyes of English law, but could be re-asserted if, 
for example, further assets come to light in this country.”65
It is submitted that this problem has been partially resolved by the robust approach 
taken in recent years to judicial cooperation in relation to foreign corporate rescue 
proceedings, which will be discussed below.
The Judicial Assistance Discretion
The judicial discretion to assist foreign insolvency courts appears to be a substantive 
common law power which supplements the primary private international law rule 
that a foreign liquidator appointed in the company’s place of incorporation will be 
recognised. According to Dicey and Morris:
“A prominent and distinct feature of the private international law 
of insolvency has been the development of procedures whereby 
English courts have a discretion to provide assistance in aid of 
foreign proceedings. Although there were no statutory procedures 
in the context of corporate insolvencies until the Insolvency Act 
1986, it was clear that the principle of cooperation was recognised 
at common law....”66
65 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 3.101.
66 Dicey and Morris, above note 54, Volume 2, at 1140.
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This power has been widely utilised in Bermuda. It may be reasonably assumed 
that, absent any conflicting local statutory provisions, the power will be held to 
exist by the courts throughout the BACW region. The forms of common law 
assistance which have taken place fall into three broad categories:
(a)  assisting foreign liquidators with or without the commencement of ancillary 
local proceedings;
(b)  coordinating concurrent liquidation proceedings on a reciprocal basis; and
(c)  assisting foreign corporate rescue proceedings, including proceedings in 
which the foreign proceedings serve as the main proceedings in relation to a 
local company.
Judicial Cooperation in Practice: Recent Case Law from the British Atlantic 
and Caribbean World
Assisting Foreign Liquidators with or without the Commencement of Ancillary 
Local Proceedings
“...it is now well established that in an appropriate case the Bermuda 
Court would assist a foreign court in a cross-border insolvency on the 
basis of well-established common law principles.”67
In Re Foundation Partners,68 the Supreme Court of Bermuda (Kawaley J) 
responded to a Letter of Request from the Cayman Grand Court by:
(a)  recognising the winding-up order and appointment of the joint liquidators in 
respect of a Caymanian company made by the Caymanian Court; and
(b)  granting a stay of proceedings against the company, without commencing 
ancillary winding-up proceedings.
The reasons for this decision included the following:
“11. It is true that these broad statements of principle leave to be 
answered on a case by case basis the precise parameters of the scope 
of particular forms of assistance which this Court may provide to a 
foreign liquidator. However, there seems now to be no doubt that 
this Court may at least empower a foreign insolvency representative 
to do all acts in Bermuda (in relation to Bermudian located assets 
67 O’Neill & Woloniecki, above note 17, at paragraph 17-072.
68 Re Foundation Partners Ltd [2009] SC (Bda) 36 Com (29 July 2009).
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of the company in liquidation abroad) as could be performed by a 
local liquidator if ancillary proceedings were commenced here. In 
Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp. –v- Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc and others [2007] 1 
A.C. 508 at 518, Lord Hoffman opined as follows:
‘22 What are the limits of the assistance which the court can give? In 
cases in which there is statutory authority for providing assistance, 
the statute specifies what the court may do. For example, section 
426(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a request from a 
foreign court shall be authority for an English court to apply “the 
insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to 
comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction”. At common law, 
their Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the 
form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form 
no part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least 
be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done 
in the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is 
to enable the foreign office holder or the creditors to avoid having to 
start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies 
to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings 
had taken place in the domestic forum.’
12. In Re Dickson Holdings Limited [2008] Bda LR 34; (2008) 73 
WIR 102, I indicated that this Court might have reservations about 
recognising the foreign liquidation of a Bermudian company without 
the commencement of local proceedings if local public policy issues 
were engaged. Such reservations would not likely arise when the 
assistance sought relates to a proceeding in the insolvent company’s 
own domicile, as in the instant case. More pertinently, however, an 
order similar to the specific order sought in the present case was 
granted by the English High Court in Re Phoenix Kapitaldienst 
GmbH [2008] BPIR 1082, a case which was also referred to in the 
course of the hearing. In that case, statutory recognition of the foreign 
proceedings under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 was not 
available in respect of a German insolvency proceeding. Nor did the 
EC Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 apply as the 
company was an investment undertaking. Following the Cambridge 
Gas case, Registrar Jaques made the following order:
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“(1) the appointment of Frank Schmitt, Attorney-at-Law, Olof-
Palme-Strasse 13, D-60439 Frankfurt (the applicant) as Insolvency 
Administrator of Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH by the Local Court 
Frankfurt (Insolvency Court) pursuant to an order made on 1 July 
2005 a copy of which together with the certified translation thereof 
is appended hereto in the proceedings (the Proceedings) more 
particularly set out in the schedule hereto be recognised by this 
Honourable Court;
(2) without prejudice to the generality of the order made in para 
(1) the applicant as such administrator be empowered or otherwise 
entitled to exercise and/or enjoy all such rights, powers, duties 
and obligations contained in and afforded to Licensed Insolvency 
Practitioners appointed as officeholders pursuant to or otherwise 
made in connection with the Insolvency Act 1986 including but not 
limited to the right to exercise any and all powers available to such 
officeholders arising under or otherwise available in connection with 
s 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986, such powers to be exercised in 
relation to the proceedings.”
13. No direct authority was cited for the stay sought by the JPLs 
which was effectively in terms mirroring the statutory stay which 
is no doubt in force in Cayman and which would undoubtedly be 
triggered under section 167(4) if there were ancillary winding-up 
proceedings instituted here. However, it seemed clear to me that little 
practical purpose would be served in recognising the appointment of 
the JPLs and empowering them to collect and preserve assets if this 
Court was not also willing to grant a stay of any proceedings here 
against the Company.
14. There can be no question that if Bermudian liquidators had 
been appointed, they would [be] empowered to “bring or defend 
any action or other legal proceeding in the name of and on behalf 
of the company”: Companies Act, section 175(1)(a). They would 
accordingly be able to apply, under section 165 of the Act, to stay 
any pending proceedings against the Company between the date of 
the presentation of the petition and the making of a winding-up order. 
By necessary implication, the liquidators would also likely be able to 
apply preemptively to restrain the institution of proceedings in breach 
of the statutory stay (by, for instance, purported secured creditors), 
invoking the general jurisdiction of the Court to grant injunctions 
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to prevent interference with the applicant’s legal or equitable rights. 
Such injunctive relief might more typically be sought, perhaps, with a 
view to preventing the dissipation of assets rather than the institution 
of proceedings, but the Court’s jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief 
to protect the interests of the insolvent estate would in such context 
be fundamentally the same.” 
This decision did not result from an inter partes hearing following full argument 
and so has limited authoritative effect. It will likely be the exception rather than 
the rule, when limited relief is sought by foreign liquidators, that effective judicial 
assistance will be available without the far clearer statutory support afforded by 
ancillary winding-up proceedings. In another 2009 ex parte ruling which did not 
result in any considered judgment, the Bermuda Supreme Court (Bell J) on an 
unopposed basis granted an ancillary winding-up order to BVI liquidators of two 
affiliated insolvent BVI companies which had conducted business from Bermuda. 
The companies were Bernard Madoff feeder funds and the foreign liquidators wished 
to utilize the statutory examination provisions of section 195 of the Companies 
Act 1981 to obtain information from their Bermuda-based former auditors. The 
jurisdiction of the Bermuda Court to wind up an overseas company operating in 
Bermuda without a permit was subsequently confirmed by another judge in the 
context of acceding to the liquidators’ document production application, although 
this first instance decision is currently subject to a pending appeal.69
In Re Stanford,70 the High Court of Antigua and Barbuda (Thomas J) removed 
the joint liquidators, in part, to facilitate more effective cooperation with office 
holders and proceedings abroad. This order was directly made on the application 
of a creditor, but the grounds for removal included complaints that the liquidators 
had failed to:
(a)  cooperate with a United States Receiver; and
(b)  seek recognition from a competent Canadian court before taking various 
actions there.
This case did not involve assisting foreign liquidators of an overseas company as 
the bank was a local company with substantial connections abroad.
An elegantly pragmatic approach to the recognition of a foreign liquidator 
of a local company was recently adopted by the Cayman Grand Court (Quin 
69 Re Kingate Global Fund Ltd; Re Kingate Euro Fund Ltd [2010] SC (Bda) 47 Com (20 August 2010).
70 Re Stanford International Bank (in liquidation), Claim No. ANUHCV2009/0149, Judgment dated 8 June 2010.
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J), based on common law principles before the current statutory international 
cooperation provisions were brought into force. A Caymanian company with 
primary commercial ties to the United States was placed in liquidation there 
and a Chapter 7 trustee was appointed. Shareholders subsequently presented a 
winding-up petition in the Cayman Islands and sought to appoint liquidators there. 
The directors opposed the application on the grounds that it was unnecessary, in 
light of the appointment of the Chapter 7 trustee, and might result in complications; 
alternatively, they sought a stay of any order appointing Caymanian liquidators. 
The Grand Court appointed one liquidator (not the two sought) as:
(a)  the primary liquidation proceedings were those in the United States and 
the Chapter 7 trustee might at some point seek recognition in the Cayman 
Islands; and
(b)  certain important matters never fell to be resolved in the place of the company’s 
incorporation.
In addition, the appointment order was stayed to permit the Cayman liquidator to 
liaise with the trustee with a view to potential cooperation.71 As Quin J observed:
“48 I should state that at this stage the Chapter 7 trustee has not 
made any application to be recognized by this court, nor has he 
appointed attorneys to make any representations on his behalf. I do 
acknowledge that Mr. Peterson requested to join the hearing of the 
petition by telephone, but I was of the view that, without meaning 
any discourtesy whatsoever to Mr. Peterson, a more formal approach 
should be made on the first occasion. Proceedings in both the 
Grand Court of the Cayman Islands and the US Bankruptcy Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois are at a very early stage, and it 
is reasonable to assume that as Chapter 7 trustee, Mr. Peterson is 
extremely busy coming to terms with the facts behind the failure 
of the substratum of the company. However, as matters stand, this 
court has not received any letter of request for assistance from Mr. 
Peterson, or from the US Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois.
49 I did state, when we adjourned on November 6th, that this court 
embraces the concept of co-operation and co-ordination as reflected 
by the principles of international judicial comity. I would have thought 
71 Re Lancelot Investors Fund Ltd [2009] CILR 7.
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that it must be in the best interests of the Cayman petitioners and 
indeed all the creditors of the Cayman company for co-operation and 
assistance between the two jurisdictions to be actively encouraged.”
Coordinating Concurrent Liquidation Proceedings on a Reciprocal Basis
In Bermuda, the coordination of parallel insurance liquidations twinned with 
parallel schemes of arrangement in Bermuda and London became common place 
in the 1990s. By the early 21st century, the emphasis had shifted to concurrent 
corporate rescue proceedings, principally between Bermuda and the United States 
and Bermuda and Hong Kong (see further below).
The most notable modern example of judicial cooperation in respect of concurrent 
liquidation proceedings in the BACW region remains the BCCI case, in which the 
Grand Court of the Cayman Islands was involved in the worldwide liquidation 
of the affiliates of the Caymanian Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd. Smellie CJ recently determined that a single exchange rate as at 
the winding-up date should be used for converting other currencies into USD, 
the worldwide liquidation currency. In the course of his judgment, he reviewed 
the history of the liquidation (covering a period when only common law judicial 
cooperation powers were available under Caymanian law) and explained the most 
recent problems being addressed by the various courts concerned. The issues arose 
from the paradoxical fact that creditors in jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, 
whose assets were ring-fenced for their “protection” and had not participated in 
the global pooling arrangements, had achieved returns substantially less than the 
eventually impressive and unforeseen global dividend of more than 85%. These 
creditors were now seeking to invoke the universalist principle to top up their 
dividends under the English hotchpot rule:
“1 The worldwide liquidation of the BCCI companies is now in its 
final stages. The bleak prospect of recoveries at the date of liquidation 
has since been transformed into the reality of actual dividends paid to 
creditors in the global liquidation of 86.5% to date. A major reason 
for this level of success has been the close co-operation between the 
global liquidators of the principal BCCI companies. The question now 
arising for resolution by this court is this: At what rate of exchange 
should dividends be paid in meeting the hotchpot claims of the so-
called “rump creditors” of the BCCI Overseas liquidation?
2 A brief overview of the history, as taken from the latest report of the 
joint official liquidators to this court, will set the relevant context. At 
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the outset of the global liquidation, the global liquidators recognized 
that, in a number of material respects, the BCCI Group had conducted 
its affairs as a single entity, without clearly identifying which company 
or entity within the group was concerned with or responsible for 
any particular transaction. It became the decided view of the global 
liquidators and their legal advisers that the intermingling of the affairs 
of BCCI S.A. and BCCI Overseas was such that it would have been 
impracticable without considerable delay and enormous expense (and 
might well have been impossible) to determine, as between those two 
major companies, their respective assets and liabilities. In addition, 
many of the different companies in the BCCI Group and the branches 
of BCCI S.A. and BCCI Overseas became the subject of a multiplicity 
of separate “ring-fencing” local liquidations or similar proceedings in 
the jurisdictions in which they were incorporated or located.
3 In order to avoid the expense, difficulty and delay which would 
otherwise have arisen, a pooling agreement was negotiated between 
the principal BCCI companies and executed in November 1994. In 
brief, the pooling agreement provides for the pooling of the assets of 
the principal BCCI companies (and their branches which agreed to 
participate), and for admitted creditors to all receive the same rate of 
dividend out of the pooled assets. Although the pooling agreement 
contained specific provisions for participation by the branches of 
BCCI S.A. and BCCI Overseas, very few of the branches actually 
participated. China was the only branch of BCCI Overseas which 
entered into a branch participation agreement and of the BCCI 
S.A. branches, only Japan, Cyprus, Bahrain, and the United Arab 
Emirates participated.
4 This low rate of participation of the branches in the pooling 
agreement was due largely to decisions taken very early on in the 
liquidation process by the local regulatory authorities in the countries 
in which the branches operated. They appointed their own local 
liquidators, who acted in the separate interest of the local creditors by 
“ring-fencing” local branch assets and by purporting to deal to some 
extent with the branch liabilities.
Branch Ring-Fencing
5 The laws of the Cayman Islands, under the principle of universality, 
do not recognize a branch as being a separate legal entity from the 
86 International Insolvency Law: Future Perspectives
head office (see Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] CILR 211).72 
Accordingly, where a branch had been ring-fenced but the process 
put in place at its location of business did not result in the complete 
discharge of its obligations owed to creditors, those creditors—but not 
those whose obligations had been entirely assumed or discharged—
would continue to have a provable debt in the liquidation of the 
head office.
6 Such claims would, however, be limited by the pari passu principle 
which, in order to ensure fairness to all creditors, has been deemed 
to apply globally, throughout the liquidation of the principal BCCI 
companies. Although the liquidators attempted to take control of the 
BCCI Overseas branch network, the operations of all 27 branches 
of BCCI Overseas outside the Cayman Islands were individually 
ring-fenced under local laws and were treated by the local regulators 
as separate legal entities with local authorities appointed over their 
affairs (although China later participated in the pooling agreement). 
In some countries, the ring-fencing was effected by way of a local law 
that gave a separate legal existence to the BCCI Overseas operations 
in that country. However, in most cases the ring-fencing occurred on 
a practical level by way of local laws that prohibited the repatriation 
of funds from the country, controlled the conversion of local currency 
to foreign currency, or gave preference to local creditors from the 
branch assets.
7 The decision of the local regulatory authorities to ring-fence 
particular branch operations was probably influenced by the low 
initial dividend assessment of the global liquidators. These were 
necessarily conservative and exclusive of the possibility of recovery 
from the majority shareholders, the US Government, former auditors, 
major debtors and other third parties—recoveries which have since 
then been realized. Taking into account the negative factors then 
prevailing, the original estimate of the global liquidators of return to 
creditors participating in the pooling arrangements was in the range 
of 5% to 10%.
8 In most cases, the return to local creditors was estimated by local 
authorities to be higher than the initial pooling estimate if the ring-
72 Citation inserted.
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fenced assets of the particular branch were realized and paid for the 
benefit of the local creditors, and the local authorities rejected the 
pooling arrangement accordingly. Although from this ring-fenced 
competitive process distributions to creditors were higher than 10%, 
in a number of cases the return to creditors is less than the 86.5% 
global dividend rate now achieved and paid to date from the BCCI 
Group companies who are participants in the pooling agreement (with 
even a bit more expected before final winding up).
9 In keeping with the principle of universality, although these ring-
fenced branches are not signatories to the pooling agreement, their 
creditors are eligible to participate in ‘top up’ or hotchpot payments 
from the BCCI Overseas head office liquidation provided that the 
liquidators can obtain information from the respective branch to 
verify their claims. While this verification process remains a major 
challenge for the joint official liquidators because, in particular, of 
the lack of control over branch records; provisions must be made 
for the potential verification of the claims of these creditors, now 
conveniently classified as ‘rump creditors’.
Branch ‘Rump Creditors’
10 Of 2,597 such claims submitted with a value of [USD] 738m., 
1,113 have been admitted with a value of [USD] 408m. Of the 1,113 
admitted claims, the top-up dividends applicable to 486 of them 
are valued at [USD] 17.8m. This amount will remain blocked until 
satisfactory evidence has been received of the closure of the relevant 
branch liquidation or of there being no possibility of further dividends 
being paid on such branch liquidation (the China branch having 
subsequently remitted its assets to the global pooling arrangement, 
its creditors have now been paid the 86.5% global dividend rate by 
the joint official liquidators).
11 This issue has been raised before the Luxembourg court by 
the liquidator of the Dutch branch of BCCI S.A. supported by the 
liquidator of the German branch. It relates to the top-up dividends to 
be paid to rump creditors who have received dividends in their local 
branch liquidations.
12 Applying the hotchpot principle and in keeping with the principle 
of universality already discussed, it is accepted by the global 
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liquidators that such creditors are entitled to claim in the principal 
liquidations, but subject to bringing into account dividends received 
from their branch liquidations. The issue then becomes that which 
was identified first above, that is what rate of exchange shall be 
applied to the dividends received in the branch liquidation in local 
currency for conversion into [USD] (the currency of the global 
liquidation) for bringing those dividends into hotchpot? From the 
earliest dates of the global liquidation, all debts which are proved in 
the principal liquidations have been converted (where necessary) and 
paid in [USD].
13 In the case of BCCI Overseas, it was ordered by this court on 
[19 June 1992] that as at the date of liquidation ([14 January 1992]), 
the currency into which all debts shall be converted is to be [USD]. 
In so ordering, this court applied r. 4.91 of the English Insolvency 
Rules 1986, which applied to Cayman liquidations in appropriate 
circumstances until replaced by local insolvency rules in 2009. In the 
Cayman Islands (as, indeed I am advised, in London and Luxembourg 
as well) this practice has resulted in a fixed rate approach.
14 Having so fixed the value of these claims, the approach of the 
Cayman liquidators has been to convert all local distributions made 
by branch liquidators in local currency into [USD] at the same [14 
January 1992] exchange rate, rather than to use fluctuating exchange 
rates since [14 January 1992]. This approach has been followed on 
the basis that it is one which is equitable to creditors overall and 
appropriate in the complex situation arising from the existence of 27 
BCCI Overseas branches. For example, it avoids the need to receive, 
process and verify information such as payment dates, and to identify 
varying conversion rates. It is the view of the joint official liquidators 
that by fixing the exchange rate at [14 January 1992], for both the 
claim value and for valuing subsequent payments by the local branch 
liquidator in local currency, the dividend rates paid calculated in 
local currency will exactly match dividend rates paid if calculated 
in US dollars.
15 When the issue was raised in Luxembourg by the Dutch liquidator, 
the Cayman approach was set out in a memorandum dated [24 
January 2008], prepared by one of the joint official liquidators, Mr. 
Michael Pilling. This approach, I am told, found favour with the 
Luxembourg liquidator and ultimately with the Luxembourg court 
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at first instance. The matter has, however, been taken on appeal to 
the Luxembourg Court of Appeal by the Dutch liquidator with the 
support of the German liquidator.
16 The Dutch liquidator has contended for a different approach 
in relation to the conversion of the six previous [EUR] interim 
distributions to the Dutch creditors into [USD]. I am told that his 
argument is that, as a matter of Dutch law, the determination of 
the amount of the distribution has to be made on the basis of the 
conversion rate applicable on the day of the distribution. This is 
said to be consistent with the European Convention known as the 
CEME-Treaty of 1968. The argument then put forward is that in 
the absence of any provision to the contrary in other relevant EU or 
Luxembourg law, the system of the CEME-Treaty and the Dutch law 
should be followed, and therefore the conversion rate at the moment 
of the distribution to the creditors concerned in the Dutch insolvency 
proceedings should apply. It must be recognized, however, that if 
this approach prevails, then all the uncertainties of fluctuating rates 
of conversion, as discussed above, would attend the process of 
top-up payments.
17 A third alternative approach put forward by the Luxembourg 
liquidators would require conversion at the time of actual payment 
in the principal liquidation in Luxembourg. While there may be an 
apparent logic to this approach, it gives rise to a practical problem: 
as top-up payments will only be made in the future when branch 
liquidations are closed and so branch dividend payments will 
have been concluded, it would not be possible, using this third 
alternative approach, to make accurate provision in advance for such 
top-up payments.
18 The matter was brought to the attention of this court by way of the 
joint official liquidators’ application on [11 May 2009]. Then it was 
ordered that the joint official liquidators should apply the fixed rate 
of conversion to future top-up payments as it had been applied for 
all other purposes of the liquidation since 1992. Any other approach 
would create significant differences in treatment as between creditors 
on the basis of arbitrary changes in their national exchange rates as 
against the [USD] since January 1992. It would also create significant 
and possibly insuperable operational problems for the administration 
of the liquidation estates.
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19 A quick illustration will show the potential arbitrariness and 
unfairness. If, at the date of liquidation, a foreign debt was, at the 
rate of exchange then prevailing (say four units of local currency to 
one [USD]) worth [USD] 1m., that same debt if the rate of exchange 
became 2:1, would be worth [USD] 2m. Conversely, if the rate of 
exchange changed in the other direction.
20 As in every exchange of currency someone gains and someone 
loses, the recipient of a favourable varying rate of exchange would 
gain at the expense of those other creditors who are not in that 
position. Such an outcome is anathematic to the concept of equal 
treatment upon which the fundamental pari passu principle is based.
21 Those creditors who are to be paid in [USD]—the denominated 
currency of the liquidation estate—are not at fault vis-à-vis the 
foreign currency creditors. The BCCI companies are the defaulters. 
The creditors are all, so to speak, together in the same boat. There is 
therefore no clear reason why the risk of depreciation (or appreciation 
as the case might be) in the value of the [USD] as against the foreign 
currency pending distribution of the assets should be borne by those 
creditors whose claims were from the outset denominated in [USD].
22 In addition to those sound practical reasons discussed above, 
there is sound legal basis as well for directing that the fixed rate 
of conversion should apply. I now turn to a discussion of the legal 
reasons, as a matter of Cayman and, indeed, English law…”
Assisting Foreign Corporate Rescue Proceedings
In terms of understanding how judicial cooperation has taken place in recent case 
law in its most fertile field, the domain of corporate rescue, two introductory points 
must first be addressed. How has corporate rescue been possible in a statutory 
framework which has no explicit equivalent of administration proceedings (United 
Kingdom), interim receivership (Canada) or Chapter 11 proceedings (United 
States)? What guiding principles inform the shape that cooperation takes?
The main legal and commercial objects of corporate rescue proceedings, inspired 
by the early 1930s Depression vintage original version of Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code, are to:
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(a)  preserve the insolvent entity as a going concern while a restructuring takes 
place with the protection of a liquidation stay of proceedings against the 
debtor; and
(b)  restructure the insolvent entity without displacing the existing management, 
albeit that the interests that the directors represent are creditor rather than 
shareholder interests.
Under the United Kingdom Companies Act 1948 winding-up regime still in force 
in Bermuda and many other jurisdictions in the BACW region, it was for many 
years assumed that a provisional liquidator could only be appointed to displace 
the company’s management altogether as a prelude to a winding-up order and a 
“full-blown” liquidation. This view was, in hindsight, based more on an uncritical 
observation of the circumstances in which provisional liquidators were appointed 
than on a critical analysis of the relevant statutory provisions themselves. The 
genius of the provisions is that, although they are ultimately derived from 
bankruptcy law provisions developed in the 19th century, an era when bankruptcy 
was considered to be a crime, they are flexible enough to meet the rescue demands 
of the modern corporate commercial rescue environment.
Firstly, when considering powers a liquidator appointed by a court has, their scope 
is most amply and generically defined as follows:
“Powers of Liquidator
175(1) The liquidator in a winding-up by the Court shall have power, 
with the sanction either of the Court or of the committee of inspection —
(a) to bring or defend any action or other legal proceeding in the name 
and on behalf of the company;
(b) to carry on the business of the company so far as may be necessary 
for the beneficial winding up thereof;
(c) to appoint an attorney to assist him in the performance of his duties;
(d) to pay any classes of creditors in full;
(e) to make any compromise or arrangement with creditors or persons 
claiming to be creditors or having or alleging themselves to have any 
claim, present or future, certain or contingent ascertained or sounding 
only in damages against the company, or whereby the company may 
be rendered liable;
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(f) to compromise all calls and liabilities to calls, debts and liabilities 
capable of resulting in debts, and all claims, present or future, certain 
or contingent, ascertained or sounding only in damages, subsisting 
or supposed to subsist between the company and a contributory or 
alleged contributory or other debtor or person apprehending liability 
to the company, and all questions in any way relating to or affecting 
the assets or the winding up of the company, on such terms as may be 
agreed, and take any security for the discharge of any such call, debt, 
liability or claim and give a complete discharge in respect thereof.
(2) The liquidator in a winding up by the Court shall have power—
(a) to sell the real and personal property and things in action of the 
company by public auction or private contract, with power to transfer 
the whole thereof to any person or to sell the same in parcels;
(b) to do all acts and to execute, in the name and on behalf of the 
company, all deeds, receipts and other documents, and for that 
purpose to use, when necessary, the company’s seal;
(c) to prove, rank and claim in the bankruptcy, insolvency or 
sequestration of any contributory for any balance against his estate, 
and to receive dividends in the bankruptcy, insolvency or sequestration 
in respect of that balance, as a separate debt due from the bankrupt or 
insolvent, and rateably with the other separate creditors;
(d) to draw, accept, make and indorse any bill of exchange or 
promissory note in the name and on behalf of the company, with the 
same effect with respect to the liability of the company as if the bill 
or note had been drawn, accepted, made or indorsed by or on behalf 
of the company in the course of its business;
(e) to raise on the security of the assets of the company any 
money required;
(f) to take out in his official name letters of administration to any 
deceased contributory and to do in his official name any other 
act necessary for obtaining payment of any money due from a 
contributory or his estate which cannot be conveniently done in the 
name of the company, and in all such cases the money due shall, 
for the purpose of enabling the liquidator to take out the letters of 
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administration or recover the money, be deemed to be due to the 
liquidator himself;
(g) to appoint an agent to do any business which the liquidator is 
unable to do himself;
(h) to do all such other things as may be necessary for winding up the 
affairs of the company and distributing its assets.
(3) The exercise by the liquidator in a winding up by the Court of the 
powers conferred by this section shall be subject to the control of the 
Court, and any creditor or contributory may apply to the Court with 
respect to any exercise or proposed exercise of any of those powers.”
These powers are very broad and cumulatively undoubtedly envisage a situation 
both before and after a winding-up order where the liquidator has displaced the 
directors altogether. They are based on section 245 of the Companies Act 1948 
(United Kingdom), which was in turn based on section 191 of the Companies 
Act 1929 (United Kingdom).73 However, the Bermudian statute also permits the 
Court to tailor the liquidators’ powers to suit the needs of particular cases when a 
liquidator is appointed provisionally.74 It is this simple express statutory power that 
has been used in the corporate rescue context to allow what amounts to debtor-in-
possession restructuring proceedings to take place, with the provisional liquidators 
representing the interests of creditors by supervising the directors who remain 
in office:
“Power of Court to Appoint Liquidators
170(1) For the purpose of conducting proceedings in winding up a 
company and performing such duties in reference thereto as the Court 
may impose, the Court may appoint a liquidator or liquidators.
(2) The Court may on the presentation of a winding-up petition or at 
any time thereafter and before the first appointment of a liquidator 
appoint a provisional liquidator who may be the Official Receiver or 
any other fit person.
(3) When the Court appoints a provisional liquidator, the Court may 
limit his powers by the order appointing him.” (emphasis added)
73 H. Buckley, Buckley on the Companies Acts (13th ed) (1957, Butterworths, London), at 515, citing 19th century 
case law on many of these powers.
74 Ibid., at 505, based on section 184, Companies Act 1929 and section 238, Companies Act 1948.
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The typical order appointing provisional liquidators in the context of parallel 
corporate rescue proceedings would include terms along the following lines:
“1. Larry Lazarus and Peter Phoenix are hereby appointed as 
Joint Provisional Liquidators (“JPLs”) of the Company with the 
following powers:
(a) to oversee the continuation of the business of the Petitioner under 
the control of the Petitioner’s Board of Directors and under the 
supervision of this Court;
(b) to oversee and otherwise liaise with the existing Board of Directors 
of the Petitioner in effecting a reorganization and/or refinancing of the 
Petitioner under the supervision of this Court [etc.]
2. To seek to enter such protocol or other agreement as the JPLs deem 
appropriate for the coordination of these proceedings, and any other 
like proceedings for the restructuring and/or reorganization of the 
Company and other companies within the Company’s group and to 
seek the approval of such protocol or other agreement by this Court, 
the and any other courts in which such proceedings are brought, 
as appropriate.
3. If deemed appropriate, to draft a scheme of arrangement under the 
provisions of [section] 99 of the Companies Act 1981 between the 
Company and its creditors and/or shareholders to give effect to and/
or facilitate a reorganization and/or refinancing…”
So the traditional insolvency law provisions permit, partly by implication, 
an insolvent company to petition for its own winding-up and to apply for the 
appointment of provisional liquidators who will supervise the implementation 
by the directors of a restructuring. However, there is no express or implied 
statutory power to cooperate with a foreign court. In this regard, any assistance 
the Bermudian court affords to foreign corporate rescue proceedings reflects the 
exercise of a common law discretionary power. The leading Bermudian judicial 
statement on the scope of this discretionary power, exercised by way of recognising 
United States Chapter 11 proceedings as the primary restructuring proceeding in 
relation to a Bermuda domiciled company, is the judgment of Ward CJ (now Sir 
Austin Ward, Justice of Appeal) in his 26 November 1999 judgment in Re ICO:75
75 Re ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Ltd, Civil Jurisdiction 1999: No. 288, at 2-3.
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“A look at the background to the application may be instructive. On 
[27 August 1999] a Petition was filed by the company which was 
insolvent seeking the appointment of joint provisional liquidators. 
There was no prayer that the company be wound up immediately. 
On the same date the company filed for protection under Chapter 
11 of the U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Code to allow it to consider a 
re-financing/re-organisation which, if successful, would result in the 
company continuing business.
An Order was made that Messrs. Wallace and Butterfield be 
appointed joint provisional liquidators. I am satisfied that the Court is 
given a wide discretion and had jurisdiction under section 170 of the 
Companies Act 1981 and Rule 23 of the Companies (Winding-Up) 
Rules 1982 to make such an Order. Under it the directors of the 
company remained in office with continuing management powers 
subject to the supervision of the joint provisional liquidators and of 
the Bermuda Court.
I do not accept that because the company is a Bermuda registered 
company therefore the Bermuda Court should claim primacy in the 
winding-up proceedings and deny the joint provisional liquidators 
the opportunity of implementing a U.S. Chapter 11 re-organisation. 
Nor do I accept that a Chapter 11 re-organisation will, of its very 
nature, destroy the rights of creditors and contributories under the 
regime being established. Such an approach would be to deny the 
realities of international liquidations where action must be taken 
in many jurisdictions simul taneously. In this case proceedings are 
being conducted in the USA and in the Cayman Islands as well as 
in Bermuda. The aim of the proceedings is to enable the company 
to re-finance in the sum of [USD] 1.2 billion or to re-organise so as 
to continue in operation. Under such circumstances the Court should 
co-operate with Courts in other jurisdictions which have the same 
aim in relation to the affairs of the company. It is not a question 
of surrendering jurisdiction as much as harmonisation of effort. 
Moreover, the joint provisional liquidators are officers of this Court 
who submit confidential Reports informing the court of progress 
being made in the liquidation from time to time. I am satisfied 
that proceedings in many jurisdictions relating to the same subject 
matter may properly be conducted at the same time where there is 
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a connecting factor. Barclays Bank plc v Homan and others [1993] 
BCLC 680.”
This judgment set out reasons for a decision made on an ex parte basis. It implicitly 
applies the UNCITRAL centre of main interest (“COMI”) principle and explicitly 
adopts a universalist approach emphasising the need for the various proceedings to 
be harmonised towards the common goal of ensuring the company’s continuation 
as a going concern. This at once principled and pragmatic approach has informed 
parallel restructuring proceedings involving Bermuda and other jurisdictions (most 
frequently the United States and Hong Kong) ever since.
In addition to these common law cooperation principles, one important statutory 
concept deserves special mention. Bermuda and most of the BACW jurisdictions 
have company provisions relating to schemes of arrangement with late 19th century 
British antecedents.76 These provisions may be utilised for solvent modifications of 
shareholder (or creditor) rights and for insolvent modifications of creditors’ rights. 
Like a Chapter 11 plan of reorganisation, if the statutory majority of the creditors 
or separate classes of creditors approve the arrangement, the dissenting minority 
are bound by the vote of the majority. Sections 99-100 of the Bermuda Companies 
Act 1981 require:
(a)  leave of the Court to summon the meeting(s);
(b)  an explanatory statement to be sent with a copy of the proposed arrangement 
to those whose support is sought;
(c)  an affirmative vote of a majority in number representing three-quarters in value 
of all creditors voting (or, where applicable, all creditors in each class); and
(d)  court sanction of the arrangement with dissenters having an opportunity to 
contend that the arrangement ought not to be approved.
Accordingly, the content of parallel restructuring proceedings is informed not 
simply by common law judicial cooperation rules; such proceedings may also 
involve the coordination of a statutory scheme of arrangement in Bermuda and a 
statutory plan or scheme abroad.
76 Section 167, Bahamian Companies Act 1992 (“arrangements”), is not derived from the same source and appears 
to be less streamlined than the scheme of arrangement provisions in Bermuda and elsewhere. The “proposal” 
concept under the Barbadian and Trinidadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Acts appear on the face of the statutory 
provisions to create a far more complicated and regulated regime than the comparatively sparse scheme of 
arrangement regime. This view may reflect in part the writer’s lack of familiarity with the relevant provisions. The 
British statutory antecedents include the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870; section 153, Companies 
Act 1929; sections 206-207, Companies Act 1948.
97Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean World: Challenges and Opportunities
The most significant recent case dealing with this topic is the Judicial Privy 
Council’s decision in Cambridge Gas.77 This case is significant for the BACW 
region not just because it is a rare modern example of a judgment following a 
contested hearing on the scope of the common law discretion to assist foreign 
corporate rescue provisions. It is also highly pertinent because it comes from the 
highest appellate tribunal for most of the subject territories and so the reasoning is 
binding on the courts of the overwhelming majority of the territories concerned. 
Ironically, the case arose in the unusual factual context of a shareholder seeking to 
challenge a creditor reorganisation in relation to an insolvent company. Typically, 
shareholders accept that, once a company becomes insolvent, their interests in the 
company are for most purposes extinguished altogether. Why this occurs is that 
most insolvency law statutes provide that in a winding-up shareholders are only 
entitled to receive any distributions if creditors have been paid in full. The relevant 
Bermudian provision is found in section 225 of the Companies Act 1981:
“Distribution of Property of Company
225 Subject to this Act as to preferential payment the property of 
a company shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its 
liabilities pari passu, and, subject to such application, shall, unless 
the bye-laws otherwise provide, be distributed among the members 
according to their rights and interests in the company.”
Once a winding-up petition is presented against an insolvent company, which will 
likely result in the company being wound up, shareholders ordinarily lose any 
realistic prospect of receiving any return on their investment. This principle applies 
with equal force in circumstances where a restructuring is being implemented 
designed to ensure that the debtor continues as a going concern and whether or 
not a company is being restructured in its place of incorporation or as a foreign 
debtor under a Chapter 11 plan. In the Cambridge Gas case, Navigator Holdings 
plc was a holding company which owned ships forming part of the insolvent 
business and which was funded by investments in the New York bond market. The 
United States Bankruptcy Court confirmed a plan under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code, under which the shares of Navigator (an Isle of Man 
company 70% owned by Cambridge Gas) would be transferred to the creditors. 
The United States Court sent a Letter of Request to the Manx High Court seeking 
an order of that court vesting the shares in the creditors’ representatives. This was 
presumably based on the fact that United States conflict of law rules regarded the 
77 Above note 64.
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situs and governing law of the shares as being the law of the company’s place of 
incorporation, so that there was a practical need to implement the transfer of the 
shares provided for by the plan under Manx law. Cambridge Gas, a Caymanian 
company, opposed the application on the grounds that:
(a)  it had never submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States Court (although 
its parent had proposed a rival shareholder plan which was rejected); and
(b)  the United States Court had no power to affect the rights of property located 
in the Isle of Man.
The High Court refused to recognise the plan, accepting both of Cambridge Gas’ 
main submissions. The principal conflict of law finding was that the confirmation 
order was a judgment in rem and judgments in rem can only deal with property 
located within the jurisdiction of the court. The Court of Appeal found that 
the confirmation order was a judgment in personam. The Judicial Committee 
found that:
(a)  insolvency orders were sui generis and did not fall into either category;
(b)  the effect of the plan could have been achieved through a scheme of 
arrangement under Manx law; and
(c)  at common law, the Manx Court had a discretion to recognise the plan and 
assist the creditors to implement it under local law.
In words which echo those of Court of Demerara in 1814, Lord Hoffman, on behalf 
of the Privy Council, concluded as follows:
“21 Their Lordships consider that these principles are sufficient to 
confer upon the Manx court jurisdiction to assist the committee of 
creditors, as appointed representatives under the Chapter 11 order, 
to give effect to the plan. As there is no suggestion of prejudice to 
any creditor in the Isle of Man or local law which might be infringed, 
there can be no discretionary reason for withholding such assistance.”
Without much explicit analysis, this decision supported the unreasoned judicial 
practice in jurisdictions, such as Bermuda, over several years, which expanded 
the traditional common law rule that only foreign “main” proceedings in the 
company’s domicile would be recognised to embrace the modern COMI concept. 
However, the Bermuda practice has almost invariably entailed the commencement 
of parallel proceedings in Bermuda in relation to a Bermudian incorporated 
company. The Judicial Committee seemingly had no difficulty with the fact that 
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the only formal insolvency proceeding afoot was in a jurisdiction other than 
the company’s domicile. It has recently been judicially noted that public policy 
objections to an insolvency proceeding designed to result in the debtor’s ultimate 
liquidation without any parallel proceeding may give rise to public policy concerns 
in the company’s place of incorporation:
“24. Nevertheless, it may be useful to note that persons incorporating 
companies in Bermuda which are substantially managed abroad ought 
not to expect this Court to give “rubber-stamp” recognition to foreign 
principal winding-up proceedings which are commenced without 
parallel proceedings here. In most cases, commercial logic will 
likely be the best guide as to whether it is appropriate to commence 
winding-up proceedings abroad in respect of a local company without 
also commencing proceedings here. Legally, a Bermuda company 
can never be wound up and dissolved for all purposes without a 
dissolution taking place under Bermuda law. Even if a company is 
struck off the register and dissolved without a winding-up under 
Bermuda law, any disgruntled creditor (or perhaps, a shareholder 
as well) may subject to limitation constraints apply to set aside a 
dissolution and open a winding-up under local law. In any liquidation 
of substance, it will be impossible for the place of incorporation to 
be ignored. And where the way in which a Bermudian company 
is wound up has implications for the reputation of Bermuda as an 
international financial centre, public policy may well dictate that this 
forum ought to play a more significant role than purely commercial 
concerns might otherwise dictate.”78
Lord Hoffman’s landmark judgment in the Cambridge Gas case also tentatively 
explored the somewhat cloudy issue of the precise limits of the forms judicial 
assistance may take:
“22 What are the limits of the assistance which the court can give? 
In cases in which there is statutory authority for providing assistance, 
the statute specifies what the court may do… At common law, their 
Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the form 
of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form no 
part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least be 
able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in 
78 Re Dickson Holdings [2008] Bda LR 34; [2008] SC (Bda) 37 Com (9 May 2008) (per Kawaley J).
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the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is to 
enable the foreign office holder or the creditors to avoid having to 
start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies 
to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings 
had taken place in the domestic forum.”
It is suggested that commercial factors will usually dictate whether or not ancillary 
proceedings are commenced as part of an insolvent restructuring process taking 
place outside the debtor’s domicile. The risks of not implementing a plan through 
a parallel scheme (or plan) in the place of incorporation (in terms of potential 
challenges in the company’s domicile) may often outweigh the benefits of not 
incurring the costs involved. It is also subject to argument whether or not the forms 
of assistance are in law limited to what the assisting court could have done under 
local law.
In the context of parallel proceedings at least, the Bermuda Court has routinely 
recognised various orders made in the course of related parallel Chapter 11 
proceedings without any analysis of whether substantially similar orders could 
have been made under local law. Lord Hoffman’s dictum is probably most 
accurately read as applying to assistance with regard to matters which are governed 
substantively by local law, such as the transfer of the shares of Navigator Holdings 
plc. Where recognition is sought of orders made in respect of matters governed 
by the law of the overseas forum, in principle it ought not to matter whether or 
not the effect of the order could have been achieved under local law, public policy 
concerns apart. This is consistent with the sui generis nature of many orders made 
insolvency proceedings, neither wholly personal nor wholly in rem, as affirmed 
by the Judicial Committee in Cambridge Gas and as recognised by the Court 
of Demerara in Odwin v Forbes.79 The universalist principle has the effect of 
modifying the application of the conflict of law rules that might otherwise apply 
in relation to non-insolvency judgments.
Is the form of assistance which can be provided limited to remedies which are 
available under local law? The answer may be affirmative in any case where 
substantive relief is sought from an assisting court outside of the context of parallel 
proceedings. The answer may be negative if one is considering whether or not 
the assisting court will recognise various orders and procedural mechanisms of 
a foreign “main” proceeding. For instance, when schemes of arrangement are 
implemented under Bermuda law in tandem with a Chapter 11 plan, the Bermuda 
79 Henry, above note 49, at 100.
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Court will often approve voting classes and priority rules for the purposes of the 
Bermuda scheme which derive from the United States Bankruptcy Code and which 
do not have precise equivalents under Bermuda insolvency law. But the authority 
for sanctioning a scheme is statutory and accepted as permitting creditors to 
contract out of the usual insolvency law regime. If purely common law assistance is 
involved, with no local insolvency proceedings or scheme afoot (as in Cambridge 
Gas), the forms of assistance which can be provided may very well be limited to 
those available under local law.
Section 77 of the Bahamian Insurance Act 2005 (Cap 308) permits an insurer 
or the Commission to petition the court to place an insurer which is in financial 
difficulties under judicial management. The same section also empowers the 
Commission to seek similar relief in respect of an insurer incorporated and in 
liquidation abroad, but with a branch office in the Bahamas, to be placed under 
judicial management. These statutory corporate rescue and judicial cooperation 
provisions in the insurance context do not appear to be replicated in the non-
insurance sphere.
A recent ongoing example of common law cross-border cooperation involving a 
Bahamian insurer placed under judicial management in its domicile on 8 September 
2009 is the British American Insurance Company Ltd. case, where the following 
orders have reportedly been made:80
Table 3.4. Orders in the British American Insurance Company Ltd. Case
Source: www.baico-intl.com
Judicial  
Management
Judicial 
Administrator
Provisional 
Liquidation
Judicial Manager 
Order Recognized
Antigua and Barbuda Anguilla Bermuda Turks and Caicos Islands
Montserrat Dominica
St Kitts and Nevis
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Grenada
St. Lucia
It is believed to be the case that express statutory support exists for the making 
of the various non-Bahamian orders in respect of the overseas business of the 
Bahamian company, but that the coordination of the proceedings in the various 
80 See: www.baico-intl.com.
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fora has taken place in the exercise of common law discretion powers to assist 
foreign courts in the restructuring of a multinational enterprise.81
Court to Court Communications in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases
“One of the most essential elements of cooperation in cross-border 
cases is communication among the administering authorities of 
the countries involved. Because of the importance of the courts in 
insolvency and reorganization proceedings, it is even more essential 
that the supervising courts be able to coordinate their activities 
to ensure the maximum available benefit for the stakeholders of 
financially troubled enterprises.”82
The need for court to court communications arises in the context of parallel 
insolvency proceedings where complex coordination issues arise. Through a 
Practice Direction issued on 1 October 2007, Bermuda’s Commercial Court adopted 
the ALI/III “Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-
Border Cases”.83 The original guidelines were adopted with a view to facilitating 
cross-border insolvency adjudication in the NAFTA region. They would seem 
to be a useful precedent for the BACW region, in particular for members of the 
CSME. They set out a procedural code for court to court communications designed 
to promote communications subject to guarantees of due process and transparency. 
INSOL Europe was involved in the development of the European Communication 
and Co-operation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency of 2007, which were 
clearly influenced by the earlier North American precedent.
Similar statutory rules, based on Articles 25-27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
have more recently been adopted by three European countries, a development 
which provides further (albeit indirect) support for the credibility of the ALI/III 
Guidelines as a code which can bridge the common law-civil law divide. The main 
European trigger for this development appears to be the Model Law. According to 
Professor Bob Wessels:
“As a result, in autumn 2010, the following European countries have 
adopted rules concerning communication and co-operation in cross-
81 See e.g. section 61, Nevis Insurance Act 2009, which provides for the local business of a foreign insurer to be 
placed under judicial management. The Act does not appear to have any further judicial assistance provisions. 
82 American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Principles of Cooperation Among the NAFTA Countries 
(2003, ALI, Philadelphia PA) (adopted by the American Law Institute on 16 May 2000 and the International 
Insolvency Institute on 10 June 2001).
83 See: www.gov.bm (see “Publications” on the Judiciary’s homepage under the Ministry of Justice sub-community).
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border cases: United Kingdom, Poland, Rumania and Greece, whilst 
in new legislation proposed in Slovenia and the Netherlands similar 
provisions are under way...”84
Conclusion
The above review of cross-border judicial cooperation rules in the BACW shows 
that no standard statutory framework exists, even amongst CARICOM Member 
States. Only a minority of territories have enacted modern statutory international 
cooperation and corporate rescue rules (BVI, Barbados, the Cayman Islands and 
Trinidad and Tobago). However, BVI’s international cooperation provisions have 
yet to be brought into force. Nevertheless, common law discretionary cooperation 
powers exist, while traditional statutory provisional liquidation rules are flexible 
enough to serve the needs of modern corporate rescue proceedings. The extensive 
common law cooperation powers, first articulated in the region in the early 19th 
century by the Court of Demerara in what is now Guyana, owe their theoretical 
existence to Dutch civil law writers. These powers (in the context of recognition 
of foreign insolvency proceedings) essentially represent an internationalist 
segment of common law conflict of law rules developed in the sphere of personal 
bankruptcy and heavily influenced by the notion that the law of an individual’s 
domicile ought ordinarily to determine most matters relating to his personal status. 
In the modern corporate rescue context, however, this approach has been modified 
so as to contemplate principal proceedings taking place in the debtor’s commercial 
rather than legal domicile.
The intellectual cross-pollination in the international insolvency arena continues. 
Although the modern trend appears to be in the direction of a civil law-style 
codification of the law, inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law, the more 
fluid common law litigant and judge driven approach clearly has much to offer, 
particularly in the quintessentially fact-sensitive corporate rescue context. This 
conclusion is demonstrated by the ample role the common law has played in 
cross-border cases in jurisdictions such as Bermuda, BVI and the Cayman Islands 
without statutory international cooperation rules. It also demonstrated by the 
recent adoption in the European region of both a 2007 European version of the 
United States lawyer and judge driven “Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court 
Communications in Cross-Border Cases” as well as UNCITRAL Model Law-
inspired statutory equivalents. This further illustrates how creative insolvency 
professionals (broadly defined, be they academics, judges or practitioners) are 
84 Wessels, above note 40.
104 International Insolvency Law: Future Perspectives
capable of both shaping cross-border practice and inspiring legislative action 
as well.
The most important lesson to draw from the above analysis of the BACW region 
is that the apparent problem of the absence of statutory cross-border insolvency 
solutions will likely be counterbalanced by a range of practical and legally 
efficacious common law solutions. While the flexible common law approach to 
handling insolvency cases has much to commend it, the need for clarity in cross-
border cases straddling the common law and civil law traditions suggests that 
legislative codification is the preferred option. What Professor Ian Fletcher has 
observed, in relation to the English approach to concurrent proceedings,85 applies 
with equal (if not greater) force to the BACW:
“Although the English approach has been emulated in other Common 
Law jurisdictions... the full possibilities that exist under English law 
are less widely known than they deserve to be. This is possibly on 
account of the relative inaccessibility of case law, as opposed to 
legislation, when viewed from the standpoint of those operating 
outside the common law tradition.”86
Postscript (2014)
This is a postscript to a paper based on an Edwin Coe Lecture, delivered in Vienna 
in late 2010, titled “Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean 
World: Challenges and Opportunities”, which was published three years ago. 
Before proceeding to briefly summarise recent case law dealing with one aspect of 
this paper, it may be helpful to set the scene.
Eight years ago the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, through Lord Hoffman, 
gave its imprimatur to the idea that there was still a place for common law judicial 
cooperation in the modern world in Cambridge Gas.87 A resounding cheer went up 
amongst the ranks of insolvency lawyers and judges in offshore jurisdictions such 
as Bermuda whose attempts to plant the seeds for modern statutory international 
cooperation rules had fallen on stony ground. Their longstanding efforts to “muddle 
through” by creatively using insolvency law provisions crafted in Britain in the 
post-war era to serve modern cross-border liquidation and restructuring goals had 
at last received, albeit in very general terms, high judicial approval.
85 Writing, it must be noted, before the adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law-inspired legislation which answered, 
to some extent at least, his plea for a statutory restatement of the law.
86 Fletcher, above note 41, at paragraph 3.105.
87 Above note 64.
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Lord Hoffman, it is worth recalling, made the following crucial observations which 
had resonance well beyond the confines of the narrow facts of the Cambridge 
Gas case:
“19. The underdeveloped state of the common law means that 
unifying principles which apply to both personal and corporate 
insolvency have not been fully worked out. For example, the rule that 
English moveables vest automatically in a foreign trustee or assignee 
has so far been limited to cases in which he was appointed by the 
court of the country in which the bankrupt was domiciled (in the 
English sense of that term), as in Solomons v Ross, or in which he 
submitted to the jurisdiction: Re Davidson’s Settlement Trusts (1873) 
LR 15 Eq 383. It may be that the criteria for recognition should be 
wider, but that question does not arise in this case. Submission to the 
jurisdiction is enough. In the case of immovable property belonging 
to a foreign bankrupt, there is no automatic vesting but the English 
court has a discretion to assist the foreign trustee by enabling him to 
obtain title to or otherwise deal with the property.
20. Corporate insolvency is different in that, even in the case of 
moveables, there is no question of recognising a vesting of the 
company’s assets in some other person. They remain the assets of 
the company. But the underlying principle of universality is of equal 
application and this is given effect by recognising the person who 
is empowered under the foreign bankruptcy law to act on behalf of 
the insolvent company as entitled to do so in England. In addition, 
as Innes CJ said in the Transvaal case of Re African Farms 1906 TS 
373, 377, in which an English company with assets in the Transvaal 
had been voluntarily wound up in England, “recognition carries with 
it the active assistance of the court”. He went on to say that active 
assistance could include:
“A declaration, in effect, that the liquidator is entitled to deal 
with the Transvaal assets in the same way as if they were 
within the jurisdiction of the English courts, subject only to 
such conditions as the courts may impose for the protection 
of local creditors, or in recognition of the requirements of our 
local laws.”
21. Their Lordships consider that these principles are sufficient to 
confer upon the Manx court jurisdiction to assist the committee of 
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creditors, as appointed representatives under the Chapter 11 order, 
to give effect to the plan. As there is no suggestion of prejudice to 
any creditor in the Isle of Man or local law which might be infringed, 
there can be no discretionary reason for withholding such assistance.
22. What are the limits of the assistance which the court can give? In 
cases in which there is statutory authority for providing assistance, 
the statute specifies what the court may do. For example, section 
426(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a request from a 
foreign court shall be authority for an English court to apply “the 
insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to 
comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction.” At common law, 
their Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the 
form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form 
no part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least 
be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done 
in the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is 
to enable the foreign office holder or the creditors to avoid having to 
start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies 
to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings 
had taken place in the domestic forum.”
The narrow finding was that the Isle of Man Court had a discretion to recognise 
and assist a foreign insolvency court (the United States Bankruptcy Court) and to 
give effect to under local law a plan of arrangement approved in relation to an Isle 
of Man company subject to Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States by order 
of the US Court. This narrow finding was later, in a somewhat different context, 
suggested to be wrong by the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Lord Collins) 
on the grounds that it impermissibly stretched traditional conflict of law rules: 
Rubin v Eurofinance and New Cap Re v AE Grant [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 
236 (“Rubin”).
However, the broader pronouncements in Cambridge Gas about the breadth 
and flexibility of the common law discretion to assist foreign insolvency courts 
where the overseas forum is also the insolvent debtor’s domicile were affirmed 
in Rubin. An important practical consideration which the Judicial Committee 
in Cambridge Gas did not have to decide is to what extent, and based on what 
principles, can the common law assisting court apply local law in aid of the foreign 
insolvency representatives and/or court. These problems do not arise if the foreign 
representative can deploy statutory recognition provisions which explicitly trigger 
the application of local insolvency law rules to the “assistance proceeding”.
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The Bermudian, BVI and Caymanian courts have had to confront the question of 
the extent to which local insolvency law can be deployed in aid of common law 
assistance since “Cross-Border Insolvency in the British Atlantic and Caribbean 
World: Challenges and Opportunities” was written, three years ago. The result of 
the Bermudian analysis, with conflicting results at the Supreme Court (trial court) 
and Court of Appeal levels, remains somewhat uncertain although it is possible that 
greater clarity will be provided through a final appeal to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. The Caymanian position is also “up in the air”, with the Grand 
Court having decided, but the Court of Appeal adjudication still incomplete. The 
BVI position is quite nuanced, with a recent decision giving comfort to both the 
advocates and opponents of a broad common law cooperation approach.
An important distinction exists between the Bermudian, on the one hand, and the 
BVI and Cayman position, on the other. In the latter two jurisdictions, statutory 
international cooperation provisions exist so the need to rely upon common law 
rules appears to be significantly muted. In the case of Bermuda, no statutory rules 
exist and considerable doubt exists over the scope of the jurisdiction to wind-up 
overseas company; accordingly, the need for clarity as to the availability of 
common law assistance powers takes on a heightened significance.
Bermuda: Can Liquidators of Caymanian Companies request the Bermudian 
Court to provide Assistance by compelling their Former Auditor, Resident 
in Bermuda, to produce a Wider Range of Documents than can be obtained 
under Caymanian Law?
The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative in Re Saad 
Investments Company Ltd (in Official Liquidation); Re Singularis Holdings Ltd (in 
Official Liquidation) [2013] Bda LR 28. The facts may be summarised as follows.
As regards Saad Investments Company Ltd (“SICL”), the company already in 
Caymanian Official Liquidation, petitioned for its winding-up in Bermuda on 17 
August 2012 under the Companies Act 1981. A winding-up order was made by 
the Supreme Court on 14 September 2012. On 13 February 2013, the ancillary 
Bermudian joint liquidators applied under section 195 of the Companies Act 
1981 for its former auditor, a Bermuda exempted partnership managed in Dubai 
(“PwC”), to produce documents and be examined. An ex parte order was granted 
on 4 March 2013. An application to set aside the ex parte order was refused on 15 
April 2013.
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No issue of common law cooperation arose in respect of SICL. The examination/
production order was challenged on merits and scope grounds before the Supreme 
Court, which was bound by an earlier Court of Appeal for Bermuda decision to 
the effect that the jurisdiction to make a winding-up order could not be made in 
the ensuing liquidation: PwC (a Firm) v Kingate Global Fund Ltd; Kingate Euro 
Fund Ltd [2011] Bda LR 31. The jurisdiction to wind-up SICL was raised by 
the former auditor before the Court of Appeal for Bermuda, which rejected the 
decision by a majority (Geoffrey Bell JA (Acting), Edward Zacca, P; Sir Robin 
Auld JA (dissenting): PricewaterhouseCoopers (exempted partnership No. 7420 
v Saad Investment Company Ltd; Singularis Holdings Ltd [2013] CA (Bda) Civ 
(28 November 2013).
The controversy (only resolved by the Judicial Committee’s decision in 
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Company Ltd [2014] UKPC 35) 
as to whether any general statutory jurisdiction to wind-up overseas companies 
existed under Bermudian law explains why the liquidators of Singularis Holdings 
Ltd (“SHL”), a company related to SICL, sought to obtain comparable documents 
from PwC through the parallel route of an application for common law assistance. 
As far as SHL is concerned, the Supreme Court was required to confront head on 
the question of:
(a)  whether it could make a production/examination order either applying section 
195 of the Companies Act or by analogy with that statutory power, and
(b)  assuming that the Court could potentially make such an order, whether it should 
do so in circumstances where the scope of relief sought by the Caymanian 
liquidators was broader than that available under SHL’s domiciliary law.
The Supreme Court held (applying Cambridge Gas and obiter dicta in Rubin):
(a) it could grant the relief sought:
(i) by applying local insolvency law remedies on the basis that local 
procedural law governed the common law assistance proceedings (Frank 
Schmitt v Henning Deichmann [2012] EWCH 62 (Ch); [2013] Ch 61 
(Proudman J) (“Re Phoenix”); Picard (as Trustee for the liquidation of the 
Business of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC) et al v Primeo 
Fund (In Official Liquidation), Cayman Grand Court FSD 275 of 2010, 
Judgment dated 14 January 2013 (Andrew Jones J) (“Primeo”)); or
(ii) by analogy with the local statutory insolvency powers (Re Impex Services 
Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 (Deemster Doyle) (“Re Impex”)); and
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(b) the fact that the relief sought was unavailable in the principal liquidation 
did not constitute discretionary grounds for refusing to assist the foreign 
liquidators: Re Phoenix, at paragraph 44).
The Court of Appeal Decision in Relation to SHL
The Court of Appeal majority (Bell JA (Acting), Zacca P concurring) found 
it unnecessary to decide whether the common law jurisdiction to provide the 
assistance sought by the Caymanian liquidators existed. It was quite obvious that 
even if such jurisdiction did exist, it should not be exercised on discretionary 
“forum-shopping” grounds, principally:
(a) the fact that similar relief was not available in SHL’s domicile; and
(b) the fact that the connections of all parties to Bermuda were tenuous.
Auld JA, however, grasped the scope of the common law jurisdiction to provide 
assistance question without compunction and found it seriously wanting. He 
rejected unequivocally the notion that the examination/production order could be 
made as against SHL at common law in circumstances where section 195 of the 
Companies Act 1981 did not apply. He tempered this somewhat radical rejection 
of well-established notions of common law recognition and assistance with the 
following sage remarks:
57. I conclude by echoing the views of many others, more 
knowledgeable and experienced than I am in cross-border insolvency 
proceedings. There is an urgent need for an internationally coherent 
and readily identifiable set of legal norms and forensic tools in this 
field to provide a speedy, practical and inexpensive service to the 
commercial community for resolution of jurisdictional disputes and 
other enforcement issues. With respect to the many and distinguished 
judges who, individually, have had to grapple with the problem on 
a case-by-case basis over many years, the collective product of 
their endeavours is a poor service to creditors and debtors alike in 
coping with the serious, urgent and costly pressures of insolvency. 
As Lord Collins88 and many others highly experienced in the field of 
insolvency law have demonstrated and urged, international agreement 
and statutory implementation is the way to go about it, not piecemeal 
judicial “legislation”…”
88 Rubin, at paragraphs 133 to 155.
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Auld JA (at paragraph 58(2) (b), and for somewhat different reasons) agreed with 
the majority that, in any event, the Caymanian liquidators’ application should be 
refused on discretionary grounds because:
“…it would offend the private international law principle of comity by 
vastly exceeding powers in corresponding provisions in the overseas 
country, Cayman, where the principal and/or sole winding-up orders 
were made.”
In the insolvency context that is a somewhat surprising formulation of comity, 
because it implies that a foreign court would not wish to empower its officers to 
take advantage of more generous remedies available under foreign law. In practice, 
the contrary disposition on the part of the primary liquidation court is often likely 
to be the case.
The SHL liquidators appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
against this decision; PwC appealed against the dismissal of its appeal against 
the winding-up order and statutory production order made against it in the SICL 
winding-up proceedings.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decision
Bermuda’s highest appellate Court decided the SHL appeal (Singularis Holdings 
Ltd v PwC [2014] UKPC 36 (“Singularis”)) by upholding the Court of Appeal for 
Bermuda decision in substance but for reasons which provided some degree of 
comfort and discomfort for judges at the various local court levels. The unanimous 
decision of the Court of Appeal that assistance should be refused on forum grounds 
was unanimously upheld. However, none of the Judicial Committee considered 
the question of whether the jurisdiction to provide assistance existed at common 
law was an academic question which did not need to be decided or opined upon.
The Privy Council majority (Lords Sumption, Collins and Clarke) found that 
a specific common law power to compel the former auditors to produce the 
information sought existed, as a complement to the common law discretion to 
recognise the foreign liquidators and provide them assistance generally. The source 
of the specific assistance power was the common law itself, hence no need to 
apply general or local statutory provisions, whether directly or by analogy, arises. 
This was a direct and eloquent response to the trial judge’s plea for appellate 
guidance on how a first instance judge should determine what forms of assistance 
can be provided at common law. It is responsive to the reality that jurisdictions 
such as Bermuda which lack statutory ground rules for international recognition 
and assistance in cross-border insolvency cases are wholly dependent upon the 
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common law. The majority approach is not entirely unproblematic in that it not 
only awakens the common law from what Professor Fletcher described as its 
“arrested state of development”, but arguably also enlivens judicial law-making 
to an extent that many modern common law judges find uncomfortable at best and 
objectionable at worst. The majority’s decision implies that whenever new forms 
of common law assistance are sought in a cross-border insolvency case, the court 
is not just permitted but required to determine afresh whether the power to grant 
the specific form of relief can be found to exist as part of the common law.
Most common law judges are more attuned to the more constrained tasks 
of statutory interpretation and/or defining the scope of common law claims 
and remedies the existence of which was settled centuries ago. The minority 
dissenting views of Lords Neuberger and Mance in SICL, broadly viewed, reflect 
philosophical anxieties about judges assuming such a broad law-making role and, 
perhaps, a conviction that jurisdictions which lack modern cross-border insolvency 
legislation should leave the “Dark Ages” and join the fold of “Modernity”. This 
writer has sympathy with these anxieties and shares the conviction that statutory 
ground rules represent international best practice for the cross-border insolvency 
field. But as a first instance judge in a jurisdiction which presently lacks the 
requisite statutory tools, the preferred practical and philosophical disposition must 
be to exploit the ancient magic of the common law to the fullest extent possible in 
providing common law assistance to foreign liquidators who properly request it.
At first instance in SHL, the Court analysed the scope of the common law power 
to assist in the following way. The power to assist was a discretionary power 
consisting of a fundamental decision as to whether to recognise and, as an incident 
of recognition, to grant assistance. When it came to determining what remedies 
could be granted by way of assistance, these remedies had to be found in the 
existing remedies available in either the generally applicable law of the forum 
or, ideally (but more difficult to justify in the case of SHL on the hypothesis that 
SHL could not be wound up under Bermudian law) the local insolvency statute 
itself. While preferring the argument that the lex fori governed the relief to be 
granted and that the effect of recognising the foreign winding-up and liquidator 
appointment orders was to confer on the foreign liquidators the same status as 
liquidators appointed under the local statute, the first judge accepted that this 
required a somewhat convoluted reading of the insolvency provisions. The primary 
finding made was that a production order could be made by analogy with an order 
under section 195 of the Companies Act 1985, because the Court possessed a 
broad general power under its rules to order discovery in the action commenced 
by the Caymanian liquidators for recognition and assistance.
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The Privy Council majority judgments on the nature of the assistance power are 
seemingly far more ample and generous. They appear to characterise the forms 
of assistance which may be provided as themselves emanating from the common 
law, rather than remedies which exist under existing generally applicable rules 
of local law which simply have to be shaped to meet the distinctive facts of the 
relevant assistance application. It is respectfully suggested that it is far easier for 
a court dealing with a common law assistance application to shape the remedy 
from a toolkit which already exists under local law than to fashion an entirely new 
common law remedy. The following passage in Lord Sumption’s leading judgment 
is pertinent in this regard:
“19... In the Board’s opinion, the principle of modified universalism 
is part of the common law, but it is necessary to bear in mind, first, 
that it is subject to local law and local public policy and, secondly, 
that the court can only ever act within the limits of its own statutory 
and common law powers. What are those limits? In the absence 
of a relevant statutory power, they must depend on the common 
law, including any proper development of the common law. The 
question how far it is appropriate to develop the common law so as to 
recognise an equivalent power does not admit of a single, universal 
answer. It depends on the nature of the power that the court is being 
asked to exercise. On this appeal, the Board proposes to confine 
itself to the particular form of assistance which is sought in this 
case, namely an order for the production of information by an entity 
within the personal jurisdiction of the Bermuda court. The fate of that 
application depends on whether, there being no statutory power to 
order production, there is an inherent power at common law do so.”
This statement follows an historical review of the nature and scope of the common 
law power to recognise and assist, which characterises the power as primarily 
designed to enable a foreign liquidator to exercise in the assisting forum the 
liquidation powers conferred on him by the debtor’s domiciliary law. The judgment 
then proceeds to explore whether a common law power to compel the production 
of evidence exists. After conceding that a statutory base is required to compel the 
production of evidence for use in foreign proceedings, it is concluded that what 
was sought here was information to assist the foreign liquidators to discharge their 
functions, and that no statutory base was required to exercise this power:
“23. The present case is not a Norwich Pharmacal case. The 
significance of Norwich Pharmacal in the present context is that it 
illustrates the capacity of the common law to develop a power in the 
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court to compel the production of information when this is necessary 
to give effect to a recognised legal principle. In the Board’s opinion, an 
analogous power arises in the present case. Relief is not being sought 
by way of assistance to a litigant who can rely on ordinary forensic 
procedures for the purpose. It is being sought by the officers of a 
foreign court. The principle of modified universalism is a recognised 
principle of the common law. It is founded on the public interest in 
the ability of foreign courts exercising insolvency jurisdiction in the 
place of the company’s incorporation to conduct an orderly winding 
up of its affairs on a world-wide basis, notwithstanding the territorial 
limits of their jurisdiction. The basis of that public interest is not only 
comity, but a recognition that in a world of global businesses it is in 
the interest of every country that companies with transnational assets 
and operations should be capable of being wound up in an orderly 
fashion under the law of the place of their incorporation and on a 
basis that will be recognised and effective internationally. This is a 
public interest which has no equivalent in cases where information 
may be sought for commercial purposes or for ordinary adversarial 
litigation. The courts have repeatedly recognised not just a right but a 
duty to assist in whatever way they properly can. The Bermuda court 
has properly recognised the status of the liquidators as officers of that 
court. The liquidators require the information for the performance of 
the ordinary functions attaching to that status. Their acknowledged 
right to take possession of the company’s world-wide assets is of little 
use without the ability to identify and locate them, if necessary with 
the assistance of the court. The information is unlikely to be available 
in any other way…”
Lord Collins in a separate but concurring judgment robustly rejected the analysis 
upon which the liquidators had relied in arguing their appeal, namely that the 
common law power could simply be found by applying by analogy the statutory 
winding-up provisions which did not apply. He concluded:
“64. In my view to apply insolvency legislation by analogy “as if” 
it applied, even though it does not actually apply, would go so far 
beyond the traditional judicial development of the common law as to 
be a plain usurpation of the legislative function.”
This conclusion, which purports to reject an argument which found favour with 
the first instance judge, is difficult to marry with the findings which were actually 
made. Obviously it is wrong as a matter of principle to simply apply statutory 
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provisions to circumstances where they are not intended to apply. On the other 
hand there is nothing revolutionary or unconstitutional about delineating the scope 
of a common law power by reference to a corresponding statutory provision which 
does not apply to the case at hand. A well-recognised example of applying a statute 
by analogy is where courts dealing with equitable claims, which are analogous to 
corresponding common law claims, apply “by analogy” the statutory limitation 
periods which do not directly apply to the equitable claims: see e.g. Companhia 
de Seguros Imperio v Heath (Rebx) Ltd et al [2000] EWCA Civ 219. The first 
instance judge’s primary finding was that the power to order the production of the 
information sought could be found in the Court’s general discovery powers, which 
could be exercised in the following two ways:
(a) by compelling the production of documents relevant to the action for 
recognition and assistance; and
(b) applying by analogy the conditions for granting relief which would apply 
in the case of a domestic insolvency under section 195 of the Bermudian 
Companies Act 1981.
The trial judge did express a preference for an alternative basis for applying the 
local statute which he acknowledged was more radical. That was:
(a) viewing local procedural law as governing the form of assistance to be 
given; and
(b) construing the local insolvency statute as applying not just to liquidators 
appointed under the statute but also to liquidators whose common law 
recognition clothed them with the same legal status as a local liquidator.
This direct application of the statute was contended for by the judge on the 
hypothesis that the statute was intended by necessary implication to apply to a 
liquidator recognised at common law. This alternative analysis may fairly be 
rejected as being based on a convoluted and unsupportable statutory construction, 
but not on the basis articulated by Lord Collins. In fairness to Lord Collins, it 
appears from his judgment (paragraph 78 et seq.) that the arguments advanced 
before the Privy Council, as frequently occurs, did not completely mirror the 
findings made at first instance on these issues.
The complexity of identifying the scope and extent of “purely” common law 
powers begs the following question: was the Privy Council majority bound to 
conclude that the relevant assistance power had to be found in the common law 
itself? Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger agreed) seemed to consider that 
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it would have been preferable to base the application for information on more 
easily recognisable general common law or statutory powers. It appears from the 
judgments that the liquidators sought to justify the existence of the power on the 
basis of the most obtuse legal basis articulated by the first instance judge rather than 
on the most prosaic basis. The notion that Order 24 has no application to an action 
commenced for recognition and assistance in the form of obtaining information 
because the information sought is distinguishable from “evidence”, for instance, 
seems a highly technical and artificial distinction, especially if it is accepted that 
the information sought is not analogous to evidence for use (at trial) in foreign 
proceedings. Because the Privy Council majority prudently avoided making wide 
generalisations about different scenarios, it is only fair to acknowledge that other 
forms of assistance may give far less difficulty in terms of identifying the existence 
of the relevant common law power. Nevertheless it must surely be the case that 
generally applicable statutory provisions can be deployed in aid of exercising the 
common law assistance power.
It is respectfully suggested that it would be far more straightforward and consonant 
with the generally applicable conflict of law rules to adopt the following approach 
to common law assistance applications:
(a) there is a common law power to recognise and assist foreign liquidators 
appointed in an insolvent company’s place of incorporation;
(b) the forms of assistance available in the proceedings for recognition and 
assistance are governed by the lex fori;
(c) the laws of the forum which may be applied include generally applicable 
statutory provisions and generally applicable common law rules;
(d) the conditions applicable to deciding whether to grant relief and if so in what 
particular form are governed by common law cross-border insolvency rules;
(e) in exceptional cases where generally applicable local law affords no adequate 
remedy, the court may have to embark on an enquiry as to whether appropriate 
relief can be fashioned using purely common law powers.
Lord Mance in his dissenting judgment (on the issue of the existence of a common 
law power) made the following trenchant observations:
“147...I am not at present persuaded that it is appropriate to extend the 
common law power to assist by ordering the provision of information 
beyond categories which have some recognisable basis in current law, 
that is cases where there is (a) evidence that the person ordered to 
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provide the information or documentation has property belonging to 
the insolvent company, or (b) evidence of some wrongdoing by the 
person so ordered or (c) evidence of some wrongdoing by another 
person in which the person so ordered was or is innocently mixed up. 
A general common law power to order the disclosure of information 
and documentation by, and the questioning of, anyone, either because 
a foreign liquidator shows that this may assist him identify or recover 
assets anywhere in the world or, a fortiori, because it would enable 
him understand the company’s affairs, goes not only beyond anything 
which it is necessary to contemplate on this appeal, but is also beyond 
anything that I can, as at present advised, regard as permissible 
or appropriate.”
These remarks reflect an understandable anxiety about the notion of a general 
common law power to order the production of information wholly detached from 
the mainstream body of relevant law. It is submitted that the assistance sought, 
properly analysed, could indeed be granted within existing general legal principles, 
be they discovery (flexibly construed) or Norwich Pharmacal. Lord Neuberger 
agreed with Lord Mance, but was also reluctant to deal on an obiter basis with 
issues which it was not strictly necessary to decide. He noted:
“154...The extent of the extra-statutory powers of a common law 
court to assist foreign liquidators is a very tricky topic on which the 
Board, the House of Lords and the Supreme Court have not been 
conspicuously successful in giving clear or consistent guidance – see 
the judgment of Lord Hoffmann on behalf of the Board in Cambridge 
Gas Transportation Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc [2007] 1 AC 508, all five 
opinions in the House of Lords in In re HIH Casualty and General 
Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, and the judgment of Lord Collins 
for the majority of the Supreme Court in Rubin v Eurofinance SA 
[2013] 1 AC 236, discussed by Lord Sumption at paras 16-19, and 
the judgment of Lord Collins in this case.”
It is respectfully suggested that because the topic of common law assistance 
to foreign liquidators is such a “tricky topic”, the guidance given by the Privy 
Council in Singularis will be of considerable value to judges and practitioners in 
jurisdictions which presently lack statutory international cooperation provisions. 
Those jurisdictions, incidentally, include jurisdictions with strong commercial 
ties with the British offshore world, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. As Lord 
Clarke concluded (at paragraph 115):
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“…there is no reason why the common law should not be developed, 
provided that the development is measured and supports a 
recognised principle.”
In this regard it is to be hoped that in future cases the unanimous view that it was 
“forum shopping” for the liquidators to seek relief they could not obtain under 
Caymanian law from the Bermuda court may be reconsidered. The principle that 
this finding is based upon was described by Lord Sumption in the following terms:
“29...It is right for the Bermuda court, within the limits of its own 
inherent powers, to assist the officers of the Cayman court to transcend 
the territorial limits of that court’s jurisdiction by enabling them to 
do in Bermuda that which they could do in the Cayman Islands. But 
the order sought would not constitute assistance, because it is not 
just the limits of the territorial reach of the Cayman court’s powers 
which impede the liquidators’ work, but the limited nature of the 
powers themselves. The Cayman court has no power to require third 
parties to provide to its office-holders anything other than information 
belonging to the company. It does not appear to the Board to be a 
proper use of the power of assistance to make good a limitation on the 
powers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction under its own law. 
This was in substance the ground on which the liquidators failed in 
the Court of Appeal when they characterised the present application 
as ‘forum-shopping’. In the opinion of the Board it is correct.”
The quoted passage appears to blur the admittedly unclear lines of demarcation 
between the legal basis for recognition (giving extra-territorial effect to the foreign 
winding-up order) and the legal basis upon which assistance is granted. It is clearly 
consistent with the fundamental character of common law assistance that foreign 
liquidators should not seek to do abroad what they are not empowered to do by 
the law of the only forum in which they have been appointed. It is less obvious 
that the same constraint applies to the pursuit of distinctive remedies in a foreign 
forum. No such constraints appear to apply where an application for assistance 
is made pursuant to statutory international cooperation provisions so it is unclear 
why a different rule should apply to common law assistance. Even if historically 
assistance has been justified by reference to permitting the foreign liquidator to 
carry out their foreign law defined duties in the assisting forum, the remedial phase 
has surely always been defined by what is possible under local law. Moreover, the 
focus has been on maximum assistance possible rather than seeking to minimize 
the assistance given by reference to procedural law idiosyncrasies in the primary 
liquidation forum.
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From the perspective of the primary liquidation court, liquidators are typically 
appointed in international liquidations on terms that generally empower them to 
seek such assistance from foreign courts as may be required. Judges making such 
appointment orders are, it is submitted, unlikely to view themselves as authorizing 
the liquidators to obtain assistance from a foreign court pursuing only remedies 
which are available in the primary liquidation court, without more. The goal of 
the primary liquidation court would be for the liquidators to recover the maximum 
assets and/or information as can be obtained from the foreign court. The reasoning 
appears to be that the foreign liquidators seeking recognition and assistance are 
pursuing what approximates to a claim governed by foreign law, so that any local 
remedies should mirror those available in the foreign forum. This approach seems 
somewhat artificial as, in the case of an application for common law assistance 
made in Bermuda, the assistance “claim” is clearly governed by Bermudian law. 
It seems odd not to apply Bermuda law remedies to a Bermuda law claim pursued 
in a Bermudian in circumstances where the foreign court would be bound to 
endorse rather than disapprove extending to its liquidators invaluable relief which 
the foreign court was unable to itself extend. This flies in the face of the various 
public policy considerations which underpin the common law assistance power 
and potentially produces absurd results.
This aspect of the Singularis decision, adopted by common accord as if the point 
was self-evident, is perhaps the most puzzling part of the Privy Council’s decision. 
One can only speculate whether the result was subliminally influenced by the 
somewhat unusual procedural history of the information gathering exercise. Rather 
than commencing proceedings in Bermuda on the basis that PwC was resident 
there, the liquidators first applied to the Caymanian court and PwC submitted to the 
jurisdiction. In general civil litigation terms, pursuing a “second bite of the cherry” 
in Bermuda appeared to be a classic case of “forum shopping”. It is submitted that 
in the insolvency law arena proper (i.e. excluding adversarial litigation to which 
liquidators are parties), the concept of forum shopping has always enjoyed and 
should continue to enjoy a distinctive connotation than it does in the context of 
adversarial litigation.
In the interests of not unduly restricting the scope of common law assistance in 
cross-border insolvency cases, it is hoped that the “forum-shopping” aspect of 
Singularis will come to be seen as coloured by the facts of that particular case. 
However, the judgments of the majority have provided the clearest possible 
support for the vitality of the common law and its ability to provide assistance to 
foreign liquidators.
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The Cayman Islands: Does the Cayman Grand Court have Jurisdiction to 
assist a Foreign Insolvency Representative at Common Law and, if so, can 
Local Statutory Insolvency Rules be applied?
In Picard (as Trustee for the liquidation of the Business of Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities LLC) et al v Primeo Fund (In Official Liquidation), Cayman 
Grand Court FSD 275 of 2010, Judgment dated 14 January 2013 (Andrew Jones J) 
(“Primeo”), a first instance court also found that the common law power to assist 
foreign liquidators had not been diminished by the Rubin decision. These questions 
arose in the context of the determination of preliminary issues.
The applicant in this case was the Trustee for the liquidation of the business of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), a New York corporation 
with limited ties to the Cayman Islands. The respondent (“Primeo”) had invested 
monies with BLMIS. The Trustee wished to recover payments made by BLMIS 
to Primeo within the six months prior to the commencement of the insolvency 
proceeding in New York. BLMIS could not be wound-up under Caymanian 
law. However, the Trustee sought to rely upon, inter alia, Caymanian statutory 
insolvency avoidance provisions and, alternatively US avoidance provisions.
Statutory powers to provide assistance to foreign representatives do exist in 
Cayman, under Part XVII of the Caymanian Companies Law. However, Jones 
J found (at paragraph 19) that those powers did not include the deployment of 
avoidance provisions. He went on to consider the common law position, and 
held that:
Rubin did not undermine the holding in Cambridge Gas that common 
law assistance embraced the notion of active assistance by the local 
court (at paragraph 33);
“It remains open to this Court to accept Lord Hoffman’s answer to 
the question I have to decide. I conclude, as Proudman J did in [Re 
Phoenix], that the scope of the assistance available at common law 
includes the power to entertain an avoidance claim under section 145 
(or its predecessor section)” (paragraph 35);
Courts granting assistance at common law can apply local insolvency 
law, subject only to the limitation that “the common law cannot bring 
into play a statutory provision to achieve a purpose which is different 
from the object of the statute” (at paragraph 40, applying Al Sabah v 
Grupo Torras [2005] 2 AC 233 (PC)).
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The Grand Court’s decision has been appealed to the Caymanian Court of Appeal, 
and it was hoped that a judgment will be delivered on these intriguing questions 
in the course of 2014. In the event, the Court of Appeal decided to await the 
judgment in Singularis which effectively determined that the Primeo case was 
wrongly decided. Lord Collins after considering the Primeo decision that common 
law assistance could take the form of applying local statutory anti-avoidance 
provisions opined as follows:
“102. The Court of Appeal did not reach the question whether Jones 
J was entitled to apply the Cayman anti-avoidance provision at 
common law. The court had been informed that an issue central to 
that question, namely whether Cambridge Gas should be followed, 
was before the Court of Appeal of Bermuda. Because the matter 
was before this Board and shortly to be heard, the Court of Appeal 
was invited to hand down an interim judgment dealing only with the 
issues on the mutual assistance statutory provisions. The appeal has 
now been settled. It follows from what I have said that the decision of 
Jones J on the present aspect of the case was wrong.”
The British Virgin Islands: Can a Foreign Representative whose Appointment 
is recognised solely at Common Law be clothed with the same Statutory 
Powers as a Duly Appointed Local Liquidator?
In Re C (a Bankrupt) Claim No BVIHC (COM) 0080 of 2013 (Bannister J, 
Acting, 31 July 2013), many of the authorities considered by the Bermudian and 
Caymanian courts in Re Saad Investment Company Ltd and the Primeo case, were 
revisited by the BVI Commercial Court. Regretfully, the Saad case was not itself 
considered. Trustees of a Hong Kong bankrupt applied for common law recognition 
and sought an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the court conferring on them 
the same powers that would be conferred on trustees appointed under Part XII of 
the Insolvency Act 2003.
Following an exceptionally lucid and concise analysis of the various authorities, 
Bannister J held that there was no basis supported by authority upon which the 
trustees could be conferred the composite basket of powers, either at common 
law or under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, which a trustee appointed under 
the 2003 Act would vested with (paragraph [20]). He opined that Proudman J’s 
contrary ruling in Re Phoenix, decided before Rubin, was wrong (paragraph [15]). 
He declined to follow the Cayman Grand Court’s decision in Primeo.
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The following portions of the BVI Commercial Court judgment explained the 
scope of assistance which Bannister J considered could properly be given in aid of 
common law recognition as follows:
“[13] Each of the varied examples given by Lord Collins in the 
passage which I have set out above from Rubin v Eurofinance will 
similarly be seen to be an example of specific assistance given by 
local to foreign Courts as a matter of discretion in each case for the 
purposes of preserving the integrity of their insolvency procedures. 
In none of them, including Re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd,89 upon 
which Miss Harris relied strongly, is there any suggestion that at 
‘common law’ a foreign insolvency practitioner, once recognized, is 
to be treated as entitled to exercise the powers which he would have 
had had he been appointed pursuant to the insolvency laws of the 
given jurisdiction. The cases mentioned by Lord Collins all stress the 
discretion of the assisting Court to decide what, if any, assistance to 
provide to the foreign Court through its officer.
[14] As for Impex, what the Manx Court did was to use its own powers 
to compel the attendance of witnesses for examination. It did not do 
so under the Manx Companies Act, which it held was not available 
to it because the applicant was not the liquidator of a Manx company. 
It did it under its inherent jurisdiction and by way of assistance – just 
as, no doubt, it could have granted Norwich Pharmacal relief to the 
applicant Impex is not authority for the conferring of local statutory 
powers or rights upon a foreign office holder. If anything, it is 
authority to the contrary. It is authority, however, for the proposition 
that the local Court will use its own inherent powers to provide 
assistance to the foreign office holder.”
So Bannister J firmly rejected the notion that local statutory insolvency powers 
could be engaged in the context of common law assistance, whether those powers 
were sought collectively or individually. His forceful analysis suggests that 
assistance ought to be:
(a) tailored to allowing the foreign representative to do specific things; and
(b) limited to permitting the representatives to deploy powers that the Court can 
confer on them under its general and/or common law powers.
89 [2004] BPIR 564.
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Point (a) appears to this writer to be a more compelling point than does point (b). 
Point (a) is broadly consistent with the principle which Andrew Jones J in Primeo 
extracted from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision in Al Sabah 
v Grupo Torras [2005] 2 AC 233. As Jones J opined (at paragraph 40 of his 
judgment in Primeo):
“…the common law cannot bring into play a statutory provision to 
achieve a purpose which is different from the object of the statute.”
It is also not made explicitly clear why common law assistance can be provided 
based on selected “inherent” general powers which are often of statutory derivation, 
but cannot be provided based on selected statutory insolvency powers. Perhaps 
it is implicit in Bannister J’s compressed reasoning (and, indeed, the similar 
approach taken by Deemster Doyle in Re Impex) that general statutory powers 
are designed for general use in any proceedings before the local court. By way of 
contrast, statutory insolvency provisions are only designed for use in proceedings 
commenced under the relevant insolvency statute, and not otherwise.
The approach of Bannister J in Re C a Bankrupt is so closely aligned with the 
majority judgments of the Privy Council in Singularis that only one word of further 
commentary is required: bravo!
Conclusion
Despite the enactment of statutory international cooperation provisions in BVI and 
Cayman, the courts of those jurisdictions, alongside Bermuda’s courts, have had to 
grapple with the question of the extent to which common law forms of assistance 
can be given in aid of foreign insolvency proceedings.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Singularis delivered insolvency 
lawyers with a veritable five course feast. The majority (Lords Sumption, Collins 
and Clarke) confirmed that the power to assist foreign liquidators at common law 
under what has been described as the principle of modified universalism is very 
much alive, and extends to ordering parties in possession of information relevant to 
a company’s assets and business to produce the relevant information. This finding 
was strictly obiter, and while Lords Mance and Neuberger disagreed with the 
existence of the relevant power, they did not dissent from the proposition that 
as regards various other forms of relief, the common law power to assist foreign 
liquidators does exist.
It is obviously possible to quibble with some of the finer points of analysis, notably 
the surprisingly unanimous view that relief may not be granted by the assisting 
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court in terms more generous than is available in the primary liquidation forum. 
This finding seems to elide two distinct concepts:
(a) what the foreign liquidators are empowered to do by virtue of their appointment 
(e.g. commence proceedings, collect assets); and
(b) what remedies are available to them under the law of the assisting forum.
It is submitted that as the common law assistance claim is substantively governed 
by the law of the assisting forum, relief available under the same law should not 
be trimmed back to conform with corresponding relief in the primary liquidation 
forum. The position may well be different if a foreign claim is being prosecuted 
abroad by foreign liquidators.
However, the decision as a whole has provided the clearest possible support for 
the vitality of the common law and its ability to provide assistance to foreign 
liquidators. As Lord Neuberger has aptly pointed out (at paragraph 154), reflecting 
on the difficulties that this topic has presented even at the highest appellate levels:
“…The extent of the extra-statutory powers of a common law court 
to assist foreign liquidators is a very tricky topic…”
The challenges of the past will, to some extent, continue in the future so long as 
recourse must be had to common law assistance remedies lacking any statutory 
fortification. Future analysis of this topic will be considerably enriched by the 
judgments delivered in the Privy Council in Singularis. It is crystal clear, as 2015 
dawns, that the vitality of common law judicial assistance in cross-border insolvency 
cases will remain undiminished in the British Atlantic and Caribbean World.
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Chapter 4
Interaction of Corporate Law and Insolvency Law: 
German Experience and International Background
Professor Dr Karsten Schmidt
Introduction and Preliminary Observations
A Domestic View on a Global Affair
The topic of my Edwin Coe Lecture is devoted to the question: To what extent does 
insolvency law interfere with business law? And: In what respect is the evolution 
of insolvency law influenced by corporate law? In other words: I will be talking 
about the evolution of corporate law, brought into action by insolvency law, and 
vice versa.
My presentation will start with some very general preliminary observations. The 
first one is that insolvency law policy has become a global affair due to persistent 
competition of insolvency law concepts.1 And this competition increasingly affects 
corporate law in particular and business law in general. The perspective will be 
based on the experience of German legislation and the approach may appear 
rather academic. I am hopeful, however, that this approach will reveal a number 
of questions targeting practitioners’ tasks and legal policy all over the world.
Corporate Distress: Subject both to Insolvency Law and Corporate Law
Corporate distress is subject both to insolvency law and corporate law.2 At first 
glance this seems to go without saying. Quoting Gertrude Stein’s famous “a rose 
is a rose is a rose” nobody would hesitate to conclude that a corporation is a 
corporation is a corporation, even in case of crisis or insolvency. The coincidence 
of corporate law questions and insolvency law questions would be a simple task if 
insolvency law rules merely referred to procedural issues and the total of company 
* This is a re-edited and updated version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 16 in R. Parry (ed), 
Substantive Harmonisation and Convergence of Laws in Europe (2012, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (213-231).
1 H. Eidenmüller/T. Frobenius/W. Prusko, NZI 2010, 545 et seq.; H. Eidenmüller, ZGR 2006, 467; H. Eidenmüller, 
ZZP 121 (2008), 273, 274 et seq.
2 See K. Schmidt, ZHR 174 (2010), 243 et seq.
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law rules was not affected by impending insolvency or the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. This, however, is not the case as:
• Corporate governance includes coping with crisis management.
• Impending insolvency casts its shadow on corporate finance and governance.
• The directors and sometimes even the shareholders participate in the 
opening procedures.
• The corporate finance rules will not be the same after the commencement in 
insolvency proceedings.
• Insolvency proceedings will interfere with corporate structure and 
corporate governance.
Accordingly, it is sometimes difficult to find out if a rule affecting a distressed 
corporation is part of corporate law or insolvency law. In England e.g. the 
Insolvency Act 1986 deals with company voluntary arrangements,3 whereas the 
Companies Act 2006 deals with the schemes of arrangement.4 The question will 
be: does this conclusively mean that the first belongs to insolvency law and the 
second belongs to corporate law? As we will see, this qualification issue becomes 
crucial in conflict of laws cases. It may, however, be relevant for legal policy 
issues, too. In 2008, German legislation shifted some mandatory provisions about 
corporations from the corporate law codes to the Insolvency Code,5 e.g. the rules 
about shareholder loans6 and wrongful trading.7 One of the unadmitted ideas behind 
this step was to make these provisions applicable to foreign law corporations with 
a real seat in Germany, particularly English private limited companies. Following 
the incorporation theory, these corporations are governed by the rules of their 
domestic company law.8 In case of insolvency procedure, however, insolvency law 
prevails as lex fori,9 now including former company law provisions. At first glance, 
3 Sections 1-7, Insolvency Act 1986.
4 Sections 895–901, Companies Act 2006.
5 Gesetz zur Modernisierung von des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) of 23 
October 2008, BGBl. I, 2026.
6 Sections 39, 135 Insolvency Code (InsO), instead of section 32a/b, Limited Liability Companies Code (old 
version) (GmbHG a.F.).
7 Section 15a, Insolvency Code (InsO), instead of section 92(2)-(3), Corporation Code (AktG), section 64, Abs. 
1, Limited Liability Companies Code (old version) (GmbHG a.F.); section 130a, Abs. 1, Commercial Code (old 
version) (HGB a.F.).
8 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (C-212/97) [1999] ECR I-1459; Überseering BV v NCC Nordic 
Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (C-208/00) [2002] ECR I-09919; Kamer van Koophandel en 
Fabricken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd (C-167/01) [2003] ECR I-10155.
9 See Article 4(1), European Insolvency Regulation; section 335, Insolvency Code (InsO).
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this recent extension of insolvency law may appear as a poor trick of German 
legal policy. However: these rules are acknowledged as part of insolvency law in 
most countries outside Germany as well. Consequently, this legal policy strategy 
is acceptable, yet not due to its allocation in the respective codes, but rather for 
common sense reasons. In July, the Insolvency Law Chamber (Senat) of our 
Federal Court held that, even prior to the new legislation, the special provisions 
about shareholder loans had been insolvency law rules, as far as they required the 
opening of insolvency proceedings.10 We learn from all this that the qualification 
issue is more difficult than it seems.
The Traditional Division between the Two Legal Disciplines
The history of corporate insolvency law is a story of increasingly intensive 
links between both disciplines.11 In Germany, academic and legislative tradition 
neglected these links. Originally insolvency law only dealt with liquidation and 
equal treatment of creditors. The Konkursordnung of 1877 was based on the 
historical ideas of procedural execution, inspired by Salgado de Somoza’s famous, 
but 350 year old work “labyrinthus creditorum”, and did not show the footprints 
of commerce and business. The first attempts to extend the goals of insolvency 
law to business reorganisation were made during the depression between the two 
World Wars. Legislation introduced the instrument of majority arrangements (in 
Germany: “Zwangsvergleich”12 and “Vergleich”13), which already came close to 
the idea of insolvency plans. These reorganisation procedures, however, did not 
establish themselves in business reality. Additionally, a formal division between the 
bankruptcy proceedings leading to liquidation and the arrangement proceedings as a 
turnaround instrument was responsible for the disappointing results of this reform.
The present Insolvency Code (“Insolvenzordnung”) of 1994 tries to integrate the 
task of corporate restructuring into insolvency law by:
• extending the grounds for opening of insolvency proceedings (imminent 
illiquidity is sufficient);
• introducing the institute of “debtor in possession” (Eigenverwaltung) in favour 
of the company’s management; and,
• implementing the Chapter 11 idea of an insolvency plan.
10 BGH, 21 July 2011 - IX ZR 185/10, ZIP 2011, 1775 (“PIN”).
11 See K. Schmidt, Wege zum Insolvenzrecht der Unternehmen (1990, Kommunikationsforum, Köln), at 23 et seq.
12 Section 160 et seq., Bankruptcy Code (Konkursordnung).
13 Section 1 et seq., Arrangement Code (Vergleichsordnung).
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This was a promising attempt. But still, although enacted with the best of intentions, 
these turnaround instruments in the “Insolvenzordnung” again proved to be 
disappointing. For this reason, the aforementioned reform bill of 2008 (“MoMiG”) 
strengthened the impact of insolvency law on business law. So, actually, the 
relation between corporate law and insolvency law is no longer the same. And, 
as I will show, German legislation will take a second reform step pointing in the 
same direction this very year.
Insolvency and Corporate Governance
The Traditional Concept
A Management Affair
Let us, however, first look at business law as such. Avoiding business distress and 
reacting on an emerging crisis is, first of all, a corporate governance concern.14 
Worth mentioning among directors’ duties is:
• the continuous observation of liquidity and solvency;
• the immediate reaction on any symptom of a crisis; and
• the timely resort to restructuring measures.
The management board of a German stock corporation is expressly committed 
by section 91 of the Stock Corporation Act to establish a monitoring system. In a 
limited corporation, which is a close corporation, this formal rule does not apply. 
However, the general duty to protect the business is an unwritten, yet binding 
general corporate governance rule affecting the limited corporation as well.
The relevant measures at hand may, e.g., consist of:
• changing business strategies;
• substitution of employees and managers;
• financial reconstruction; and
• other rehabilitation measures.
In a listed stock corporation, the directors are responsible for most of these 
strategies. In a close corporation, the strategic matters are in the hands of the 
14 K. Schmidt in K. Schmidt and W. Uhlenbruck (eds), Die GmbH in Krise, Sanierung und Insolvenz (4th ed) (2009, 
Beck, München), at 19 et seq. (paragraph 1-2 et seq.).
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shareholders. It is, however, up to the directors to inform the shareholders or the 
supervisory board about any imminent threat to the business. Directors neglecting 
the relevant duties may be personally held liable for any damage arising from 
this negligence.
Consequently, avoiding solvency problems and surmounting the emergence of a 
crisis is, predominantly, not an insolvency law concern, but a concern of:
• business administration; and
• business law (in particular: corporate law).
No Fiduciary Duties Prior to Insolvency Proceedings?
On the other hand, in the common view, corporate governance in general 
and directors’ duties in particular are deemed to protect the company and its 
shareholders, but not its creditors. Admittedly and as everyone knows, the creditors 
will indirectly benefit from good governance, as a properly managed business can 
be expected to meet its debts. Yet, the point of reference of director’s duties still 
is the business itself.
Some academics, however, question this principle, substantiating their doubts 
with a landmark decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery.15 Under strict 
circumstances,16 this court acknowledges fiduciary duties of directors for the 
benefit of creditors, particularly in cases of “insolvency in fact”.17 At first glance, 
this opinion may appear exotic. You may be surprised when I tell you that German 
law follows a similar approach ever since. Insolvency in fact is the moment of 
truth, or let us say: the moment when the directors have to disclose the financial 
situation of the company.
The Moment of Truth
German law defines de facto insolvency in two insolvency code provisions under 
the label “illiquidity” (section 17 of the Insolvency Code) and “overindebtedness” 
(section 19 of the Insolvency Code). Looking at the structure of our Insolvency 
Code, these provisions merely appear as triggers for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. And indeed, filing for bankruptcy proceedings and a court decision 
upon this request requires the existence of a ground for insolvency proceedings. 
Yet this state of de facto insolvency is not only a reason for opening bankruptcy 
15 For detailed references, see L. Klöhn, ZGR 2008, 110, 120 et seq., 130 et seq.
16 Blackmore Partners v. Link Energy, 2005 WL 2709639 (Del. Ch.), 6.
17 P. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Company, 621 A.2d 784, 18 Del. J. Corp. L., 658, 668.
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proceedings, but also indicates the moment of truth vis-à-vis the creditors. We will 
now see, how German legislation tries to define these crucial situations.
The Relevant Provisions
It may be regarded a very German idea to define the moment of truth in the law. In 
accordance with section 18 of the Insolvency Code, the debtor and only the debtor 
is entitled to request the commencement of insolvency proceedings when faced 
with imminent illiquidity. This provision is supposed to serve as an incentive to 
file for bankruptcy at an early stage.18 I will, however, ignore this interesting rule 
for two reasons:
• First: From the directors’ perspective this particular insolvency ground would 
compare to a promise rather than a moment of truth.
• Second: The German experience is that this incentive is not effective.19 
This indicates, that insolvency proceedings in Germany are not attractive to 
distressed businesses and ought to be subject to reform.
“Moment of truth” means, that the business crisis has to be revealed to the creditors 
and to the court. This is the case of actual illiquidity or overindebtedness. In 
accordance with section 17(2) of the Insolvency Code, the debtor shall be deemed 
illiquid, if he is unable to meet his mature obligations to pay. The objectives of 
section 17(2) seem to be very clear and convincing, particularly since we do not 
find any prognostic element in its wording. However, case law has added some 
prognostic elements to this definition of illiquidity, because the courts make a 
distinction between illiquidity and a momentary holdup of payments.20
Section 19, however, which is applicable only to businesses without unlimited 
personal liability, contains a much more crucial rule about the moment of truth. 
Its name is “overindebtedness”, although I doubt, that this term hits the nail on its 
head. The “overindebtedness” concept is more than 100 years old. The definition 
of section 19(2) is much younger. In its literal sense, “overindebtedness” means 
that the assets of a business no longer cover its debts. The expression implies 
a mere balance sheet test. In the past, however, business people, lawyers, and 
judges found out that the result of this test depends on the valuation of the assets, 
and this assessment depends on the prospects of the business: going concern or 
18 J. Drukarczyk, in H-P. Kirchhof et al. (eds), Münchener Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung (2nd ed) (2007, Beck, 
München), § 18 para. 1 et seq.
19 W. Uhlenbruck, in F. Richter et al. (eds), Festschrift für Drukarczyk (2003, Vahlen Franz, München), at 441 et seq. 
20 BGH, 24 May 2005 - IX ZR 123/04, BGHZ 163, 134.
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liquidation? This understanding led to a case law test of overindebtedness which, 
after an intense discussion, was adopted by the Insolvency Code in 1994:
“Over-indebtedness shall exist if the assets owned by the debtor no 
longer cover his existing obligations to pay. In the assessment of the 
debtor’s assets, however, the continuation of the enterprise shall be 
taken as a basis, if according to the circumstances such continuation 
is deemed highly likely.”21
As for myself; I was not convinced by this definition. In my research work I had 
proposed a different test,22 which in the end had been adopted by the Federal Court, 
but was rejected, when the Insolvency Code was enacted. This definition sounds, 
but only sounds, similar to that of 1994:
“Over-indebtedness shall exist if the assets owned by the debtor no 
longer cover his existing obligations to pay, unless the continuation 
of the enterprise is highly likely under the circumstances.”23
The difference lies in the function of the prognostic element. In the first definition, 
the prognosis serves as a mere premise for the valuation of the assets. In the second 
definition a positive prognosis as such may justify the continuation of the business. 
This means, continuation is lawful as long as the assets cover the debts or (!) the 
prognosis seriously promises the business’s sustainability. The difference in the 
approach is obvious, although there is an ongoing discussion about the disparities 
in the results. In the second definition the prognosis is much more effective. It may, 
in itself, justify the continuation of the business in spite of a lack of assets.
The original definition of overindebtedness worked pretty well as long as there was 
no general financial crisis in Germany. The moment, however, the recent crisis was 
on, policy was concerned with the future of our banks. Instantaneously, legislation 
shifted to the alternative definition in order to prevent a disastrous collapse of the 
banking system in the wake of the Lehman Brothers insolvency.24
Again, one might ask, whether this was a poor trick of legislation: rescuing banks 
by bringing the law in line with the expected result. For my part, however, I see 
this as a historical chance to make up for the legislator’s mistake of 1994. The 
moment of truth is the point of time, when the company no longer deserves the 
21 Section 19, Insolvency Code (InsO) in the version of 5 October 1994, BGBl. I, 2866.
22 K. Schmidt, AG 1978, 334, 337 et seq.; Schmidt, above note 11, at 50 et seq. 
23 BGH, 13 July 1992 - II ZR 269/91, BGH 119, 201.
24 Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz of 17.10.2008, BGBl I, 1982.
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confidence of the creditors. I admit, this criterion is contrary to the German ideal 
of drafting a crystal-clear definition. Business life, however, tells us that this idea is 
a mere illusion. A realistic view reveals that fighting the protraction of insolvency 
proceedings cannot be based on a clearly defined delimitation of the crucial point 
of time. The English rule about wrongful trading e.g. only requires that the director: 
“…knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation.” (section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986)
The present understanding of “overindebtedness” in Germany comes close to this 
concept. A rather secondary question is whether the term “overindebtedness” is 
still adequate under this prognostic approach. What is in a name? Call it the way 
you prefer! But stick to the prognosis as part of directors’ responsibility in business.
Duties to File for Bankruptcy
What does the moment of truth mean to the company’s directors? According 
to the German Insolvency Code, the directors now are bound to file for the 
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings without undue delay but after three 
weeks at the latest (section 15a of the Insolvency Code). The violation of the duty 
to file for insolvency is a civil and criminal offense. It is a violation of both German 
tort law (section 823(2) of the Civil Code) and public interest (section 15a(4)-(5) 
of the Insolvency Code). In the perspective of comparative law, the duty to file 
for insolvency is said to be based on a unique concept. In my view, however, it is 
nothing but the German version of wrongful trading.25 By the way, it is more than 
one hundred years old. It had been inserted as a corporate law rule in the relevant 
codes during the nineteenth century. Only three years ago, legislation shifted this 
rule to the Insolvency Code. Its application does not – unlike section 214 of the 
English Insolvency Act 1986 – presuppose the opening of insolvency proceedings, 
although in most cases this will happen. In a following insolvency liquidation, the 
insolvency receiver is authorized by section 92 of the Insolvency Code to claim 
the overall damage caused to the company and the creditors as a whole by the 
delay. This claim is brought in a civil procedure, and the amount to be paid will be 
estimated by the civil court (section 287 of the Civil Procedure Code). And again, 
this civil law sanction comes very close to the concept of section 214 of the English 
Insolvency Act 1986, where:
25 Schmidt, above note 14, at 971 (paragraph 11.1); K. Schmidt, in M. Lutter (ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (2006, 
De Gruyter, Berlin) at 144, 155, 159 et seq.
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“…the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare” that 
the director “is to be liable to make such a contribution … to the 
company’s assets as the court thinks proper.”
Obviously there remain technical differences between these two concepts. 
In Germany:
• the decision is made in a separate civil procedure.
• the amount to be paid to the company’s assets is defined as the overall damage 
of stakeholders. 
• the offense is defined as the violation of duties to file for bankruptcy.
The general attempt, however, is amazingly similar. For this reason, I try to 
convince my German colleagues and German judges that even in our country the 
unlawful behavior of directors in section 15a cases is not the failure to initiate 
bankruptcy proceedings but rather the continuance of the business. Consequently, 
it is not unjust that even shadow directors can be punished or held liable for 
damages, although they are not authorized to file for the opening of bankruptcy 
proceedings. And this, in the result, is what German courts do.26
As I already told you, the German wrongful trading rule is part of the Insolvency 
Code since 2008, but has been derived from corporate law rules, which had been 
in force for more than 100 years, now replaced by section 15a of the Insolvency 
Code. Again this brings me to the question: Is section 15a of the Insolvency Code 
an insolvency rule or rather a corporate law rule about directors duties? I guess that 
most of you will agree to this insolvency law approach, which actually is accepted 
by practitioners and academics in my country, too. And yet: the relevant duties 
have to be observed prior to insolvency proceedings.
This leads to some remarks about shareholders’ liability in wrongful trading cases.
German law acknowledges shadow directors’ responsibility for wrongful trading.27 
Shareholders can be sued as shadow directors, but just under very narrow 
circumstances. For this reason there had been a flourishing “funeral services” 
market for distressed corporations. Their strategy was to acquire a company’s 
shares, make the directors resign from their positions, and liquidate the company 
outside insolvency proceedings without taking up director’s duties. In order 
to prevent this abuse the reform bill of 2008 contains a special rule about the 
26 BGH, 11 July 2005 - II ZR 235/03, ZIP 2005, 1550.
27 BGH, 11 July 2005 - II ZR 235/03, ZIP 2005, 1550.
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shareholders’ responsibility for wrongful trading in the case of leadershiplessness 
(section 15a(3) of the Insolvency Code).
Directors’ Duties for the Benefit of Creditors
So, let me conclude. German company law does not acknowledge directors’ duties 
in favour of creditors prior to de facto insolvency. There are, however, a number of 
corporate governance rules with indirect effect in favour of the creditors, although 
the creditors cannot sue the directors for specific performance or damages. It is 
up to the shareholders or the supervisory board to enforce the relevant duties. Yet 
things change completely in a situation of de facto insolvency, as defined in the 
Insolvency Code.
The interrelation between corporate law and insolvency law regarding this issue 
therefore works:
• indirectly in absence of de facto insolvency on the basis of corporate 
government rules; and
• directly from the beginning of de facto insolvency under wrongful trading rules.
In both cases, a future insolvency receiver will be able to enforce the civil sanctions 
claiming for payment to the insolvency estate.
Business Organisation and Insolvency Proceedings
Debtor in Possession or Court Appointed Official
Today, most insolvency laws in the world provide two models of business 
organisation in insolvency cases: management by a court appointed insolvency 
official or the debtor in possession model. German legislation learnt this from the 
US Chapter Eleven.28 Its concept, adopted only in 1994, was regarded as promising. 
However, it did not keep its promise. In Germany most insolvency proceedings are 
still exclusively managed by a court appointed receiver. The debtor in possession 
concept has been a long time in coming and is not yet really accepted in business 
insolvency cases. The recent Arcandor proceedings e.g. – collapse of a huge 
corporate group of department stores and a mail-order business – appeared to be 
an encouraging example, but ended in insolvent liquidation proceedings managed 
by a court appointed receiver. I will later come back to the presumable reason for 
this characteristic failure of the debtor in possession concept in Germany.
28 See the explanatory memorandum to the German Insolvency Code 1994, Bundestagsdrucksache 12/2443, 105.
135Interaction of Corporate Law and Insolvency Law: German Experience and International Background
There are, however a lot of open questions even with regard to ordinary cases of 
insolvency receivership. Concerning corporate governance in an insolvent company, 
there is an ongoing debate on the separation of powers between the receiver and 
the continuously existing company’s organs.29 Courts and commentaries, for 
example, are restrictive in imposing the duties of a company’s organs upon the 
receiver, such as the information of shareholders. Even environmental agencies 
hold that environmental liabilities stemming from the period prior to the opening 
of insolvency procedures do not have any binding effect on the receiver and the 
insolvency estate, a result which in my eyes is hardly acceptable.30 Another point of 
discussion is the business judgment rule.31 Does a receiver, running the company’s 
business, benefit from this common sense driven privilege regarding corporate 
governance liability? As for myself, I am in favour of the so called insolvency 
judgment rule, although many academics do not agree. 
On the other hand, in the debtor in possession scenario, where the directors 
themselves act as liquidators or continue running the business, a specific 
insolvency law question is at stake. Does – and to what extent does – the opening 
of insolvency proceedings affect the organisation even though the management is 
still in the directors’ hands? The answer of most insolvency laws is that, beyond 
the change of directors’ duties, the company’s organisation is altogether subject to 
fundamental change. The shareholders for example or a supervisory board must 
no longer monitor the directors, who have to abide by the creditors’ resolutions 
and the decisions of the insolvency court. The majority of colleagues in my 
country accepts this concept. Yet, in a recent publication, I raised the question 
if this understanding is in line with the debtor in possession idea.32 In my view, 
the debtor in possession concept should not interfere with the organisation of the 
business and just stick to the directors’ duty to act in accordance with insolvency 
law, but nothing more.
Company Group Aspects
The worldwide phenomenon of corporate groups – “groupe de sociétés”, “gropo 
de sociedades” or whatsoever – makes things even more complicated. The 
“Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law” of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) extensively deals with the “Treatment 
of corporate groups” (2005), “enterprise groups” (2009), discussing, inter alia, 
29 See – with further references – K. Schmidt, AG 2011, 1 et seq.
30 K. Schmidt, NJW 2010, 1489 et seq.; K. Schmidt, ZIP 2000, 2013 et seq.
31 C. Berger/M. Frege, ZIP 2008, 204 et seq.; C. Jungmann, NZI 2009, 80 et seq.
32 K. Schmidt, BB 2011, 1603 et seq.
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the question if corporate groups shall be subject to “substantive consolidation” 
or at least “joint administration”. At first glance, many of us may be in favour 
of “substantive consolidation” regarding the corporate group as a unit. However, 
even the UNCITRAL documents reveal that substantive consolidation will only be 
workable under “very limited circumstances”. This statement seems convincing to 
me. Groups of companies are based both on the separation of the group members 
and the non-uniform links between them. For this reason, even the famous German 
“Konzernrecht”-rules do not deal with the group as such but only with control, 
financial relations and linked responsibilities between group members, such as 
parents, daughters or siblings.33 Substantive consolidation would go far beyond 
this concept, leading to multiple and permanent piercing of the corporate veil. In 
my eyes, this simple observation sufficiently proves that the consolidation concept 
is not helpful as a general principle.
For the same reason, a uniform group forum for the corporate group will never 
work as a mandatory rule. Nevertheless, the forum concern must be considered 
both national and transnational. The moment the crisis of a business in a corporate 
group affects other group members, we should ask for a group-oriented center 
of main interest. This is a crucial concern. In some German cases, we witnessed 
that group members moved from one seat to another for the only reason to open 
insolvency proceedings at the forum of their parent company.34 In order to render 
this manœuvre unnecessary, I made some suggestions to German legislation, 
published in a German law journal, concluding that we should work on these 
details instead of expecting too much from a mandatory corporate group forum.35
Insolvency Plans
Conceptual Basis
Today, most countries in the world are familiar with the concept of insolvency 
plans. This makes me confine myself to some very short remarks, before switching 
to legal policy. The first one is that, beyond the powerful model of Chapter Eleven, 
there had been precursors in many countries. The legitimacy of insolvency plans 
– contrary to unanimous arrangements – derives from the combination of private 
workout and court approval. The question, whether the stakeholders’ resolution 
is a private law instrument in spite of the last-mentioned requirement is merely 
33 K. Schmidt, in U. Schneider et al. (eds), Festschrift Lutter (2000, Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln), at 1167 et seq.
34 See Eidenmüller/Frobenius/Prusko, above note 1; H. Eidenmüller, KTS 2009, 137 et seq.; M-P. Weller, ZGR 
2008, 835 et seq.
35 K. Schmidt, KTS 2011, 161 et seq.
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academic. The apparently more practical issue of rights to file a plan is extensively 
dealt with in the German code. The creditor or the insolvency administrator is 
entitled to submit an insolvency plan to the insolvency court (section 218(1) of 
the Insolvency Code). Reality, however, tells a different story. Regardless of the 
formal competence to file, a plan needs to be prepacked under the assistance of 
major stakeholders. The legal policy issues lie elsewhere.
Reorganisation Plans affecting the Shareholders
As mentioned before, the performance of insolvency plan proceedings and the 
debtor in possession model is still disappointing in my country. One of the reasons 
for this, again is, beyond economic reality, the persistent division of corporate law 
and insolvency law. Due to this concept, insolvency plans only deal with creditors 
and disregard the shareholders. This is detrimental to business reorganisation.36 If, 
e.g., the restructuring of an enterprise shall consist of four elements:
• waiver of debts;
• deferment of payments;
• reduction of (old) share capital; and
• increase of capital providing fresh funds;
the resolution referring to debts is part of the insolvency plan produced by the 
creditors,37 whereas the resolution referring to the share capital is passed by the 
shareholders.38 Up to now, German insolvency law does not provide any particular 
reduction or increase of capital instruments. The indispensable link between these 
coherent measures can only be established by a “conditional insolvency plan” 
(“bedingter Insolvenzplan”) (section 249 of the Insolvency Code). This insolvency 
plan will not be acknowledged by the insolvency court, unless a capital increase 
resolution has been registered. The basic idea behind this concept was that 
company law and insolvency law have different tasks and different legitimating 
rationales. Yet this approach is a rather academic one and has never been accepted 
in business practice.
Major problems arise in debt-to-equity swap scenarios, consisting of:
• debt cancellation;
36 See H. Eidenmüller, in Kirchhof et al. (eds), above note 18, at 66 et seq. (§ 217, paragraph 2); H. Eidenmüller/A. 
Engert, ZIP 2009, 541 et seq.
37 Section 235 et seq., Insolvency Code (InsO).
38 Sections 55, 58, Limited Liabilities Code (GmbHG); sections 182, 222 Corporation Code (AktG).
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• reduction of share capital (regarding the old shares);
• increase of capital (promising a raise of the assets);
• using remaining claims of insolvency creditors as contributions in kind.
Obviously this package of restructuring measures is not workable as long as the 
relevant decisions have to be made by different bodies in separate procedures.
In December 2011, however, the German Bundestag passed an amendment to the 
Insolvency Code called the Act for Enhancing Business Restructurings.39 This act 
is meant to smooth the path between insolvency law and corporate law. One of 
its achievements will be the insertion of corporate restructuring measures into the 
insolvency plan rules (which means another step to bring it into line with the US 
model). The shareholders will constitute a special group of stakeholders affected 
by the insolvency plan (section 220 of the Insolvency Code). Besides, there will 
be a new section among the rules regarding insolvency plans (section 217 et seq.), 
which reads as follows:
“§ 225a RegE InsO – Rechte der Anteilsinhaber
(1) Die Anteils- oder Mitgliedschaftsrechte der am Schuldner 
beteiligten Personen bleiben vom Insolvenzplan unberührt, es sei 
denn, dass der Plan etwas anderes bestimmt.
(2) Im gestaltenden Teil des Plans kann vorgesehen werden, dass 
Forderungen von Gläubigern in Anteils- oder Mitgliedschaftsrechte 
am Schuldner umgewandelt werden. Eine Umwandlung gegen den 
Willen der betroffenen Gläubiger ist ausgeschlossen. Insbesondere 
kann der Plan eine Kapitalherabsetzung oder -erhöhung, die 
Leistung von Sacheinlagen, den Ausschluss von Bezugsrechten 
oder die Zahlung von Abfindungen an ausscheidende Anteils 
inhaber vorsehen.
(3) Im Plan kann jede Regelung getroffen werden, die 
gesellschaftsrechtlich zulässig ist, insbesondere die Fortsetzung einer 
aufgelösten Gesellschaft oder die Übertragung von Anteils- oder 
Mitgliedschaftsrechten.
(Section 225a RegE-InsO Rights of Shareholders
39 Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen (ESUG) of 7 December 2011, BGBl. I, 2582.
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(1) The share- or membership-rights of persons holding a share in 
the debtor remain unaffected by the insolvency plan, unless the plan 
provides otherwise.
(2) The constructive part of the plan may provide that claims of 
creditors are converted in share or membership rights in the debtor. 
No conversion can be made against the will of the affected creditor. In 
particular, the plan can provide for a capital reduction or increase, the 
performance of contributions in kind, the exclusion of subscription 
rights or severance payments to departing shareholders.
(3) In the plan, any arrangement permitted by law, in particular the 
continuation of a dissolved company or the transfer of shares or 
membership rights can be made.)”
Paragraph 3 of this new section plainly reveals the goal of this new legislation. The 
competence to amend the articles of association for restructuring purposes will 
shift from the shareholder meeting to the insolvency plan procedure.40
The basic idea of this concept is convincing. It had already been launched by the 
Expert Group which prepared the German Insolvency Code more than 25 years 
ago (First Report of the Insolvency Law Commission, 1985), but has not been 
taken up by legislation. The reason for this reluctance was not merely an academic 
one. It was due to the awareness of the involvement of complex corporate law 
issues. Particularly in a debt-to-equity swap scenario, difficulties will arise on 
different fields:
• firstly, the comparative valuation of claims and shares as different kinds of 
stakeholdership (affecting voting rights and conditions of the debt-equity-
swap scenario);
• secondly, and necessarily, the fair treatment of creditors and shareholders; and
• thirdly, a procedure, meeting the requirements for legitimacy under insolvency 
law and corporate law.
A simple example: Let us think that the share capital is EUR 1 million. The cram-
down may lead to EUR 100,000 only. We will have to rely on experts’ opinions in 
order to know that this figure is correct.
40 See also the explanatory memorandum to the ESUG, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/5712, 47.
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Let us further assume that an increase of capital will be financed partly by fresh 
money and partly by a debt-to-equity-swap. Who tells us that the valuation of the 
claims, which will be converted into share capital is correct?
Let us finally assume that the turnaround fails. In this case, the insolvency receiver 
(liquidator) might sue the debt-to-equity investors for payments, alleging that the 
valuation of the claims was incorrect and the value did not cover the increase of 
capital. This threat would be a disincentive regarding the debt-to-equity-model. In 
order to prevent this effect the reform bill will preclude those claims by declaring 
valuation in the insolvency plan proceedings binding. The relevant provision in the 
amended Insolvency Code will read as follows (section 254 (4)):
“(4) Werden Forderungen von Gläubigern in Anteils- oder 
Mitgliedschaftsrechte am Schuldner umgewandelt, kann der 
Schuldner nach der gerichtlichen Bestätigung keine Ansprüche wegen 
einer Überbewertung der Forderungen im Plan gegen die bisherigen 
Gläubiger geltend machen.
(In the event that claims of creditors are converted into shares of 
the debtor company, the debtor, after confirmation by the court, may 
not bring a claim based on the overvaluation of those contributions 
against the former creditors.)”
In the eyes of German corporate law and regarding its major concern, the capital 
protection concept, this insolvency law privilege means biting the bullet. The 
general rule of creditor protection is that a shareholder, whose contribution in kind 
does not equal the par value of his share, has to render a cash contribution in the 
amount of the deficiency.41 The new legislation releases the creditors from this 
pending risk in insolvency plan scenarios. A mandatory creditor protection rule 
will be replaced by the control of the insolvency court. This concept will mean new 
challenges for insolvency proceedings, insolvency courts, and insolvency judges. 
It is their task to approve the insolvency plan including creditors and shareholders. 
This will require much more business expertise and responsibility.
41 Section 9, Limited Liability Companies Code (GmbHG).
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Pre-Insolvency Procedures
General Preconditions
What does “Pre-Insolvency Procedure” mean?
The last part of my presentation attempts to explain that the legal policy debate 
about pre-insolvency procedures, too, is a discussion about the interaction of 
insolvency law and corporate law. Shall we rely on the tools of corporate law 
for turnaround strategies prior to de facto insolvency, or should insolvency 
law provide special procedures in order to enhance corporate reorganisation in 
business distress?
My first question in this respect is: What does “pre-insolvency procedure” mean? 
The diversity of models provided in European countries will make us uncertain. I 
leave the Italian “piano de risanamento” and the Austrian Reorganisation model 
out, for these are more or less mere safe harbour arrangements.
France offers no fewer than four pre-insolvency procedures. The “procédure de 
sauvegarde”, which comes rather close to insolvency plan proceedings, gained a 
remarkable attention in the Eurotunnel case. The Italian “concordato preventive” 
virtually resembles an insolvency plan. In England, the “company voluntary 
arrangement” seems to be close to these reorganisation models, too. However, 
presently the scheme of arrangement seems to be at the center of attention, and this 
institution is regulated by the Companies Act 2006, not the Insolvency Act 1986. 
The variety of informal reorganisation models is overwhelming.
Pre-Insolvency Scenarios in the Absence of Formal Procedures
The legal policy question regarding pre-insolvency procedures depends on the 
usefulness of national civil and corporate law rules for turnaround purposes. And 
these national rules differ significantly. In Germany, the courts tend to implement 
pre-insolvency ideas in corporate law rules addressing the shareholders, not the 
company’s creditors.
According to the Federal Court, creditors are not bound to approve an arrangement 
between the company and the majority of creditors, even if the existence of the 
company is at stake.42 The shareholders, however, are exposed to German case 
law rules regarding their duties in restructuring scenarios. In a landmark decision 
of 2009, the Federal Court held that members of a partnership or close corporation 
42 BGH, 5 November 1991 - VI ZR 20/91, BGHZ 116, 31 (“Akkordstörer”).
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in particular situations can be forced by a majority resolution to choose between 
paying in fresh money or leaving the company.43
This decision is of extreme importance for turnaround strategies in the investment 
branch. For tax reasons, many private investors in Germany do not buy shares at 
the stock market, but rather form small partnerships. Many of these partnerships 
have been severely hit by the financial crisis. And many of them cannot survive 
without fresh funds. The obligation of partners or shareholders to contribute to 
the business is limited by the sum they promised in the articles of association. 
This holds true even in a crisis of the business. However, if the majority is ready 
to rescue the company by contributing fresh money, the minority can be forced to 
choose between doing the same or leaving the company, provided:
• firstly: a turnaround proves to be impossible without fresh money;
• secondly: the turnaround prospects are positive;
• thirdly: the contributions of the majority will definitely be paid; and
• fourthly: the squeeze-out-position of the minority is not worse than their 
position in a liquidation scenario.
Comparative Observations
The interim conclusion after these observations is that German law is:
• ready to include the creditors, but not yet the shareholders, in insolvency 
proceedings; and, to the contrary
• ready to include the shareholders, but not the creditors, outside 
insolvency proceedings.
As long as the courts follow this approach, it is up to legislation to decide whether 
this ought to be changed in the wake of English, French or Italian examples. This, 
however, requires diligent comparison not only of insolvency law, but also of the 
general preconditions in the respective national laws and jurisdictions.
43 BGH, 19 October 2009 - II ZR 240/08, BGHZ 183, 1.
143Interaction of Corporate Law and Insolvency Law: German Experience and International Background
The German Perspective
Recognition
In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the debate on the recognition 
of English schemes of arrangement in German courts.44 In the “Rodenstock” Case 
– Rodenstock is a German optical lens manufacturer – the High Court of Justice 
(Chancery Division)45 recently held that a scheme of arrangement negotiated 
between English banks and the German company can be sanctioned under English 
jurisdiction. The court relies on two distinguished German experts’ opinions that 
this decision would be recognised by the Federal Court in spite of a contrasting 
decision of a German higher court of appeal.46 I presume that these experts are 
right and I will leave out the complicated details with the exception of one. The 
German higher court of appeal had argued, inter alia, that a scheme of arrangement 
is regulated by the Companies Act 2006 and not the Insolvency Act 1986.47 Even 
if a German company may be subject to an English insolvency procedure, its seat-
oriented company law regime is German, not English, and there is no scheme 
of arrangement in German company law. In my eyes, this conclusion is wrong, 
illustrating once again that the affiliation of a legal concept to corporate law or 
insolvency law has to be determined in accordance with the nature of the subject 
matter, not blindly in accordance with the relevant code.
Legal Debates in Germany
If, as I presume, German companies will be affected by English schemes of 
arrangement, the question is, whether a similar instrument should be created in my 
country. As already mentioned there is an ongoing discussion about pre-insolvency 
proceedings in Germany.48 The different national approaches are conscientiously 
observed, especially in research and legal policy. However, the forthcoming 
reform-bill will not integrate formal pre-insolvency proceedings in the Insolvency 
Code. For the time being, legislation will be satisfied with enhancing business 
reorganisations in insolvency proceedings.
44 See O. Gebler, NZI 2010, 665, 668 et seq.; P. Mankowski, EWiR 2010, 711 et seq.; C. Paulus, ZIP 2011, 1077 
et seq.; R. Petrovic, ZInsO 2010, 265 et seq.; A. Riewe, NZI 2011, 483 et seq.
45 Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch).
46 OLG Celle, 8 June 2009 - 8 U 46/09, ZIP 2009, 1968.
47 Ibid., at 1970 et seq.
48 V. Beissenhirtz, ZInsO 2011, 57 et seq.; H. Eidenmüller, ZIP 2010, 649 et seq.; M. Jaffé, ZGR 2010, 248 et seq.; 
C. Paulus et al., WM 2010, 1337 et seq.; L. Westpfahl, ZGR 2010, 385 et seq.
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Objections to the Introduction of Pre-Insolvency Regimes in Germany
My personal view on this issue is that it is company law rather than insolvency 
law which provides legal rules for turning around a business. Directors’ sense of 
responsibility will inspire them to act:
• in good time;
• confidentially; and
• without any interference of courts and state authorities.
This is a kind of a confession. Although I am fully convinced by the concept of 
Chapter 11 pertaining to corporate restructuring in insolvency proceedings, I am 
even more convinced of the importance of business law for the same purpose, prior 
to de facto insolvency. Business law provides:
• informal tools;
• lean management structures; and
• permanent awareness and responsibility.
Although this cannot be proved statistically, I firstly rely on the invisible hand of 
business law. A formal insolvency proceeding is a dramatic step: a step into state 
regulation and interference. As long as German insolvency law is not even able to 
convince the business world of the usefulness of insolvency proceedings in the state 
of imminent illiquidity, legislation is bound to enhance insolvency proceedings 
and to make it more attractive to companies, directors, and stakeholders. This is 
what the 2011 reform is striving for. And I agree with this attempt.
Again, I am in favour of:
• modernisation of insolvency law following the American model; and even
• pre-insolvency rules which may, e.g., provide alternative dispute regulations 
close to insolvency.
But I am opposed to statutory formal pre-insolvency proceedings in Germany.
Postscript (2014)
The Legal Basis
On 1 March 2012, seven months after the 2011 Edwin Coe Lecture, the Act for 
Enhancing Business Restructurings (ESUG) came into force and had a huge 
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practical impact from the outset, especially with regard to the newly introduced 
section 225a of the Insolvency Code: “Any measure permissible under company 
law” can now – in formal insolvency proceedings – be realized by insolvency plans 
rather than by shareholder resolutions. This means strengthening the influence of 
creditors in distressed companies’ restructuring proceedings.
To compensate the shareholders for that intrusion into their rights, they now have a 
say in the voting process on insolvency plans (sections 222, 243 of the Insolvency 
Code). Formally, passing an insolvency plan requires majority approval of the 
group of (all) shareholders. Yet this right of the shareholders is significantly 
diluted by the cram-down-powers of the insolvency court, which can approve an 
insolvency plan against the shareholders’ vote if the following criteria are met:
“Section 245 – Prohibition to Obstruct
(1) Even if the necessary majorities have not been achieved, a voting 
group shall be deemed to have consented if
1. the members of such a group are likely not to be placed at 
a disadvantage by the insolvency plan compared with their 
situation without such plan,
2. the members of such a group participate to a reasonable 
extent in the economic value devolving on the parties under 
the plan, and
3. the majority of the voting groups have backed the plan with 
the necessary majorities.
(2) A reasonable participation of a group of creditors for the purpose 
of subsection (1) No. 2 shall exist if under the plan
1. no other creditor will receive economic values exceeding the 
full amount of his claim;
2. neither a creditor with a lower-ranking claim to satisfaction 
without a plan, compared with the creditors forming his 
group, nor the debtor nor a person holding the debtor’s 
shares receives an economic value; and
3. no creditor to be satisfied on an equal footing with the 
creditors forming his group without a plan receives an 
advantage with respect to such creditors.
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(3) A reasonable participation of a group of shareholders for the 
purpose of subsection (1) no. 2 shall exist if under the plan
1. no creditor receives economic benefits exceeding the full 
amount of his claim and
2. no shareholder who would be equal in rank to the shareholders 
in the group if no plan were drawn up is better placed than 
they are.”
To sum this up, shareholders’ approval is not necessary if under the plan they are:
(i) not worse off than in the absence of a plan;
(ii) if specific shareholders are not favored over all the other shareholders; and
(iii) the shareholders participate to a reasonable extent in the economic value of 
the restructured firm. According to subsection 3, the shareholders participate 
to a reasonable extent if the creditors receive no value exceeding the nominal 
value of their claims.
Shareholders Sidelined
If insolvency proceedings are opened because of overindebtedness, a company 
by definition is unable to pay the full nominal amount of its creditors’ claims. 
Section 225a(3) of the Insolvency Code in combination with section 245 of the 
Insolvency Code therefore appears to be an instrument for the creditors(!) to take 
comprehensive measures regarding the company itself.49
The new concept behind section 225a of the Insolvency Code in combination 
with section 245 of the Insolvency Code – the inclusion of shareholders rights’ 
in insolvency plan proceedings – is not only law in the books but already affected 
widely-debated (not only amongst lawyers) real cases.
Takeover Effects?
One example is the so called Pfleiderer case, in which the shareholders of a 
distressed stock company were approached by its creditors with the request to 
give up nearly all of their shares in a rights issue-procedure to the benefit of the 
creditors. The shareholders claimed that sacrifice the creditors demanded from 
them was too great and ended up with nothing, as their shares were eventually 
49 This reflects the prevailing view amongst German lawyers at this point of time; for a summary on the new 
insolvency/corporate law regime, see H. Eidenmüller, “Der Insolvenzplan als gesellschaftsrechtliches 
Universalwerkzeug” (The Insolvency Plan as a Corporate All-Purpose Tool), NJW 2014, 17 et seq.
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completely eliminated in an insolvency plan procedure in which the creditors 
successfully invoked sections 225a and 245 of the Insolvency Code.50
Squeeze-out Effects?
Another example is the so called Suhrkamp case. Suhrkamp is a distinguished 
book publishing company in which the majority partner initiated – pursuing a 
common strategy with the company’s creditor – a transformation of the partnership 
into a stock corporation in insolvency plan proceedings with the help of sections 
225a and 245 of the Insolvency Code, as a result of which the other partner lost 
several minority rights. This experience has given race to an ongoing discussion 
on the legitimate goals of insolvency proceedings.51
Questions to be answered
There is now need for a discussion on whether the Act for Enhancing Business 
Restructurings (ESUG) did strike the right balance between insolvency and 
corporate law. The author especially doubts whether a mere balance-sheet-test 
(section 245 of the Insolvency Code) is sufficient to cram down a plan on the 
shareholders that expropriates them completely.52
50 E. Decher/T. Voland, ZIP 2013, 103 et seq.
51 F. Schäfer, ZIP 2013, 2237 et seq.
52 K. Schmidt, ZGR 2012, 566, 579 et seq.
148 International Insolvency Law: Future Perspectives
149On The Future of European Insolvency Law
Chapter 5
On The Future of European Insolvency Law
Professor Bob Wessels
Introduction
I would like to begin this afternoon by thanking the board of the Academic Forum 
of INSOL Europe for the invitation to speak to you today.1
Early this year, the European Commission issued a “Consultation on the Future 
of European Insolvency Law”.2 It is an open, internet-based consultation inviting 
reactions to a questionnaire which will assist the Commission to determine 
whether and how the existing legal framework should be improved and 
modernised. My first thought was: what is European Insolvency Law (capitals 
supplied)? Fortunately, the Commission provides for an answer: the European 
Insolvency Law is laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency 
proceedings (the “EIR”), which has applied since 31 May 2002.
I am challenging this phrasing. I would like to depart from the description that 
European Insolvency Law is a body of rules and practices, formed both by national 
law and the law of the European Union relating to matters of financial distress. 
In earlier publications, I indicated that the core content of insolvency law concerns 
the prevention, regulation and administering of discontinuity in legal relationships 
of persons who have legal rights (companies or natural persons) and find themselves 
in financial difficulty. The essence of the legal domain of European Insolvency Law 
then is the avoidance or streamlining of (the consequences of) the possible inability 
to fulfil payment obligations. Consequently, in a European context, European 
Insolvency Law is also concerned with certain contractual arrangements (e.g. 
cross-border private arrangements or “work outs”) and the recording of “best 
practices”, which, in practice, play an important role.3
* This is a re-edited version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 11 in R. Parry (ed), European 
Insolvency Law: Current Issues and Prospects for Reform (2014, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (133-158).
1 During the lecture, only selected topics of the text were addressed.
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?form=Insolvency.
3 See e.g. B. Wessels, International Insolvency Law (3rd ed) (2012, Kluwer, Deventer), at paragraph 10001.
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Presently, this body of rules and practices has certain recognisable principles in the 
cross-border area, such as the principle of applying the lex concursus, automatic 
recognition of certain judgments and cross-border cooperation between insolvency 
office holders. The totality of this body, however, largely is a crystal ball, as 
European Insolvency Law is still searching for patterns of interactions between the 
two systems of national laws and European Union law, and the coherence within 
the law of the European Union itself. Among the many topics that are presently 
debated, evaluated, regulated or litigated in this area, in the light of European 
Insolvency Law, the following three themes specifically stand out as the most 
important to discuss today.
1. The present state of European Insolvency Law, for which I make a 
distinction between:
1.1. The early period;
1.2. The cross-border period;
1.3. The harmonisation period.
2. Insolvency law and its role in establishing a better Europe:
2.1. Better functioning of the internal market;
2.2. Initiatives regarding natural persons?
3. Actors in the field of European Insolvency Law, being:
3.1. Legislature;
3.2. Courts;
3.3. Insolvency office holders;
3.4. Academia.
I will then end with some concluding remarks regarding the “Future of European 
Insolvency Law”, which is also the title of my lecture.
The Present State of European Insolvency Law
The Early Period
European Insolvency Law, until 2002, has shown its presence in different shapes 
and forms, although I add that its visibility has been limited. One of the first and 
very important signs has been in the area of the transfer of undertakings with 
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Directive 77/187/EC with regard to Safeguarding of Employees’ Rights in the 
event of Transfer of Undertakings. The Directive, quite remarkably, is silent on 
the question whether it applies in cases of insolvency. In a Dutch case of 1985, 
the European Court of Justice concluded that Article 1(1) of Council Directive No 
77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 did not apply:
“…. to the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a 
business where the transferor has been adjudged insolvent and the 
undertaking or business in question forms part of the assets of the 
insolvent transferor.”
The Court added that the Member States are at liberty to apply the principles of 
the Directive to such a transfer on their own initiative. The Directive, however, 
does apply – so the Court determines – where an undertaking, business or part of a 
business is transferred to another employer in the course of a procedure such as a 
“surséance van betaling” (judicial leave to suspend payment of debts).4 Although 
in this Directive, “insolvency” as a term was not covered in the text, it is obvious 
that there is a direct effect of the European rule into the national legal system of a 
Member State.
It then took thirteen years before “insolvency” again asked for attention, now 
as an event which was expressly taken into account in the Directive 90/314/EC 
regarding the insolvency of a Tour Operator. Article 7 provides:
“The organizer and/or retailer party to the contract shall provide 
sufficient evidence of security for the refund of money paid over and 
for the repatriation of the consumer in the event of insolvency.”5
Here again, insolvency led to a set of national rules in the legislation of the Member 
States. In several other European Union instruments too, “insolvency” as a legal 
phenomenon was made a part of its provisions, e.g. in the Directive 97/9/EC on 
Investor Compensation Schemes, Directive 2000/35 with regard to Late Payments 
in Commercial Transactions, Directive 2000/74 on the Protection of Employees 
4 Abels v The Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Electrotechnische 
Industrie (Case 135/83) [1984] ECR 469. The Court observed: “In addition, the rules on liquidation proceedings 
and analogous proceedings are very different in the various Member States. For that reason, and in view of the 
fact that insolvency law is the subject of specific rules both in the legal systems of the Member States and in the 
Community legal order, it may be concluded that if the directive had been intended to apply also to transfers of 
undertakings in the context of such proceedings, an express provision would have been included for that purpose.” 
The Court’s observation “that insolvency law is the subject of specific rules… in the Community legal order” is 
interesting but rather mysterious.
5 Jürgen Blödel-Pawlik v HanseMerkur Reiseversicherung AG (Case C-134/11) [2012] EUECJ C-134/11 decided 
that Article 7 of Council Directive 90/314/EEC is to be interpreted as covering a situation in which the insolvency 
of the travel organiser is attributable to its fraudulent use of the funds transferred by consumers.
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in the Event of Insolvency of their Employer (updating Directives 77/187 and 
80/987), Regulation 2001/2157 with regard to the Statute for a European company 
(SE), in which Article 63 provides:
“As regards winding up, liquidation, insolvency, cessation of 
payments and similar procedures, an SE shall be governed by the 
legal provisions which would apply to a public limited-liability 
company formed in accordance with the law of the Member State in 
which its registered office is situated, including provisions relating to 
decision-making by the general meeting…”,
or – a recent example – the Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Foundation (FE), within which Article 36 (“Transfer of registered office”), 
paragraph 3 provides:
“The FE shall not transfer its registered office… if proceedings for 
winding-up, insolvency or similar proceedings have been brought 
against it...”6
Here, insolvency as a term seems rather narrow. The drafters certainly have not 
looked into the definition in the EIR.
The given examples are important for those direct involved (employees, travellers, 
certain legal persons etc.), but in this first pan-European period there is no sign that 
“insolvency” as such has been an object of specific policies of study on a European 
Community (since 2009: European Union) level, nor that “insolvency”, as far as 
it has been included in European Union legal instruments, is drafted in a coherent 
way in these instruments that in their core deal with other matters. There is a 
level of interaction between European Union law and the national law of Member 
States, but the interplay is limited to certain national islands of civil law. There 
is, as far as I can see, no evidence that these islands are interconnected, meaning 
that the specific national rules have been discussed or aligned between Member 
States themselves.
The Cross-Border Period
A second phase in the development of European Insolvency Law began with 
the entry into force of the EIR in May 2002. Unlike the early phase, this one is 
clearly introducing a system in a body of rules. It has given an enormous boost to 
insolvency practice, education and research. The EIR has a private international 
6 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE), Brussels, 8 February 2012, 
COM(2012) 35 final, 2012/0022 (APP).
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law angle, which has as its basis (now) Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (“TFEU”). The EIR is a legal instrument that forms a 
part of a more comprehensive framework of the private international (insolvency) 
law system of the European Union. This wider framework consists of a variety 
of components, such as the Brussels I Regulation on International Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, to which the 
Insolvency Regulation fills the gap.7 Presently (mid-October 2012), the EIR is 
the subject of a large review process. I will make some remarks regarding this 
process later.
It is in this period too that reorganisation and winding-up of financial institutions 
is on the European Union drawing table. Insurance Undertakings and Credit 
Institutions are excluded from the EIR since they are subject to special arrangements 
and, to some degree, national supervisory authorities have wide-ranging powers of 
intervention. Since 2011, some of these intervention powers are in the hands of one 
of the three European Supervisory Agencies in the financial sector. The respective 
Directives 2001/17 and 2001/24 have resulted in an abundance of implemented 
national provisions, rather detailed and spread over different national sources, such 
as Acts or Codes on civil law, Insolvency Acts and/or Banking Acts. Since a 
few years, in the midst and hopefully the aftermath of the financial crisis, debates 
are ongoing on the most desirable European structure for the resolution of banks 
and investment firms. In the June 2012 proposal for a Directive establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms,8 “resolution”9 constitutes – according to the proposal – an alternative to 
normal insolvency procedures10 and provides a means to restructure or wind down 
a bank or investment firm that is failing and whose failure would create concerns 
as regards the general public interest, such as threaten financial stability, the 
7 Article 1(1), Brussels I Regulation excludes from its scope insolvency proceedings relating to: “...bankruptcy, 
proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings.”
8 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Framework for the 
Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/
EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/
EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Brussels, 6 June 2012, COM(2012) 280 final, 2012/0150 (COD). Article 
1(3) defines “investment firm” as an investment firm as defined in Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2006/49/EC that is 
subject to the initial capital requirement specified in Article 9 of that Directive.
9 Ibid., Article 2(1): “resolution” means the restructuring of an institution in order to ensure the continuity of its 
essential functions, preserve financial stability and restore the viability of all or part of that institution.
10 Ibid., Article 2(40): “normal insolvency proceedings” mean the collective insolvency proceedings which entail 
the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator, normally applicable to institutions 
under national law and either specific for those institutions or generally applicable to any natural or legal person. 
The description generally follows the one in Article 1(1), EIR with regard to collective insolvency proceedings.
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continuity of a bank’s critical functions and/or the safety of deposits, client assets 
and public funds.11
In the period of their creation, some ten years ago, both Directives have been the 
subject of a debate on the nature of these rules. The Italian author Galanti, for 
instance, is of the opinion that the rules concerning private international law which 
are included in the Directive 2001/24 (Credit Institutions) are placed in the more 
important and overall framework of exchange of information and cooperation 
among authorities:
“The circumstance that banks and insurance undertakings are subject 
to prudential supervision accounts for the allocation of the crisis 
directives in the EU-derived law in these sectors, thus giving to the 
rules on private international law a secondary role.”12
The Belgian Professor Torremans, however, puts it in a different perspective, 
as follows:
“The final aim is therefore not so much to exclude these entities from 
the scope of the Regulation, as to put in place a tailor made special 
regime for them.” 13
Whereas the legislative instruments originating from the cross-border period 
continue to evolve concerns may be expressed regarding certain topics. There 
certainly is a level of interaction between European Union law and national law 
of Member States, but the way this interaction plays out lead to rather different 
results. To give one example of the interaction of European Union law and national 
law, the EIR led to some gaps with existing national (insolvency) procedural laws. 
In the Netherlands, for instance, in 2003 an attempt was made to realise the EIR’s 
full potential by making “national” and “European” law compatible. A set of 
some 15 legislative provisions has been included in the Netherlands Bankruptcy 
Act. Germany did the same in the German Insolvency Act, while France at the 
national level, however, has used a “circulaire” for these purposes. Mutual 
comparison of these rules demonstrate that the three countries have introduced 
many different consequences in their aim of striving for the compatibility of the 
EIR on the one hand and national procedural legislation on the other, leading to 
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/reform/20120912-com-2012-510_en.pdf.
12 E. Galanti, “The New EC Law on Bank Crises” (2002) 11 International Insolvency Review 49, at 52.
13 P. Torremans, Cross Border Insolvencies in EU, English and Belgian Law (European Monographs No. 39) (2002, 
Kluwer, The Hague), at 145.
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e.g. different rules for publication, registration, use of language or the degree of a 
court’s involvement.14
I have not seen attempts either that the implementation of those Directives in 
specific national rules has been discussed or aligned between Member States 
themselves. If you and I have an assignment and we are working from the same 
template, doesn’t it make sense that we share some thoughts and discuss some 
approaches? It seems to me a quite common way especially as we are “buddies”, 
given the existence of “mutual trust” between Member States.
Another area to pay attention to is the coherence within the system of European 
Union law itself. Coherence, I think, has two components. The first one is 
“synchronization” or “fine-tuning”, the second is what I now call “adjusting”.
Synchronisation is at hand for instance with the Brussels I Regulation and the EIR. 
In the proposals of December 2010 to amend the Brussels I Regulation,15 the cited 
exclusion in Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, excluding from its scope 
insolvency proceedings relating to:
“…bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions 
and analogous proceedings…”
leaves doubts as to its scope, which could have been avoided by sychronising, 
therefore by clarifying that Article 1(1) excludes those matters that fall within the 
scope of the EIR.
Another example of synchronisation relates to the EIR and the two Directives 
mentioned, both on the definitions of the proceedings (collective insolvency, 
winding-up, reorganisation) as well as the scope of these instruments ((collective) 
investment firms are excluded from the Regulation; does the recent draft-definition 
of June 2012 for investment firm fully close the gap of Article 1(2) of the EIR?; 
definitions of set-off and netting?). Another synchronisation item relates to the 
law applicable. Article 4(1) of the EIR applies the so called lex concursus (or 
lex fori concursus), the law of the Member State within the territory of which 
insolvency proceedings are opened governs all the conditions for the opening, 
conduct and closure of the insolvency proceedings, the admissibility of claims 
and the rules on distribution, etc. There is one difference, though. Article 10(1) 
14 Further on such realisation or adoption measures in Austria, England, Germany, France, Czech Republic and 
Poland, see Wessels, above note 3, at paragraph 10492.
15 Proposal for a Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Brussels, 14 December 2010, COM(2010) 748 final, 2010/0383 (COD).
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of Directive 2001/24 concerning banks does not determine that the “law” of the 
home Member State are universally applicable; it provides that “the laws” (plural) 
and “… regulations and procedures” of the home Member State are applicable. To 
symbolise (at least in its wording) this broader regime, I have referred to the “laws, 
regulations and practices” as the “lex domus”, in contrast to the lex concursus as 
meant in Article 4(1) of the EIR.16
The other component of coherence relates to adjustment, e.g. in case certain 
provisions of the EIR will be amended, adjustment involves the necessity to amend 
the mirror-image provisions in the Directives (e.g. those relating to applicable 
law) accordingly. According to the Spanish professors Virgós and Garcimartín, the 
instruments concerning cross-border insolvency (the EIR and the two Directives) 
are part of a single common system on cross-border insolvency, all forming what 
they call a “hermeneutic circle”, within which the rules should be interpreted and 
construed.17 Although I have criticised this unconvincing “hermeneutic circle” 
interpretation-theory,18 I agree with the authors that the European Union legislator 
is the main guarantor of the unity and coherence of the European Union law 
system, and therefore should synchronise and adjust as just mentioned.
A final note regarding this cross-border phase is that it is not only related to 
cross-border insolvency matters. Although concerns regarding the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality could be made, often preventing unification of 
matters of civil law, including insolvency law, as being impossible or exceptional, 
it should be mentioned that several provisions of the Insolvency Regulation are to 
be characterized as substantive rules and are therefore now accepted throughout 
Europe as unified rules concerning the topics to which they relate, see for example 
Articles 7(2), 20, 29-35, 39 and 40 of the EIR.
16 See G. Moss and B. Wessels, “General Introduction to the EU Insolvency Law Framework and Principles with 
regard to Financial Institutions”, in G. Moss and B. Wessels (eds), EU Banking and Insurance Insolvency (2006, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 3ff.
17 See M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice (2004, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague), at 9ff; F. Garcimartín, “The Review of the European Insolvency Regulation: Some 
General Considerations and Two Selected Issues (Hybrid Procedures and Netting Arrangements)” (Report of the 
Netherlands Association for Comparative and International Insolvency Law 2011, ius, 2012), at 19, a copy of 
which is available at: www.naciil.org.
18 See B. Wessels, “The Hermeneutic Circle of European Insolvency Law”, in E.H. Hondius et al. (eds), 
Contracteren Internationaal (Opstellenbundel aangeboden aan prof. mr. F. Willem Grosheide) (2006, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag), at 351ff.
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I give only one example, Article 7(2) of the EIR.19 Article 7(2) regulates the legal 
consequences in the event of the seller’s insolvency following the transfer of 
an asset (from seller to purchaser). Article 7(2) says that the opening of main 
insolvency proceedings against the seller of an asset, after delivery of the asset:
(i) shall not constitute grounds for rescinding or terminating the sale; and
(ii) shall not prevent the purchaser from acquiring title where at the time of the 
opening of proceedings the asset sold is situated within the territory of a 
Member State other than the State of the opening of the main proceedings.
As a result of the application of Article 7(2), the contract (sale of assets) is not 
vitiated and the legal consequences of the contract (acquiring ownership by the 
purchaser) in principle become operative. Provided the purchaser continues paying 
his instalments, he will be the owner as soon as the last term expires. The scope 
of the provision gives it priority over the rules of national law which deviate from 
Article 7(2) or contract provisions with a different content.20 Remarkably, this is 
a uniform substantive rule of (at least in the Netherlands) general private law or 
of insolvency law, created at the European level, but hardly debated in national 
legal circles.
The Harmonisation Period
Over thirty years after the first confrontation between European Union law and 
national law of a Member State in a matter of insolvency, the book of rules for 
European Insolvency Law turns to the next page: harmonisation. On 15 November 
2011, the European Parliament approved a “Motion for a European Parliament 
Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Insolvency Proceedings 
in the Context of EU Company Law”. In its motion, the European Parliament 
requests the Commission to submit to Parliament, on the basis of Articles 50, 81(2) 
or 114 of the TFEU, one or more legislative proposals:
19 Article 7(2), EIR: “The opening of insolvency proceedings against the seller of an asset, after delivery of the 
asset, shall not constitute grounds for rescinding or terminating the sale and shall not prevent the purchaser from 
acquiring title where at the time of the opening of proceedings the asset sold is situated within the territory of a 
Member State other than the State of the opening of proceedings.” In the Dutch text, Article 7 refers to “goed” (a 
legal term used to describe all property: tangible, intangible, rights ownership, entitlements and claims). However, 
this should be interpreted for the purposes of Article 7 as the Dutch term “zaak” (which refers to all moveable and 
immoveable assets). A similar observation can be made in relation to the French text (referring to “bien” rather 
than “chose”).
20 For a further treatment, see Wessels, above note 3, at paragraph 10670ff. The wider European Union context for 
retention of title problems include Article 4(1), Directive 2000/35 (on Late Payments), Articles 3, 4 and 14, Rome 
I Regulation.
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“…relating to an EU corporate insolvency framework, following the 
detailed recommendations set out in the Annex hereto, in order to 
ensure a level playing field, based on a profound analysis of all viable 
alternatives.”21
One of the categories on the European Parliament’s wish-list concerns matters 
related to harmonisation of national insolvency law. As topics ready for research 
on the suitability of harmonization, the European Parliament suggests (amongst 
others), certain aspects of the opening of insolvency proceedings, certain aspects 
of the filing of claims, aspects of avoidance actions and general aspects of the 
requirements for the qualification and work of liquidators, which is the European 
Union term for a variety of insolvency office holders working in the European 
Union Member States. Is this in any way feasible or is it “all hell breaks loose”? 
As these harmonisation-proposals are the object of a different study, soon to be 
published, I will not dwell on them now.22
Insolvency Law and its Role in establishing a Better Europe
I now turn to the second theme, the question whether insolvency law can serve 
in establishing a better Europe. Most remarkably, the European Parliament is 
indicating, as a possible legal basis for its recommendations for harmonization, 
Article 114 of the TFEU. By this suggestion, “insolvency” is directly placed within 
the goals of the establishment of the internal market.23
21 See Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Insolvency 
Proceedings in the Context of European Union Company Law (2011/2006(INI). In the motion, the 
European Parliament confirms “that the recommendations respect the principle of subsidiarity and the 
fundamental rights of citizens.” For all related documents, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0355&format=XML&language=EN. According to Wikipedia (last 
seen on 3 October 2012) a “level playing field” is: “…a concept about fairness, not that each player has an equal 
chance to succeed, but that they all play by the same set of rules. A metaphorical playing-field is said to be level 
if no external interference affects the ability of the players to compete fairly. Government regulations tend to 
provide such fairness, since all participants must abide by the same rules. Examples of such regulation: building 
codes, material specifications and zoning restrictions, which create a starting point/a minimum standard - a ‘level 
playing field’”.
22 See I. Fletcher and B. Wessels, “Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe” (Reports presented to the 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht (Netherlands Association of Civil Law)), to be discussed at its 
Annual Meeting, 14 December 2012, The Hague, The Netherlands (“Harmonisation Report 2012”).
23 In general on harmonisation and the internal market, see T. Wiedmann and M. Gebauer, “Zivilrecht und 
europäische Integration”, in M. Gebauer and T. Wiedmann (eds), Zivilrecht unter europäischem Einfluss. Die 
richtlinienkonforme Auslegung des BGB und andere Gesetze – Kommentierung der wichtigsten EU-Verordnungen 
(2nd ed) (2010, Richard Boorberg Verlag, München), at Kap. 1, nr. 37.
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Better Functioning of the Internal Market
Title VII (“Common Rules of Competition, Taxation and Approximation of 
Laws”) of the TFEU contains a Chapter 3 (“Approximation of Laws”), which 
includes Article 114 (ex-Article 95 of the EC Treaty). Its first paragraph provides:
“1. Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following 
provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set 
out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council shall, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures 
for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States which have as their object 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”24
In the literature, the term “internal market” (sometimes referred to as: single 
market) has been described as a territorial (geographic) space within which there 
is full mobility of production factors, such as labour, capital, goods and services, 
as an efficient allocation of these factors results in a higher level of welfare in 
the Union.25 According to the German scholars Wiedmann and Gebauer, this 
internal market (Binnenmarkt; marché intérieur) has developed from a step-by-
step developing project to a permanent duty of the Union (Binnenmarktaftrag als 
Daueraufgabe der Union or Internal market as an endurance assignment).26 The 
term “internal market”, therefore, has a dual meaning. Next to the indication of a 
certain space, it also relates to a goal, to strive for two complementary avenues:
(i) measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law;27 and
(ii) provisions which do not allow (private) obstacles in inter-Member State 
traffic, such as hindrances to the freedom of movement of workers within the 
24 Article 26 TFEU (ex-Article 14 of the EC Treaty): “1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing 
or ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 2. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. 3….”
25 See R. van Leuken, “Internemarktbeginsel en Privaatrecht” (2011) Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en 
Registratie 6901 (Themed issue on “Algemene beginselen van Unierecht en het privaatrecht”).
26 See Wiedmann and Gebauer, above note 23, at Kap. 1, nr. 32.
27 See Articles 114 and 115, TFEU. For an overview of these measures related to civil law in the Dutch literature, 
see A. Hartkamp, Europees Recht en Nederlands Vermogensrecht (Asser/Hartkamp 3-I*) (2011, Wolters Kluwer, 
Alphen aan den Rijn), at no. 235ff.
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Union,28 to the freedom of establishment (for corporations) (Article 49 of the 
TFEU)29 and the prohibitions regarding free competition (e.g. Articles 101 and 
107 of the TFEU on State Aid).
My point of view is that in this concept of “internal market”, the creation of a 
European community and the further establishment of the European Union, 
including its four freedoms, strongly fostering and enhancing trade, business and 
investments across national boundaries, cannot be regarded as complete without a 
transparent and solid insolvency system. This submission is not new. It has already 
been made over a decade ago by Manfred Balz, one of the architects of what now 
is the EIR, in that:
“…a functioning bankruptcy system is essential to any economy that 
aspires to achieve the freedoms of establishment of business and the 
free flow of goods, services and capital, and to integrate national 
markets into a unitary internal market.”30
Of course, certain stigma still exists, such as a debtor’s insolvency indicates his 
overall failure in business or reflects presumptions of fraud to the detriment of 
its creditors, but generally in business life, insolvency has grown to become a 
calculable and acceptable enterprise risk.31 In most of the more developed legal 
systems, insolvency law has grown in importance, although most countries 
continue to discuss and struggle with the desirable approach and therefore the 
goals of insolvency law.
As I see it, companies and businesses operate best in a challenging environment, 
which is beneficial for all parties concerned, such as suppliers, the companies’ 
management, employees, creditors, customers, shareholders and the tax collecting 
government. This logically means that uninterrupted continuity of any business is 
a desideratum in itself, as it means:
28 In a recent Opinion delivered on 13 September 2012, Advocate General Sharpston has concluded that Article 45, 
TFEU (Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Union) must be interpreted as meaning that a residence 
requirement such as that included in the Swedish skuldsaneringslagen (an insolvency measure, not listed in Annex 
A of the EIR) as a condition for obtaining debt relief constitutes a restriction on the freedom of movement of 
workers, because it is liable to prevent or deter a worker from leaving Sweden to take up employment in another 
Member State (in the case at hand: France).
29 For a discussion, see: A. Van Hoe and M. Vanmeenen, “Insolvency Law and the Freedom of Establishment: 
Friend or Foe?”, Chapter 17 in R. Parry (ed), The Reform of International Insolvency Rules at European and 
National Level (2011, INSOL Europe, Nottingham), at 179ff.
30 M. Balz, “The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings” (1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
485, at 490.
31 See J. Westbrook et al., A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (2010, World Bank, Washington DC), at 
143, submitting that insolvency is an enterprise risk.
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(i) the possibilities of continuing employment; including
(ii) job security for management;
(iii) the possibility (guided by good management) of efficiently employing all 
the available means to run a good business (e.g. natural resources, technical 
equipment);
(iv) a share in the profits (dividend) for shareholders;
(v) the possibility to continue all other relations, with small suppliers of goods and 
services and buyers/customers of the business’ products and services; and
(vi) the continuous stream of tax-money to the State, to finance its chosen policies.
In this respect, insolvency law is the vital core and provider of strength and 
resilience of any economic system. If the financial difficulties go from bad to worse, 
insolvency laws should have available rules to timely prevent these difficulties 
or respond to them, to formulate a optimal approach to a solution, within which 
all rules of company law, contract law, the law on securities, employment law, 
and of course insolvency procedural law itself, are taken into account. If indeed 
“insolvency” is a true part of the legal skeleton for an internal market in the 
meaning of Article 114 of the TFEU, a design for an insolvency law that will meet 
the key objectives within the focus of European Union policies on the longer term 
must in its substantial and procedural forms be brought into alignment with norms 
and principles which are predominant in the non-insolvency law area.32
Today, I miss a coherent vision of the structural place of insolvency in relation to 
the realisation of the internal market. With a focus on corporate insolvency law, 
the participants in the market themselves could take responsibility by discussing 
and drafting certain principles on how, for instance, a restructuring market would 
look like and, thus, assist the European Commission in further developing its ideas. 
Here a call is made to the European equivalent of associations of industry, trade, 
employees, banks, unions and insolvency specialists to further the debate on this 
important topic.
Initiatives regarding Natural Persons?
Although the European Parliament’s motion of November 2011 is certainly 
challenging, it is just as imperfect, as the great majority of recommendations 
it covers do not relate whatsoever to natural persons. In fact it refers only once 
32 In our Harmonisation Report 2012, above note 22, Fletcher and I present an Agenda for future work.
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(possibility of harmonisation of opening of insolvency proceedings) to “natural 
persons”. Is there a role for the European Union in this regard?
In the last two decades Member States have adopted specific insolvency regimes 
regarding natural persons (sometimes also “consumers”, “non-merchants” or 
“non-traders”), whilst such rules still are lacking in many countries, including 
– in Europe – e.g. in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg 
and Croatia, the last one being the 28th European Union Member State as of 1 
July 2013.33 Generally, the reason for a national treatment of the phenomenon 
seems to be that, in the area of natural persons, many times some other purposes 
in legislation may have a primary attention, such as the protection of a certain 
minimum of assets and income, available for an individual natural person (and his 
household) or the specific goal of:
“…financial rehabilitation of over-indebted individuals and families 
and their reintegration into society.”34
Such a rehabilitation may include specific support on debt counselling, participating 
in social welfare programs or certain obligations to be fulfilled during participation 
in an collective insolvency proceeding or debt rescheduling scheme (such as the 
duty to inform a court or an insolvency supervisor on new received income, the 
duty to apply for a job, and so on). Not the European Union, but the much larger 
geographically spread Council of Europe, has formulated as a goal for insolvent 
natural persons their “reintegrating in society”, which is the active component of 
the more passive view of the European Union, being the:
“…. view to guaranteeing a decent life to the poorest debtors (as a 
principle of social justice).”35
33 Lithuania will introduce legislation regarding debt rescheduling for natural persons as of 1 March 2013, see 
Law No. XI-2000, VŽ, 19 May 2012, No. 57-2823. In Hungary and Luxembourg, drafts for laws on discharge 
regimes are pending, whilst in Italy, Law 3/2012 generally deals with debts of natural persons but does not provide 
a discharge.
34 See Recommendation 4(f) of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe (20 June 2007) to its (over 40) 
member states: “[to] introduce mechanisms necessary to facilitate rehabilitation of over-indebted individuals 
and families and their reintegration into society in particular by:… f. encouraging effective financial and social 
inclusion of over-indebted individuals and families, in particular by promoting their access to the labour market” 
(Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)8, with a follow up Resolution 294 (2009)), copies available at: https://wcd.coe.
int. See J. Kilborn, “Expert Recommendations and the Evolution of European Best Practices for the Treatment of 
Overindebtedness, 1984-2010”, for which see: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663108.
35 Terms of Reference for the European Union Group of Experts on Cross-border Insolvency, at 2, copy available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/files/2012_expert-group-insolvency/terms_of_reference_group_
insolvency_en.pdf. From another angle, it has been submitted that “…consumer insolvency poses a systemic risk 
to global financial stability”, for which reason, the World Bank presently is conducting a critical comparative study 
of existing legal regimes to help nations design, modernise or revise insolvency law systems applicable to natural 
persons. See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/WB_TF_2011_Consumer_Insolvency.
pdf.
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Another reason for leaving out natural persons by the European Parliament 
certainly will be the largely different views on the fair and equitable allocation 
of consumer credits risks and the society’s view on providing rehabilitation or a 
fresh start to a natural person/debtor who has (unfortunately) fallen into a situation 
that he reasonably cannot repay all its pre-insolvency debts. Furthermore, Member 
States’ have largely different rules regarding the question what belongs to the 
insolvency estate36 or – to the contrary – what is exempted from such an insolvency 
estate,37 the contributions to be made to the estate, the extend and the nature of the 
discharge (“fresh start”), restrictions imposed on the debtor during the proceedings 
or as a condition for such a discharge, the events in which such proceedings may 
be terminated, the avoiding powers of creditors, the duration of the proceedings, 
just to name a few.38 In July of this year, the German scholar Hoffmann (with his 
COMI in Estonia) concluded that in Europe:
“…a minimum degree of comparability can hardly be determined”.39
At present, at the European level, insolvency of natural persons mainly is known 
from the phenomenon of “bankruptcy tourism”, where a natural person is shifting 
its COMI to another Member State, to be in the position to have the court of that 
Member State open collective insolvency proceedings, to which the respective 
debtor will be a subject. It is rather likely that such a choice is sparked by the lighter 
nature or the specific legal effects of these proceedings as similar proceedings 
would otherwise have had were the debtor to have its COMI in the Member State 
from which he travelled, including the durations of the proceedings.40
36 H. Rajak, “Determining the Insolvent Estate – A Comparative Analysis” (2011) 20 International Insolvency 
Review 1.
37 D. McKenzie Skene, “The Composition of the Debtor’s Estate on Insolvency: A Comparative Study of 
Exemptions” (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 28; R. de Weijs, “Harmonisation of European Insolvency 
Law and the Need to Tackle Two Common Problems: Common Pool & Anticommons” (2012) 21 International 
Insolvency Review 67.
38 See The Consumer Debt Report II, Reports of Findings and Recommendations (2011, INSOL International, 
London) and S. Viimsalu, “The Over-Indebtedness Regulatory System in the light of the Changing Economic 
Landscape” (2012) XVII Juridica International 217, also available at: www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/
ji_2010_1_217.pdf.
39 T. Hoffmann, “The Phenomenon of “Consumer Insolvency Tourism” and its Challenges to European Legislation” 
(2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy 461. For an earlier study on the same topic, see T. Hoffmann, “Consumer 
Insolvency Tourism and the EIR – Stuck between Convergence Needs and the Stockholm Action Plan?”, Chapter 
18 in Parry (ed.), above note 29, 191ff.
40 See A. Walters and A. Smith, “‘Bankruptcy Tourism’ under the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: 
A View from England and Wales” (2010) 19 International Insolvency Review 181; Marc D’Avoine, 
“Internationale Zuständigkeit des deutschen Insolvenzgerichts bei offenkundiger “Rückkehroption” des ehemals 
selbständig wirtschaftlich tätigen Schuldners mit dem Ziel der Restschuldbefreiung” (2011) Neue Zeitschrift für 
Insolvenzrecht 310.
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This topic creates at least two problems. The first one is the challenge that it 
puts on the application of the EIR for instance with French courts (especially 
in the Alsace) stretching the requirements for the determination of the COMI 
of (German) debtors,41 an English court annulling a previous order opening 
bankruptcy proceedings of a debtor (a German notary, presenting himself as 
sports photographer in the United Kingdom), which was made on false information 
regarding his COMI42 and a German court applying – beyond its deliberate narrow 
interpretation – the public policy defence against recognition of such proceedings, 
opened for instance in England.43 There may certainly be a degree of sympathy for 
these cautious judges, but the problem perceived should be solved, not by judges 
deciding in ad hoc cases, but by the legislator, based on a well-balanced set of 
legal rules.
Secondly, such forum shopping may be beneficial for an individual debtor, but even 
if it is resulting in a genuine COMI move, it may appear as an unfair circumvention 
of national rules and in the case of insolvency can result in creditors losing out. 
A rather recent example relates to Ireland, where at least thirteen Irish property 
developers, who owe the State’s National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) at 
least EUR 2 billion, have been declared bankrupt in the United Kingdom. By so 
doing, they escaped the draconic Irish 12 year period to be discharged from debts, 
and enjoyed the period from adjudication to automatic discharge, which under 
current United Kingdom insolvency law is one year. The Minister for Justice of 
Ireland, Alan Shatter, is cited as stating:
“The very essence of having a common market is that you need to 
have common rules with regard to access to bankruptcy legislation 
and not rules which appear to be in conflict with each other and can 
provide incentives for people to engage in bankruptcy tourism.”44
In the European Union, however, there are no such common rules. It has been 
observed that in Europe no harmonisation of legislation is on the agenda either, 
given the huge differences in domestic proceedings.45 Referring to the research 
of Kilborn and of Hoffmann, certain topics are (slowly) converging. A recent 
examples of this tendency is to limit the length of such proceedings, e.g. in 
41 See e.g. Court of Appeal Colmar 16 September 2008, discussed in Wessels, above note 3, at paragraph 10561a.
42 Sparkasse Hilden Ratingen Velbert v Horst Konrad Benk and the Official Receiver [2012] EWHC 2432 (Ch).
43 Landesgericht Cologne 14 October 2011 (2011) Neue Zeitschrift für Insolvenzrecht 957, correctly criticised by H. 
Vallender, “Zur Anerkennung einer englischen Restschuldbefreiung bei missbräuchlicher Wohnsitzverlegung” 
(2011) Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht 775.
44 The Financial Times, 6 July 2012.
45 See also J. Israël, “Shopping voor een schone lei” (2012) Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 19.
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Ireland, Germany and Greece. This tendency flows from changing views on how to 
respond to debt-overburdened natural persons in a modern credit-based society.46 
The first signs of another development point at a tendency to limit rights of secured 
creditors. In the ongoing financial crisis, in nearly all Member States, many over-
indebted families will have to cope with settling their debts, especially struggling 
mortgage holders. At present, in Ireland,47 a draft of a Personal Insolvency Bill 
2012 is being discussed, introducing (amongst others) three non-judicial based 
processes, one of which is the Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA), which 
applies to both unsecured debt (of any amount) and secured debt of up to EUR 3 
million. In an Opinion of 14 September 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
stated that it generally supported the Irish reforms, but observes that the PIA 
reforms are “unprecedented” both in scope (including secured debt) as in amount, 
and recommends that the limit for these PIAs, the category dealing with the biggest 
debtors, be reduced to EUR 1 million. The Opinion even asserts:
“In particular certain features of the proposed PIA regime may 
have negative implications for credit institutions in their capacity as 
creditors and even for the wider functioning of the financial system.”48
On 12 September 2012, the President of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, 
delivered his State of the Union 2012 Address. He said:
“….. Our agenda of structural reform requires a major adjustment 
effort. It will only work if it is fair and equitable. Because inequality 
is not sustainable. In some parts of Europe we are seeing a real social 
emergency. Rising poverty and massive levels of unemployment, 
especially among our young people. That is why we must strengthen 
social cohesion. It is a feature that distinguishes European society 
from alternative models. Some say that, because of the crisis, the 
European Social model is dead. I do not agree. Yes, we need to 
reform our economies and modernise our social protection systems. 
But an effective social protection system that helps those in need is 
46 See also J. Spooner, “Long Overdue: What The Belated Reform of Irish Personal Insolvency Law Tells Us About 
Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy” (2012) 86 American Bankruptcy Law Journal  243, at 298, on the rapid 
convergence in many European jurisdictions to introduce fast-track insolvency proceedings for natural persons 
in cases of “no income, no assets”.
47 I understand that similar ideas are being discussed in Greece and Norway.
48 “If made use of by large numbers of debtors, the PIAs could significantly increase default rates and thus impact 
on both the capital adequacy and liquidity position of credit institutions at a time when they are still undergoing 
restructuring”, see Opinion of 14 September 2012 on measures relating to personal insolvency (CON/2012/70), 
published on the ECB’s website. I am leaving aside the question whether Ireland, after adopting the Bill, will 
propose to include these “non-judicial” proceedings in Annex A of the EIR.
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not an obstacle to prosperity. It is indeed an indispensable element 
of it. Indeed, it is precisely those European countries with the most 
effective social protection systems and with the most developed social 
partnerships, that are among the most successful and competitive 
economies in the world. Fairness and equity means giving a chance 
to our young people. We are already doing a lot. And before the 
end of the year, the Commission will launch a Youth Package that 
will establish a youth guarantee scheme and a quality framework to 
facilitate vocational training.”
Let’s keep these words in mind.
In the Opinion mentioned above, the ECB also invites the Irish authorities:
“…to make it easier for secured creditors to repossess mortgaged 
properties upon default by the debtor.”
It is difficult to see how such a statement can be justified. I seriously query 
whether, in the recent circumstances, with hundreds of thousands of family’s 
overburdened with debt, the unconditional execution by banks is the right answer. 
Isn’t it time, given the statement of Commission’s President Barroso and in the 
light of desirabilities expressed in the Treaty on European Union: “to deepen the 
solidarity between their peoples, while respecting their history, their culture and 
their traditions”, “to promote economic and social progress for their peoples”, as 
well as e.g. Article 3(1) of the TEU, stating that “The Union’s aim is to promote 
peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”, to tackle this very sad and wide 
spread problem on a European Union level and introduce certain limitations on the 
realisation of secured rights, such as a postponement of execution under certain 
circumstances, with a discretionary position for a court. Spooner’s recent statement 
regarding draconian personal bankruptcy laws in Ireland:
“Thus the novel nature of the problem of consumer over-indebtedness 
has called for novel political responses…”49
is certainly ready to be addressed to the European Union legislator.50
49 Spooner, above note 46, at 298.
50 J-L. Vallens, “The Future of the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings”, Chapter 12 in Parry (ed), 
above note 29, at 121ff., goes much further by submitting that harmonisation seems possible in the area of 
“relief for individual debtors after bankruptcy, and discharge and new start.” On 10 October 2012, the World 
Bank published its Draft Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (inviting feedback 
by 9 November 2012), for a copy of which see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/
WBPersonalInsolvency ReportOct2012DRAFT.pdf.
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Actors in the Field of European Insolvency Law
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to finalise this lecture with some remarks 
on the actors in the field of European Insolvency Law. I fully agree with Paul 
Omar’s recent observation that creating insolvency law and rules in practice is 
a collaborative effort by judges, practitioners and academic scholars.51 I am not 
hesitant to address these others, but the first actor which comes to mind is the 
legislator itself, either the European Union legislator or national legislators. In this 
lecture, I limit myself to the earlier one.
Legislature
The European Union legislator acts as the fundamental safeguard of the unity 
and coherence of the European Union law system. As such, one of its main 
tasks is to guarantee the completeness and internal consistency of all the parts 
forming the European Union legal system on cross-border insolvency, and, in 
future the inclusion of “insolvency” in the further development of the internal 
market. Leaving aside the awkward, burdensome and politically sensitive history 
of the coming into effect of the EIR, the legislative system itself has in inherent 
conceptual failure. In the present system individual Member States may propose 
to list insolvency proceedings in Annex A. There is no evidence that there is any 
check by a European Union body, which leads to the sheer unilateral promotion 
of a national definition to an Annex with as a result a “European effect” to this 
national proceeding. As I have analysed elsewhere the present framework opens the 
door for opportunistic behaviour by a Member State placing “sort of” insolvency 
proceedings in the Annex, which is detrimental for the trust to put in the core base 
of the system of automatic recognition of insolvency judgments in the context of 
the EIR.52
I regret to inform you that also concerning the legislative process of evaluating the 
EIR the Commission is having problems – to put it mildly – to receive a sufficient 
mark. Article 46 of the EIR provides that the Commission will submit at the latest 
on 1 June 2012 a report concerning the application of the Regulation accompanied, 
if necessary, by a proposal for adaptation of the Regulation. This term has been 
exceeded. How come? Well, anyone with only a bit of knowhow and experience 
in these types of evaluations would calculate some 18 months for research, 
assessment, discussion and preparation for such a report and its accompanying 
51 P. Omar, “The Building Blocks of Insolvency Reform: Is Law Enough?” (2012) Eurofenix (Summer Issue) 32.
52 See B. Wessels, “What is an Insolvency Proceeding anyway?” (2011) 4 International Insolvency Law Review 491.
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proposal for adaptations. In April 2010, in an address to the European Parliament 
Mrs Vivian Reding on behalf of the European Commission, announced:
“Pursuant to Article 46 of the regulation, not later than 1 June 2012, 
the Commission shall present an application report and amendment 
proposal if needed. ….. Ten years after its entry into force, it is 
expected that the regulation will need a new facelift. Therefore, the 
Commission will launch a large study on this issue at the beginning 
of 2011.”
At that time, on 10 January 2011, another Commissioner, Mr Barnier, in the 
context of the work for a new framework for crisis management in the financial 
sector, said:
“By June 2012 the Commission shall present an application report 
and amendment proposal if needed.”53
Unlike the legislative commandment and the promises given, we now know 
that the Commission (note that Mrs Reding is in charge, not Mr Barnier) clearly 
failed to meet this legislative deadline. The first step to action by the Commission 
however was not taken in the beginning of 2011, but 14 months later, in March 
2012, by setting out the public consultation I mentioned earlier.54 Since April 
2012, an Evaluation Study is being conducted (performed by a consortium of 
the Universities of Heidelberg and Vienna) as well as a Study for an impact 
assessment of a revision of the Regulation, in which identified policy options in 
terms of their economic, social and fundamental rights impacts as well as the 
impacts on Member States’ judicial systems are assessed. This has been done by 
a multi-disciplinary consultancy, based in Brussels.55 As far as I am informed, 
the latter impact study was available for the Commission early September 2012, 
whilst the Heidelberg/Vienna report is due second week October 2012. A “Group 
of Experts on Cross-border Insolvency” has been assisting the Commission in the 
preparation of a legislative proposal for a revision of the EIR and the adoption of 
this proposal is foreseen (as indicated in the Commission Work Programme 2012) 
for December 2012.56 It is uncertain whether both reports of a few hundred pages 
together will sincerely influence the nearly finalised work in the process of drafting 
53 Mrs Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship. Mr Barnier is the Commission’s member for Internal Market and Services. See: www.europarl.
europa.eu. For sources, see B. Wessels, “European Insolvency Regulation: Where to go from here?” (2011) 3 
International Insolvency Law Review 298.
54 Ibid., at footnote 1. See also: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/120326_en.htm.
55 I have participated in the Panel of Senior Advisors of this Study.
56 I am a member of this Group of Experts.
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of the legislative proposal. For various reasons this state of affairs is – to say the 
least – unfortunate. In my opinion, the whole process could have gained from the 
acknowledgement of the basic imperative to start early which such a process and 
with strong leadership by (someone appointed by) the Commission in managing 
and coordinating this whole process.
A second flaw in the Commission’s approach is – at least in the area of corporate 
insolvency – to recognise and acknowledge that for the necessity to include 
insolvency law within the achievements to develop such an internal market, parties 
in this market seems to play only a limited role. However, a piece of light entered 
the room two weeks ago. On 3 October 2012, the European Commission expressed 
its wish for a strong, deep and integrated Single Market which creates growth, 
generates jobs and offers opportunities for its European citizens which were not 
there 20 years ago. I quote:
“The completion of the Single Market is a continuous exercise and 
is a central element of the European growth agenda to address the 
current economic crisis. This is why the European Commission has 
today adopted Single Market Act II, putting forward twelve key 
actions for rapid adoption by the EU institutions.”
These actions are concentrated on what is called “four main drivers for growth, 
employment and confidence”, being, I am quoting again:
“(a) integrated networks;
(b) cross border mobility of citizens and businesses;
(c) the digital economy; and
(d) actions that reinforce cohesion and consumer benefits.”
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Interestingly, section (b) has as a third action point:
“(iii) modernise insolvency proceedings, starting with cross-border 
cases, and contribute to an environment that offers second chances to 
failing entrepreneurs.”57
Doesn’t it reflect the European Union legislatures’ belief in the power of the full 
manufacturability of this internal market? It seems that the European Union is 
taking the lead in responding to problems which increasingly transcend national 
boundaries, either because the problems do not lend themselves to solely national 
regulation or because they involve the interests of the international community as 
a whole. In this new environment, the traditional areas of European Union law or 
national law (such as private law, criminal law, administrative law or insolvency 
law) acquire an increasingly internationalised character, in which its content 
is formed on different levels, with different legal measures (including soft law 
mechanisms), established either “top-down” the legislation-ladder or “bottom-up”, 
initiated by private actors or a mix of such modes of operation.58 Here, in matters 
of insolvency, the ears of the Commission should be much closer to the European 
ground. The backbone of the legal framework for insolvency as an integral part of 
the internal market is a balanced development of decision making, with time for 
57 See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/index_en.htm. For ease of reference, I quote the specific abstract 
dealing with insolvency, see the Communication related to the “Single Market Act II. Together for new growth, 
at 7, “Key action 7: Modernise EU insolvency rules to facilitate the survival of businesses and present a second 
chance for entrepreneurs”, with the following text: “Businesses operating in Europe benefit from an overall 
positive business environment, which the European Union is further improving through its better regulation 
agenda. But more can be done. Europe needs modern insolvency laws that help basically sound companies to 
survive, encourage entrepreneurs to take reasonable risks and permit creditors to lend on more favourable terms. A 
modern insolvency law allows entrepreneurs to get a second chance and ensures speedy procedures of high quality 
in the interest of both debtors and creditors. We thus need to establish conditions for the European Union wide 
recognition of national insolvency and debt-discharge schemes, which enable financially distressed enterprises 
to become again competitive participants in the economy. We need to ensure simple and efficient insolvency 
proceedings, whenever there are assets or debts in several Member States. Rules are needed for the insolvency of 
groups of companies that maximise their chances of survival. To this end, the Commission will table a legislative 
proposal modernising the European Insolvency Regulation. However, we need to go further. At present, there 
is in many Member States little tolerance for failure and current rules do not allow honest innovators to fail 
‘quickly and cheaply’. We need to set up the route towards measures and incentives for Member States to take 
away the stigma of failure associated with insolvency and to reduce overly long debt discharge periods. We also 
need to consider how the efficiency of national insolvency laws can be further improved with a view to creating 
a level playing field for companies, entrepreneurs and private persons within the internal market. To this end, the 
Commission will table a Communication together with the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation.” See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smact/docs/single-market-act2_en.pdf. The Communication mentioned is set 
for the Fourth Quarter 2012. No doubt, there will be further discussion on this key action.
58 See e.g. P. Buck-Heeb and Andeas Dieckmann, Selbstreguliering im Privatrecht (2010, Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen); M. Knauf, Der Regelungsverbund: Recht und Soft Law im Mehrebenensystem (2010, Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen); J. Smits, “The Complexity of Transnational Law: Coherence and Fragmentation of Private Law” in 
K. Brown and D. Snyder (eds), General Reports of the Eighteenth International Academy of Comparative Law 
(Washington 2010) (2012, Springer, Berlin), at 113ff.; J. Smits, Private Law 2.0. On the Role of Private Actors 
in a Post-National Society (2011, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague); S. Muller et al. (eds), The Law of 
the Future and the Future of Law (2011, Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, Oslo).
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consultation, study, constructive criticism and debate, with strong involvement of 
all players in the market.59
Courts
So far, for making rules.
“In the field of insolvency there are two actors whose integrity and 
experience are central to the functioning of the insolvency system: 
judges and administrators”.60
This submission is made by Professor Jay Westbrook from Austin, Texas, who 
delivered the Edwin Coe lecture in 2008. Of importance for the judicial area in 
Europe is the so-called Stockholm-programme. In 2012, within the European 
Union supportive measures have been taken for the benefit of:
“…delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s citizens…”
with the object of guaranteeing:
“…. respect for the human person and human dignity, freedom, 
equality, and solidarity are our everlasting values at a time of 
unrelenting societal and technological change.”61
This seems easier said than done. However, after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009, an Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme 
was published aimed actively at strengthening confidence in the European judicial 
59 In our Harmonisation Report 2012, above note 22, Fletcher and I have developed seven criteria – not necessarily 
in this order and overlaps could occur – which may point at a direction to take in the process of developing a 
legislative skeleton for harmonisation of insolvency: (i) consistency with international norms, (ii) goals for the 
European Union, (iii) take stock, (iv) formulate overriding objectives, (v) draft flexible legislation, (vi) examine 
whether these is need for action, (vii) strive for a fair balance between the (often competing) interests of creditors 
and other parties concerned. For a framework that could guide public policy-makers in assessing whether, and 
in what form, private regulation can prove the most appropriate form of policy intervention, se the interesting 
six-step process of F. Cafaggi and A. Renda, “Public and Private Regulation. Mapping the Labyrinth” (2012) 1 
The Dovenschmidt Quarterly International Review on Transitions in Corporate Life, Law and Governance 16ff.
60 Westbrook et al., above note 31, at 203.
61 European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens 
(2010/C 115/01), copy available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:00
01:0038:en:PDF.
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area.62 It is clear that it focuses on the area of freedom, security and justice, and 
therefore stays within the (perceived) restrictions of Article 81 of the TFEU.63
The Action Plan says:
“The European judicial area and the proper functioning of the single 
market are built on the cornerstone principle of mutual recognition. 
This can only function effectively on the basis of mutual trust among 
judges, legal professionals, businesses and citizens. Mutual trust 
requires minimum standards and a reinforced understanding of the 
different legal traditions and methods.”
In the area of cross-border judicial co-operation, the corner-stone principle is that 
of mutual recognition, founded on a high level of confidence in the legal systems 
of the other Member States. What the system of mutual recognition requires, 
however, is more: it requires well-founded mutual confidence, thus Pauliine 
Koskelo, President of the Supreme Court of Finland, adding:
“We cannot, however, expect our systems of criminal or civil justice 
to work well for the citizens of other Member States unless and until 
they work well in general. If the justice systems don’t function up 
to standard in the domestic context, they will hardly function up to 
standard in cross-border situations either. Therefore, we simply cannot 
escape the fact that adhering to the principle of mutual recognition 
necessarily entails that the justice systems in each and every Member 
State must be brought up to standard. This is an urgent and serious 
common concern in the interest of citizens throughout the Union.”64
In the insolvency arena, an area of concern is the uncertainty of the existence of 
common (minimum) standard for an insolvency judges. A first look at the general 
tableau of “courts” is not encouraging. In many civil law countries insolvency cases 
are not dealt with by specialised courts (like the bankruptcy courts in the United 
States), but by a court that has general competence in civil matters and disputes. 
These countries include Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, France and 
the Netherlands. In some countries (supervisory) judges could be non-professional 
62 Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, 20 April 2010, copy available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF.
63 Ibid., at 4. See C. Timmermans, “Voorrang van het Unierecht door ‘multilevel’ rechterlijke samenwerking” (2012 
February) SEW Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch Recht 50, observing that judicial cooperation takes place 
on three levels: pre-judicial reference procedures to the Court of Justice of the European Union, on an informal 
level and via court cases.
64 See her address to the IBA Northern Europe Conference, Helsinki, 3-4 September 2009, available at: www.kko.
fi/47788.htm.
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lay judges, such as in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. In England, the High 
Court Bankruptcy Registrars, and throughout the country the county court judges 
with designated jurisdiction in insolvency matters, oversee individual insolvency 
proceedings, as the bankruptcy order must be made judicially.65
I am not aware of any research results related to such questions as whether the 
judges in these courts are specialised enough (in applying rather complicated 
insolvency law matters, many times in a rather short time frame) and possess 
sufficient commercial experience. Only in the last decade useful, but limited data 
have become available to sketch the general European procedural landscape, 
resulting in such conclusions as that there is no common European definition for 
“court”, that there are “radically different” court budgets and that the professional 
status of judges is not harmonised.66
The fundamental principle in cross-border insolvency matters within the European 
Union is that recognition of judgments delivered by the courts of the Member 
States is automatic (Article 16 of the EIR) as it “should be based on the principle 
of mutual trust” (see recital 22 to the EIR and, since 2009, Article 81(4) of the 
TFEU). This principle serves as the cornerstone for confidence in the Member 
State’s judicial capacity. For the very near future, systematic examination in this 
specific field is recommended in an aim to obtain accurate and comparative data on 
aspects of the functioning of courts in insolvency matters67 and – if need be – work 
on a programme to bring the judiciary indeed up to standard. I can therefore fully 
support the reasons to monitor justice sector performance, as recently expressed 
in The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL)’s Programme on 
“Justice Monitoring and Guardians of Justice”, one of which is:
65 Other types of procedure – such as Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA) and Debt Relief Orders (DRO) – are 
commenced out of court, but the court always has “oversight” in the sense that there can be a reference or an 
appeal to the court if contested issues arise.
66 See A. Uzelac, “Harmonised Civil Procedure in a World of Structural Divergences? Lessons Learned from the 
CEPEJ Evaluations” in X. Kramer and C. van Rhee, Civil Litigation in a Globalising World (2012, TMC Asser 
Press, The Hague), at 175ff. See also the Council of Europe’s Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 
report of September 2012, establishing a reference at European level to evaluate European judicial systems 
recognised and providing – so the website says – the opportunity to compare, identify, analyse and plan possible 
improvements on the basis of a detailed picture of the daily functioning of judicial systems in 46 European States 
and to measure the main trends, see: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/.
67 Article 2(d), EIR states: “‘court’ shall mean the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State 
empowered to open insolvency proceedings or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings.”
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“(iii) economic growth depends on effective protection of property 
rights, contractual rights, labor rights, consumer rights, effective debt 
collection and insolvency.”68
The Insolvency Office Holder
For matters of insolvency, the most important actors in nearly any insolvency 
proceeding in Europe is the insolvency office holder, who will derive its authority 
from the provisions of domestic law.69 In an individual case, the allocation of 
functions between a court and an insolvency office holder liquidators, including 
the legal and operational relationships between them, will be based on law and 
additional regulations, as well as a country’s institutional system, merely related 
to the requirements to fulfil these actors’ functions, including professional and 
ethical rules that apply to them. As Westbrook indicated, a successful insolvency 
proceeding is heavily dependent on a skilled and experienced insolvency office 
holder and court. He also noted a short overview of a few different jurisdictions 
demonstrated that selection of insolvency office holders, their supervision and their 
remuneration can be arranged in “quite a number of ways”.70
In a report of 2007, published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), a comparative survey has reviewed the manner in which 
the laws of eight south-eastern European countries make provision for issues 
such as qualifications, licensing, appointment, removal/retirement/replacement, 
standards of work and conduct, discipline and remuneration of office holders in 
insolvency cases.71 The principal purpose of the survey was to determine whether 
and the extent to which the respective laws of the countries mentioned make such 
provision. Aware of the relatively young and rather untested legal regimes related 
to insolvency in these countries the drafters’ main conclusions are:
(i) that in all the topics mentioned a variety of approaches have been chosen in a 
country’s laws and regulations;
68 The other reasons are: (i) mutual trust in justice institutions, in cooperation between the police and the courts, 
and in fair, effective migration procedures, performance/productivity of justice sector organizations, (ii) human 
rights, protection of victims, prevention of crime, rule of law and fundamental freedoms, see: http://www.hiil.org/
project/Justice-monitoring-guardians.
69 I am now leaving aside these roles as they are determined by the EIR.
70 Westbrook et al., above note 31, at 208ff.
71 J. Allen et al., A Regional Report on Insolvency Office Holders in South-East Europe (June 2007). See: www.
ebrd.com/downloads/legal/insolvency/insolserv.pdf. The eight countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.
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(ii) that there is a clear need for appropriate detailed standards to guide office 
holders in their work and to improve the basis on which their work can be 
measured and assessed; and
(iii) that in general there is an inadequate disciplinary system for insolvency office 
holders (either related to the vague ground for disciplinary action or the limited 
type of available sanctions).
This has the look of a provincial patchwork where confidence and trust in the 
impartial work of an insolvency office holder is concerned. As rightly positioned 
by Kenneth Cork in the United Kingdom:
“The success of any insolvency system… is very largely dependent 
upon those who administer it. If they do not have the confidence and 
respect, not only of the courts and of the creditors and debtors, but also 
of the general public, then complaints will multiply and, if remedial 
action is not taken, the system will fall into disrepute and disuse.”72
I therefore welcome the European Parliament’s proposal to harmonise general 
aspects of the requirements for the qualification and work of “liquidators”. The 
recommendation includes the liquidator’s approval by a competent authority of a 
Member State or being appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction of a Member 
State, with proven reputation, educational background, skills to manage the affairs 
of the insolvent company, being independent and resigning his office in the event 
of a conflict of interest. At this juncture I may welcome the initiative taken by 
INSOL Europe for a thoroughgoing research in the national systems of this area 
and to draft best practices for insolvency office holders.
Academia
Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, looking into our own mirror, we see that 
true European comparative research is still in its infants’ shoes. The organisation 
of academic research is rather national, with a majority of PhD-research done by 
individual researchers, hardly cooperating with others, let alone other colleagues 
from law schools in other jurisdictions. Although I agree with Rebecca Parry 
that significant progress has been made in the development of insolvency law 
scholarship in recent years,73 the European Parliament’s call for harmonisation 
72 Cork Report, Insolvency Law and Practice – Report of the Review Committee (Chairman, Sir Kenneth Cork) 
(Cmnd 8558) (1982, HMSO, London), at paragraph 732. The report formed the basis for the reform of insolvency 
law in the United Kingdom, resulting in the Insolvency Act 1986.
73 See the Editorial Preface in Parry (ed), above note 29, at ix.
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evidently will trigger more focused comparative studies.74 The basic structure of 
for instance the Academic Forum of INSOL Europe now in place and substantially 
active since 2007, should consider to organise itself in such a way that it is well 
placed to undertake such research, preferably in collaboration with the European 
Law Institute, established last year, when it should decide to do research in certain 
areas I mentioned before. Undoubtedly, other areas of research could contribute 
to the delivery of unity and coherence of the European Union law system. For 
instance, the coherence of the procedural rules, laid down in some fifteen directives 
and regulations of European procedural law has as far as I know never been a 
subject of serious research involving researchers from several disciplines of 
law, whilst for instance a rather new concept in insolvency such as cross-border 
cooperation and communication between courts and liquidators never has been 
compared with or tested against similar coordination frameworks in Europe which 
are in place regarding criminal law or tax law.
Another area of interest should be the next generation and their introduction into 
European Insolvency Law. There is an enormous task of a system of arranging and 
ordering, so that all relevant European Union law documents related to insolvency 
are available via an online directory, the legislative history of the EIR should be 
publically available and the CJEU cases should be systematically listed. Improving 
the accessibility of primary and secondary sources in a readily and easy way will 
certainly assist to accelerate capacity building for courts, practitioners and students.
Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen, to conclude:
I have argued that “insolvency” is a true part of the legal skeleton for an internal 
market in the meaning of Article 114 of the TFEU. The Commission has put the 
revision of the EIR in its Work Programme for 2012. The revision is one of the 
measures in the field of “Justice for Growth” set out in the Commission’s Action 
Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme. The revision links in with the 
European Union’s current political priorities to promote economic recovery and 
sustainable growth, as set out in the Europe 2020 strategy, and its very recent 
initiative to modernise insolvency proceedings and to contribute to an environment 
that offers second chances to failing entrepreneurs, in the Single Market II Act. I 
74 See R. de Weijs, “Towards an Objective European Rule on Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies” (2011) 20 
International Insolvency Review 219, at 242, presenting “a blue print for future European harmonisation”. See 
related to this topic also the INSOL Europe Revision Report 2012, in the Appendix on “Harmonised Rules on 
Detrimental Acts”.
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have given some examples of interaction between European Union law and national 
law, the lack of cooperation between Member State to align their implementation 
efforts and the necessity for a unified and coherent European Union law. With 
insolvency being one of the essential pillars upon which the internal market rests, 
we presently lack clear concepts, terms and norms as well as guiding principles. 
This results in the present rather fragmented and inconsistent nature of European 
Insolvency Law.
The challenge is to understand and articulate the paradigm shift in insolvency, 
from the sacrosanct “pay what you owe” to the balanced promotion of the 
continuity of companies in distress and reintegration of over-indebted consumers 
into society. Further research and debate should lead to the creation of a design for 
an insolvency law that continuously will meet the key objectives within the focus 
of European Union policies on the longer term. Overarching and guiding principles 
then must fit in the overall legal structure for an internal market. More specifically, 
European Insolvency Law’s substantial and procedural forms should be brought 
into alignment with norms and principles which are predominant in non-insolvency 
law area. European Insolvency Law, in future, will further challenge the tension 
which exists between underdeveloped legal policies concerning insolvency in the 
European Union and the traditional sometimes out-moded national concepts of 
insolvency law.
There is much to be done, interaction, synchronisation, adjustment, unity, 
coherence. In my opinion this calls for a coordinating unit, which will operate 
at European Union institutional level. Such an organisation (I now call it 
a European Insolvency Service) would have as an overall aim to develop and 
maintain a world-class European Insolvency Law and regulatory framework, to 
deliver services to insolvency practice (creating forms and maintaining relevant 
insolvency databases), to assist in the development of a regulation of the insolvency 
profession, to coordinate basic information to be of assistance to courts, to ensure 
and facilitate coordination in cross-border cases, to advise government departments 
and agencies on insolvency and related issues, to provide information to the public 
via its website, and to continuously monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of all 
matters of European Insolvency Law.
There is a lot to be done. The Academic Forum can be a forerunner here, by 
creating awareness on these matters, undertake research and maintain its platform 
for regular dialogue and outreach. Thank you for your attention.
178 International Insolvency Law: Future Perspectives
179Spreading the Gospel: The Mission of Insolvency Law, 
and the Insolvency Practitioner, in the early Twenty-First Century
Chapter 6
Spreading the Gospel: The Mission of 
Insolvency Law, and the Insolvency 
Practitioner, in the early Twenty-First Century
Professor Ian Fletcher QC
Introduction* **
In this lecture, I will present a personal assessment of the state of insolvency law, 
and insolvency practitioners, at this still early point in the 21st century. After more 
than 40 years spent mainly writing and thinking about insolvency matters, this 
seemed an appropriate moment to review past experience and to venture some 
thoughts about the future direction and destiny for the subject and for those who 
profess it. In embarking on this task it may be appropriate to invoke the words 
inscribed on a celebrated painting by the French artist, Paul Gauguin:
“D’où venons nous? Que sommes nous? Où allons nous?”1
I start with some reflections on “Where do we come from?”
The Historic Background – Myth and Reality
When I began to make a serious study of insolvency law – in the early 1970s – 
the picture, both in terms of English domestic law and at the international level, 
was one in which time appeared to be frozen, and the inhabitants of the landscape 
(rather like Gauguin’s subjects caught in their dream-like Netherworld) seemed 
to dwell in a curious limbo in which the law’s archaic substance wholly failed to 
address contemporary conditions and actual social needs. English insolvency law, 
both individual and corporate, had remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
* This is a revised version of the Edwin Coe Lecture delivered by the author on 26 September 2013 at the INSOL 
Europe Academic Forum Annual Conference in Paris.
** This is a re-edited and updated version of a piece first published under the same title in Chapter 17 in S. Bariatti 
and P. Omar (eds), The Grand Project: Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation (2014, INSOL Europe, 
Nottingham) (179-195).
1 “Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?” The painting, dating from 1897/8, hangs in the 
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Massachusetts. Intriguingly, there are no question marks on the inscription painted 
onto the canvas by the artist.
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first seven decades of the 20th century, and the legislative frameworks established 
by nineteenth century statutes were essentially still operative, although contained 
in legislation of somewhat more recent vintage.2 At the international/cross-border 
level there was a similar lack of any serious progress towards overcoming the 
traditionally fragmented approach to the special problems encountered when an 
insolvency case contains multi-jurisdictional features.
Notably, by 1970, the original 6 Member States of what was then known as 
the European Economic Community were encountering the first of a series of 
intractable setbacks in the attempt to negotiate a convention aimed at regulating 
the conduct of insolvency cases within the frontiers of the self-styled “internal 
market”. The first draft of a proposed “EEC Bankruptcy Convention”, when first 
made available for external scrutiny in 1970, proved to be an unworkable blend of 
high-minded, academic proclamations of allegiance to the twin principles of unity 
and universality, instantly undermined within the same text due to the complete 
inability of the national negotiators to accept the logical consequences of applying 
those principles in circumstances where the national insolvency laws, together with 
the related national regimes of property and security law, remained unharmonised.3
So began a 30-year saga marked by repeated failures and recriminations until, 
at long last, sanity managed to prevail with the adoption in May 2000 of the 
European Insolvency Regulation (“EIR”),4 which succeeded in squaring the circle 
by embracing the pragmatic principle of modified universalism. This compromise 
solution affords a limited accommodation to those who might otherwise experience 
a less favourable outcome through the application to their claim of the law of the 
debtor’s centre of main interests (“COMI”). Although it is always possible to point 
to technical or practical shortcomings in the final text of the EIR as currently in 
force, it is notable for its commercial realism and for delivering tangible benefits 
in terms of value preservation and greater efficiency in the conduct of cross-border 
insolvencies. It is also capable (in the right professional hands) of facilitating the 
restructuring of businesses and preservation of employment.
2 In the 1970s, the principal legislative provisions relating to individual and corporate insolvency respectively were 
contained in the Bankruptcy Act 1914 and the Companies Act 1948.
3 For a critical account of the Preliminary Draft Convention as published in 1970, see I. Fletcher in K. Lipstein 
(ed), Harmonisation of Private International Law by the EEC (1978, Chameleon/IALS, London), at 119; also 
published in (1977) 2 European Law Review 15. The subsequent, revised Draft, published in 1980, is the subject 
of further critical analysis in I. Fletcher, Conflict of Laws and European Community Law (1982, North-Holland 
Publishing Company, Amsterdam), in Chapter 6 (187-249).
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L160/1 (30 June 2000), 
which entered into force on 31 May 2002 (Article 47).
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My early investigations into the world of insolvency convinced me of the need 
to break out of the academic ivory tower and to become acquainted with the real 
workings of the law “on the ground”, and then to be prepared to identify and 
denounce whatever shortcomings were uncovered. In the English experience, the 
grave deficiencies in the law had been publicly exposed in the 1957 Report of the 
Blagden Committee, who concluded:
“Practical experience has shown that the present law fails and, it is 
suggested, fails badly in all these primary objects.”5
Significantly, but alas all too typically of the fate of constructive proposals for the 
reform and improvement of insolvency law, no legislative initiative was pursued 
by the government of the day to translate the Blagden Committee’s numerous 
recommendations into law.
So the scandalous inadequacies of English insolvency law were perpetuated for 
two more decades until, in 1976, the Cork Committee was established by the 
Labour government of the day, largely in response to two documents which made 
an especially cogent case for such reform. These were, in 1975, the report by 
Justice entitled “Bankruptcy”,6 and in 1976 the Report of the Advisory Committee 
on the EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Bankruptcy.7 The chairman of the 
Advisory Committee, Kenneth Cork, was immediately re-engaged to chair a 
Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, with a remit to review the 
entire law of insolvency, individual and corporate, in England and Wales, and to 
propose whatever reforms might be necessary or desirable. Despite the serious 
intentions with which the Review was launched, the committee was not given the 
full resources necessary to undertake a thorough, scientific study of the law and its 
working as a prelude to formulating its proposals.
This was in marked contrast to the approach being taken contemporaneously 
in the United States in the well-resourced process which culminated in the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Nevertheless by 1982 the Cork Committee 
did succeed in producing a convincingly argued Report advocating wholesale 
reform of the English law of insolvency.8 But with a different political party by 
then in government the Cork Report was initially ignored until 1984, when the 
5 Report of the Committee on Bankruptcy Law and Deeds of Arrangement Law Amendment (Chairman, His Honour 
Judge Blagden) (Cmnd 221) (1957, HMSO, London).
6 Bankruptcy – A Report by Justice (1975). The report was produced by a committee chaired by Allan Heyman QC.
7 Cmnd. 6602 (1976, HMSO, London). This report is usually known as the “Cork I” report to distinguish it from 
the subsequent report of the Review Committee, also chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork.
8 Insolvency Law and Practice. Report of the Review Committee (Chairman, Sir Kenneth Cork) (Cmnd 8558) 
(1982, HMSO, London).
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groundswell of public opinion, fuelled by repeated financial scandals, led to the 
hasty resurrection of the Cork proposals in a Bill which ultimately became the 
Insolvency Act 1986.
A “Mission to Explain”
The unedifying spectacle of the process of domestic insolvency law reform 
between 1976 and 1986 convinced me of the need for those who possess a technical 
understanding of the law and its actual working to establish effective channels of 
communication with legislators and with policy-makers in government, in order 
to ensure that there is a proper appreciation of the vital impact that this complex 
and much-misunderstood area of law has upon the totality of social well-being in a 
modern, credit-based society. Therefore it is an important aspect of the “mission” 
of insolvency practitioners to improve awareness, both on the part of the wider 
public and within the corridors of government, of the realities of insolvency law 
and practice, and to do so in a way that earns public confidence and respect rather 
than functioning merely as special pleading on behalf of the vested interests of 
those “in the business”. The “mission to explain”, as I call it, needs to be based on 
authentic and verifiable demonstrations of how the shortcomings of the current law 
have contributed to loss of value and the needless destruction of viable businesses, 
complemented by constructive proposals for the progressive improvement of law 
and practice. I shall return to this theme in a later part of this lecture.
Professional Regulation – A Sine Qua Non
When the Cork Committee’s proposals were belatedly made the basis of legislative 
reforms, a number of elements were omitted from the Act as finally passed by 
Parliament, notably in relation to corporate rescue and the predicament of what we 
nowadays term “consumer debtors”. These omissions have had to be re-visited in 
subsequent years, and it must be acknowledged that in a number of respects we in 
the United Kingdom have still not managed to achieve a satisfactory balance – the 
genesis of a “rescue culture” is still a work in progress. However, one keystone 
proposition in the Cork Report happily bore fruit, namely that all office holders 
in insolvency proceedings must be suitably qualified, professionally organised 
and properly regulated, so as to be fully accountable for their stewardship and 
conduct of the cases in which they act. A robust, statutory framework to ensure the 
competence and integrity of those acting as insolvency practitioners (“IPs”) was 
seen by Cork as a sine qua non of a soundly-run insolvency law, a conviction with 
which I respectfully concur.
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The emergence in the United Kingdom, post-1986, of a regulated sub-profession of 
insolvency practitioners has in my view been the single most important advance in 
the operation of insolvency law in my country since the 19th century, and I believe 
it can furnish a model and example for other systems in and beyond Europe. For 
let us be in no doubt: however well-crafted the enacted, black-letter provisions 
of an Insolvency Act or Code may be, they are relatively impotent and devoid 
of value unless they are administered and applied by office holders, judges and 
regulators whose competence and integrity are systemically assured. Without a 
proper institutional infrastructure based on firm ethical standards – which cannot 
be simply wished into existence overnight – public trust and confidence in the 
system will be progressively destroyed. One has only to look back on the notorious 
state of disarray and corrupt practices that characterised the pre-Cork era to realise 
how far we in the United Kingdom needed to come, and to appreciate the need to 
avoid ever lapsing into a complacent belief that “all is now perfect”. Instructive 
accounts of the scandalous goings-on in former times, have been chronicled by 
Stephen Aris in his book “Going Bust”,9 and by Sir Kenneth Cork himself in his 
memoire “Cork on Cork”.10
In the United Kingdom since 1986, there has existed a statutory regime for the 
regulation of every person who “acts as an insolvency practitioner” by taking 
appointment in relation to any of the formal types of insolvency proceeding 
(including administrative receivership under a floating charge). The regulatory 
regime established by Part XIII of the Insolvency Act 1986 (sections 388-398), 
together with several pieces of secondary legislation,11 is designed to control 
access to the provision of IP services by imposing an exacting series of “entry 
criteria” involving education, training and experience, combined with the 
somewhat intangible quality of being a “fit and proper person” to undertake the 
functions of an IP. The entry criteria go well beyond the “mere” possession of a 
professional qualification as a lawyer or accountant, although membership of a 
“recognised” professional body is in most cases the initial platform for acquiring 
eligibility to practice as an IP. Each of the recognised professional bodies has 
obtained specific ministerial recognition granting it authority to confer a license to 
practice as an IP upon those of its members who satisfy the requisite criteria. To 
become a “recognised professional body” (“RPB”) – there are currently seven of 
9 See S. Aris, Going Bust (1985, HarperCollins, London), especially in Chapters 6, 7 and 9.
10 See K. Cork, Cork on Cork (1988, Macmillan, London), especially in Chapters 2-6 and 10.
11 See especially: Insolvency Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/2507); Insolvency Practitioners Regulations 2005 (SI 
2005/524); Insolvency Practitioners (Recognised Professional Bodies) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1764); Insolvency 
Practitioners Tribunal (Conduct of Investigations) Rules 1986 (SI 1986/952); Insolvency Practitioners and 
Insolvency Services Account (Fees) Order 2003 (SI 2003/3363) (all as amended by subsequent SIs).
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them,12 purpose-designed internal structures, acceptable to the minister, must be 
in place both for conferring a licence in the first instance, and for the regulation of 
those IPs who are licensed by the RPB in question. These rules and structures must 
be reinforced by suitably rigorous disciplinary procedures.
As though it were not already sufficiently complicated, the United Kingdom 
system superimposes an additional layer of regulatory oversight by making the 
RPBs themselves subject to the scrutiny and oversight of the Insolvency Service, 
effectively acting on behalf of the government. As the annual reports of the 
Insolvency Service make clear, these regulatory functions are an important aspect 
of the role of the Service in ensuring that public confidence can be maintained.13 
But the complexity does not end there. Particular aspects of practice are the subject 
of “statements of insolvency practice” (“SIPs”) issued by one of the RPBs, the 
Insolvency Practitioners Association (“IPA”) in conjunction with the other six, 
giving their members detailed guidance on matters of practice which are seen to 
be of particular concern (e.g. SIP 16, concerning pre-packaged administrations).14 
As if all this were not enough, there is one further element in the United Kingdom 
edifice of professional oversight, namely the Insolvency Code of Ethics, agreed 
between all the RPBs, drawn up by the Joint Insolvency Committee which serves 
as a vehicle for coordination and discussion between the seven RPBs and the 
Insolvency Service.15
The United Kingdom system may appear over-elaborate, complex and somewhat 
unwieldy. Bearing in mind that it was virtually created from scratch after 1986 its 
somewhat prolix structure can be said to have come about by accident rather than 
12 Insolvency Practitioners (Recognised Professional Bodies) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1764). The seven RPBs are: 
The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland; The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland; 
The Insolvency Practitioners’ Association; The Law Society of Scotland; The Law Society.
13 “(IP regulation): The service is the oversight regulator of IP’s and ensures that the 7 RPBs permitted by the 
Secretary of State to authorise their members as IP’s regulate them effectively.”: Annual Report of the Insolvency 
Service 2011-12, at 12, which can be viewed (together with reports for some other years) on the Insolvency 
Service website at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-insolvency-service-annual-report-and-
accounts-2011-to-2012 (last viewed 31 December 2014). Further information about the regulatory functions of the 
Insolvency Service can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/insolvency-service and also 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioner-regulation-oversight-and-monitoring-
of-authorising-bodies (last viewed 31 December 2014).
14 The collected texts of the SIPs (currently 17 in number) can be viewed at the website of R3 (the Association 
of Business Recovery Professionals) at: http://www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1380 (last viewed 31 December 
2014) and at the individual websites of the Recognised Professional Bodies.
15 The Joint Insolvency Committee (JIC) is made up of eight representatives from each of the Recognised 
Professional Bodies and from the Insolvency Service. More information can be viewed at: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/iparea/jic.htm (last 
viewed 31 December 2014). The most recent version of the Code of Ethics can be viewed at: https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/insolvency-practitioner-code-of-ethics (last viewed 31 December 2014).
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design, and to reflect the historic subdivisions between and within the respective 
professions of accountants and lawyers in England and Wales, in Scotland and 
in Northern Ireland. One would not therefore advocate the adoption of the actual 
United Kingdom structure as an international model for exportation. But what can 
be said in its favour is that it amounts to a very serious attempt at ensuring that, in 
substance, the regulatory mechanism is a robust and dynamic one, and that there 
is even a layer of oversight of the regulators themselves, thus responding to the 
familiar rhetorical query “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”.16
But it remains essential at all times to avoid lapsing into a sense of complacency. 
For example, a reputational challenge for the profession has emerged in the wake 
of the development, particularly since 2002, of pre-packaged administrations. I do 
not intend here to discuss the actual mechanics of pre-packs, nor to assess their 
merits or demerits. Rather, I wish to call attention to the evident fact that certain 
features of their development bear an uneasy resemblance to such malpractices 
as “phoenixism” and “Centrebinding”, which many assumed had been consigned 
to history by the combination of reforms enacted in 1986. But when it becomes 
something of a routine practice to utilise administration as a vehicle for concluding 
a rapid sale of assets and businesses to internal buyers without any open marketing, 
and without the necessity of obtaining prior endorsement of the creditors, many 
of whom are destined to go uncompensated, questions are bound to be asked 
regarding the professional judgment and probity of the IP selected to serve as 
administrator. Particularly when, as is so often the case, the administrator is 
selected and appointed by the very persons who are destined to acquire the assets 
at a price previously agreed with the selfsame IP prior to being clothed with the 
powers of office.
Quite understandably, the unsecured creditors who are left behind by the process 
– and likewise any holders of equity in the Oldco who are not destined to become 
involved in the new venture – can be left with the impression that something 
disreputable has taken place. That is a problem with which we in the United 
Kingdom are still cautiously trying to come to grips, for there is the very real 
risk that in trying to devise some mechanism to allay popular concern about the 
integrity of the prepack process, particularly where insiders are involved, over-
engineered solutions may be introduced which will simply kill off the rescue 
16 The Latin maxim is translatable as “Who will guard the guards themselves?”.
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culture and deprive potentially viable businesses – and those employed in them – 
of any chance of escaping the inevitable alternative of liquidation.17
I therefore reaffirm my conviction that the United Kingdom experience bears out 
the proposition that effective and proportionate regulation is a sine qua non of a 
healthy and socially beneficial insolvency law. Proportionality is crucial, because 
over-regulation can produce negative consequences which can also be detrimental 
to the public interest. I would add that I am not persuaded that there is one single, 
ideal model of regulation which can be applicable to all societies in a uniform 
manner. The model for regulation has to be tailored to match the needs and 
circumstances of the community and system in which it is to function. And it needs 
to be kept under review, and be adaptable to match changing conditions. Notably, 
the United Kingdom Insolvency Service has recently conducted a study of our own 
regulatory machinery.18 One welcome consequence of that review, implemented 
from 5 June 2013, is the introduction of a single gateway for complaints against 
insolvency practitioners in place of the labyrinthine structure that was previously 
in operation. The would-be complainant now merely has to access a single avenue 
for making a complaint, in place of having to ascertain which of 8 possible avenues 
was the correct one to use in relation to the IP in question.
At the European Level
When we move to the European level and ask the questions “where have we come 
from?”, and “what are we?” the initial impression is somewhat encouraging, as 
we reflect on (currently) 11 years during which the EIR has occupied a central 
place in the practice of insolvency in 27 of the (currently) 28 Member States of 
the European Union. But our enthusiasm must be qualified as we recognise that 
there are many practical issues which are, or can be, a source of dissatisfaction and 
mistrust. One must acknowledge the potential for such negative experiences which 
17 Following a period of consultation commenced in March 2010 seeking proposals for improving the transparency 
of, and confidence in, pre-packs, the Insolvency Service initially announced in March 2011 that additional 
legislative measures would be forthcoming. Subsequently, on 26 January 2012, a Ministerial statement was 
issued indicating that no such measures were in contemplation for the immediate future. But in July 2013, a fresh 
initiative was launched, involving further consultations to assess the working of pre-packs. The subsequent Report 
(“The Graham Report”) which was published in April 2014, contains proposals for further reform and oversight of 
the operation of pre-pack administrations. Its recommendations form the basis for provisions included in the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill, introduced into Parliament on 25 June 2014. The Graham Report can 
be viewed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration (last 
viewed 31 December 2014).
18 See the consultation document, “Strengthening the regulatory regime and fee structure for insolvency 
practitioners” (February 2014), which can be viewed on the Insolvency service website at:
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280880/Strengthening_the_
regulatory_regime_and_fee_structure_for_insolvency_practitioners.pdf (last viewed 31 December 2014).
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can result from the lack of harmonisation and standardisation, both in the substance 
of the national insolvency laws as well as in the procedures and processes available 
state by state. Further obstacles are caused by disparities between the nature and 
standards of national organisation, training and regulation of the professionals and 
courts engaged in the insolvency process in their respective ways. The prospective 
emergence of an atmosphere of mistrust is especially unfortunate, and potentially 
fatal, in relation to the functioning of the EIR itself, whose very operation is 
ultimately (and explicitly) dependent on there being “mutual trust” between 
the Member States, and between the respective national courts and nationally-
established professionals. As last year’s Edwin Coe lecturer, Professor Bob 
Wessels, so forcefully reminded us by means of a quotation from the European 
Commission Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme:
“The European judicial area and the proper functioning of the single 
market are built on the cornerstone principle of mutual recognition. 
This can only function effectively on the basis of mutual trust among 
judges, legal professionals, businesses and citizens. Mutual trust 
requires minimum standards and a reinforced understanding of the 
different legal traditions and methods.”19
In the current text of the EIR, the “principle of mutual trust” is invoked in Recital 
(22), which concerns the immediate and automatic recognition of judgments 
concerning the opening, conduct and closure of insolvency proceedings. It supplies 
the main rationale for the proposition that:
“…grounds for non-recognition should be reduced to the minimum 
necessary.”
So a great deal is staked on there being general acceptance of this “principle of 
mutual trust” across the European Union. A central aspect of the scheme of the 
EIR is that national insolvency laws and practices remain essentially untouched 
and intact, while at the same time the EIR has the effect of superimposing the 
law of the state of opening of main proceedings upon all assets, and all claims, 
which are otherwise grounded in the laws of other states (except where secondary 
proceedings can be and actually are opened). This state of affairs has the very 
real capability of creating perverse incentives for interested parties to engage in 
forum-shopping tactics in the quest for some personal advantage obtainable under 
19 European Commission, COM (2010) 171 Final, 20 April 2010, in Section 4, “Strengthening confidence in 
the European judicial area”, opening paragraph. The Action Plan can be viewed at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF (last viewed 31 December 2014).
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the insolvency laws of another state (a tendency which has become known as 
“bankruptcy tourism”).
With their growing experience of the operation of the EIR, United Kingdom courts 
have become increasingly vigilant to identify instances where the debtor’s claim 
to have accomplished a transfer of COMI to the United Kingdom is not borne out 
by the discoverable facts.20 There are also commendable examples of principled 
conduct by insolvency practitioners themselves, such as in the Hans Brochier 
case.21 There, English IPs had been induced to accept out-of-court appointment 
as administrators of a German company upon the assurance that its COMI had 
been transferred to the United Kingdom. Upon discovering that the true facts were 
otherwise they promptly took steps to notify the English court, and they sought 
(and were granted) immediate release from office. In calling attention to these 
documented examples of the efforts made by English courts and IPs to adhere to 
the spirit as well as the letter of the European Insolvency Regulation’s ambitious 
scheme for applying the principle of universalism despite the significant disparities 
between the domestic laws of the Member States, I wish to emphasise once again 
the heavy reliance which is placed on the integrity of the individual practitioner, 
and also upon the discernment of the national judge. If the principle of “mutual 
trust” is ultimately found to be based upon a false premise in relation to the 
behaviour of certain constituent members, this experiment in applied universalism 
risks falling into disrepute.
Where are we now? Where should we go?
My personal assessment of the current state of affairs (“Que sommes nous?”), 
both at the national and at the European Union level, is that while much has been 
accomplished since the “Wild West” era prior to the 1980s, much still remains to 
be done. Let me offer some thoughts on where we need to go (rather than try to 
prophesy where we are going to go).
First, the disparity between national insolvency laws needs to be addressed. This 
cannot be resolved overnight, but we need to start to tackle the more egregious 
anomalies, and identify areas where convergence can be realistically, and 
beneficially, attempted. Of course, proposals for a “European insolvency law” 
have been made in recent years, both by INSOL Europe and by the European 
20 For examples in the area of personal bankruptcy see, e.g. the cases of Mitterfellner [2009] BPIR 1075; Eichler 
(No.2) [2011] BPIR 1293; Quinn [2012] BCC 608; O’Donnell [2012] EWHC 3749 (Ch); [2013] ILPr 16.
21 Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd v. Exner [2006] EWHC 2594 (Ch); [2007] BCC 127.
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Parliament.22 On 5 July 2013, the Commission launched a Consultation on a new 
European approach to business failure and insolvency, conducted by means of 
an on-line questionnaire which includes a section inviting responses on areas 
to be selected for resolving the divergence between national insolvency laws.23 
The indications are that a gradualist approach is being prepared whereby selected 
aspects of the law will be explored and targeted for harmonisation. This is a far 
more realistic course of action than any grandiose attempt to devise a single, 
comprehensive insolvency code for the whole of the European Union.
Aspects which seem to be suitable for early exploration include the test or tests 
of insolvency which are to be employed in determining whether proceedings 
can be opened; other criteria, such as time periods, which may be employed in 
relation to the opening of proceedings, and also the relevant time periods utilised 
in the operation of typical remedies for transaction avoidance. The subject of 
directors’ liability for their conduct of company affairs would be another obvious 
candidate for attention, and likewise the basis for imposing disqualification on 
delinquent directors (with the important additional need to ensure that the effects 
of disqualification under the law of one Member State will be recognised and 
enforced in all other European Union States). But the above are, of course, merely 
the first steps in what is likely to prove the equivalent of the proverbial thousand-
mile journey – the “Long March” towards eventual harmonisation of insolvency 
laws and procedures within Europe. What are the prospects for such a project being 
accomplished, and how best should the task be approached?
Harmonisation – Festina Lente
Some comments on the theme of harmonisation can be included here based on 
recent personal experience. In 2012, Professor Wessels and I produced a Report, 
“Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe”, commissioned by the Netherlands 
Association for Civil Law.24 In drawing up our conclusions, we were struck by 
22 See the European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Insolvency Proceedings in the Context of EU Company Law (the “Lehne Report”), (6 June 2011, 2011/2006 (INI), 
PE467.008v02-00). See also the European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Harmonisation 
of Insolvency Laws at EU Level”, PE 419.633 (April 2010) (the report was prepared for the European Parliament 
by a committee of INSOL Europe). Further proposals for harmonisation of selected rules of insolvency law were 
included in the Proposals by INSOL Europe, “Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation” (May 2012), 
Drafting Committee Chairman, Robert van Galen. Both the INSOL reports can be viewed on the INSOL Europe 
website at: http://www.insol-europe.org/publications (last viewed 31 December 2014).
23 The European Commission consultation was formerly available on the Europa website at: http://ec.europa.eu/
yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?form=InsolvencyTwo. The consultation period has expired.
24 See I. Fletcher and B. Wessels, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law in Europe (Preadviezen Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht 2012/Reports of the Netherlands Association for Civil Law 2012) (2012, 
Kluwer, Deventer).
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the enormous sensitivity surrounding the use of the very term “harmonisation”, 
and indeed in our researches into the literature we detected an aversion to the very 
use of the “H” word. Reviewing the prospects for “harmonisation of insolvency 
law” with as much academic objectivity and dispassion as we could muster, we 
discerned several meritorious arguments in favour of the adoption of a cautious, 
incremental approach towards the task of harmonisation.
One quite fundamental – and also very practical – proposition which commended 
itself was that in order to formulate a single set of principles and procedures for 
uniform application European Union-wide one must first establish community-
wide agreement as to the policy goals and objectives which the insolvency laws 
are intended to promote. Such unity of vision is yet to be achieved across the 
28 Member States, and it may take some time, and much patient effort, before 
consensus can emerge. Therefore we must be prepared to commit ourselves to 
the long-term view that by regular and sustained discussion we may arrive at 
agreement on the fundamentals on which European insolvency law is ultimately 
to rest.
In the meantime, we can take encouragement from the fact that a dynamic process 
of evaluation and reform is operating in many of the Member States, as they 
observe the fruits of alternative solutions which have been adopted in sister states. 
Although there is always the danger that inter-state competition will degenerate 
into a “race to the bottom” (sometimes castigated as the “Delaware syndrome”), as 
has been experienced at times within the federal system of the United States,25 Bob 
Wessels and I considered that there was force in the argument that in the present 
age, when new solutions are still being devised in response to rapidly-changing 
social and commercial challenges, it would be premature to attempt to formulate 
one single model of insolvency law, and to seek to impose it in a top-down manner 
by means of an European Union Regulation, as this could well stifle the innovation 
and creativity being exhibited by law makers and practitioners in individual states. 
Preferably, piecemeal harmonisation could be carried out by means of European 
Union Directives, which have the additional feature that each Member State is able 
to adopt the most suitable means of transposing the measure into its domestic law, 
respecting the particular characteristics of the national system.26
I am therefore of the opinion that, at the European Union level, the mission for 
insolvency law, and for those who formulate and enact it, is to seek common 
25 For a vivid account of such experiences, see L. LoPucki, Courting Failure (2005, University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor MI).
26 See Fletcher and Wessels, above note 24, in Chapter 7.
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ground wherever possible and not to lose sight of the fact that complex factors 
within the social history of the separate Member States have contributed to the 
current pattern of diversity. The watchword must therefore be “Festina lente” 
(make haste slowly). A reasoned case should be put, building on the proposition 
that up to date insolvency laws, embodying current best practices, can be a means 
of ensuring the preservation of value and the maintenance of employment to 
an extent that cannot be achieved through the retention of antiquated laws and 
unreconstructed professional practices. As always, prudent regulatory oversight is 
crucial. I revert to my previous assertion: an insolvency law, however modern and 
finely crafted its provisions, is only as effective as the quality and competence of 
those administering it enable it to be.
Promoting Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases
In the concluding part of this lecture I wish to offer some further thoughts on how 
the quality of insolvency law, and also the professional ethos and commitment of 
those who administer and apply it in practice, can be steadily enhanced. First, I 
will address the question of cross-border cooperation, which has been of particular 
concern for some time and which is now especially topical in view of the European 
Commission’s proposals, published in December 2012, for reform of the EIR.27
If the EIR amendments proposed by the European Commission are enacted in 
more or less their current form there will undoubtedly be an increase in the flow of 
communications between courts, and between liquidators, and also in the incidence 
of applications and requests between liquidators and courts, during the course of 
proceedings within the European Union. In tomorrow’s world, there will be a 
growing need to ensure that these cross-border communications, and appearances 
and applications before foreign courts by liquidators appointed in other states, 
can be conducted in an environment where the essential factor of “mutual trust” 
can be nurtured and respected. The need to take active steps to promote cross-
border cooperation at a global level was also one of the key objectives in the 
27 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, Strasbourg 12 December 2012, 
COM(2012)744 final, 2012/0360 (COD). The final report of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
on the Commission’s proposal for a regulation amending Regulation 1346/2000, was published as Document 
A7-0481/20123, reference PE.519.449v02-00; RR\1014200EN.doc, dated Strasbourg 20 December 2013. 
Subsequently, the EU Council published a proposed text of a “compromise document”, issued as EU Council 
DOC.10284/14.ADD 1, dated Brussels 3 June 2014, with an Addendum dated 4 June 2014, 10284/14, ADD 1, 
COR 1. Following negotiations with the Parliament, the Council produced an amended text embodying a recast 
of the Regulation as originally adopted in May 2000, referenced as DOC.15414/14.ADD 1, dated 20 November 
2014. This text was adopted by the Council on 4 December 2014. The enactment process, involving a vote by the 
Parliament, is scheduled to be completed by the middle of 2015.
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project conducted between 2005 and 2012 on behalf of the American Law Institute 
and the International Insolvency Institute, for which Bob Wessels and I served as 
Joint Reporters.
Although our Report, which contains Principles and Guidelines for Cooperation 
in International Insolvency Cases,28 is an example of what is generally known as 
“soft law”, we venture to hope that the dissemination programme currently being 
developed by a steering committee established by the III will bring the Report 
to the notice of judges, legislators and practitioners across the world, and there 
are already indications that its contents are beginning to make an impression on 
judicial thinking.29 Producing an appropriate response to the challenge of nurturing 
a culture of international cooperation among judges and practitioners forms an 
important part of the “Mission”, which I shall now proceed to delineate.
The Mission
Insolvency Office Holders
Starting with the challenge indicated above, of securing appropriate conditions for 
“mutual trust” to operate within the European Union, we can note that presently 
the EIR allows the title of “liquidator” to be claimed by the person who has been 
appointed to an office listed in Annex C in relation to the Member State in which 
an insolvency proceeding (as listed in Annex A) has been opened. The criteria 
for eligibility to be appointed to such a listed office remain entirely a matter for 
the national laws of the state in question, and there is clearly a great difficulty in 
evaluating the equivalence of entry qualifications applicable to all the relevant 
professions established under the laws of the 28 Member States. Although the 
formal policy of the European Union is to promote the mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications obtained in other Member States, in reality a judge 
in any of the European Union states experiences a genuine predicament when 
faced with a request to release assets possibly worth millions of Euros into the 
custody and control of a foreign liquidator claiming to be in sole command of the 
28 The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Global 
Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (2012), Reporters: I. Fletcher and B. Wessels. The 
text of the Global Principles Report can be viewed on the website of the International Insolvency Institute at: 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/36/5897.html (last viewed 31 December 2014). 
Hard or soft copies of the Report can be ordered from the American Law Institute at: http://www.ali.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=85 (last viewed 31 December 2014).
29 As examples: the text and commentary of Global Principle 13, on international jurisdiction, was cited with 
approval by Lord Collins delivering the leading judgment of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Rubin v. 
Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46; [2012] 3 WLR 1019, at paragraph 13 of the judgment. Global Principle 1.1, and 
the Comment to Global Principle 24, were cited with approval by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit 
in its judgment in Re ABC Learning Centres Ltd (27 August 2013, not yet reported) (Scirica, Circ.J), at 8-9.
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insolvency process according to the regime of the EIR. How far can it be safely 
assumed that this foreign-qualified liquidator possesses the same order of skills and 
competence, and is subject to equivalent ethical and regulatory standards, as an IP 
whose license to practise has been conferred under domestic law?
It seems rather obvious (to this commentator at least) that the level of trust 
could be considerably enhanced if a standardised, internationally recognised and 
accredited qualification to provide the services of an IP at international level could 
be developed and administered. The INSOL Global Insolvency Practice Course 
offers a possible foundation for such a qualification. Though presently designed (as 
its title indicates) for participants who aim to practice at a global, rather than purely 
European, level, the GIP course could be adapted and extended to provide purpose-
designed training to equip its graduates with competence and standing to practice 
in an international mode under the regime of the EIR. This could be a project for 
INSOL Europe to explore in collaboration with the main INSOL organisation, and 
might pave the way for eventual harmonisation of IP qualifications across Europe.
Judges and Other Participants in the Insolvency Process
I should also like to acknowledge here the important role played by organisations 
such as INSOL Europe, and also INSOL International, in facilitating the 
development of international relationships of a personal nature, between IPs, 
judges, regulators, academics and others. Such relationships can provide a further 
basis for the building up of the levels of trust and understanding which are so vital 
to the smooth functioning of international insolvency business. This can be seen 
in the steady expansion, from tentative beginnings a little more than two decades 
ago, of the practice of judge-to-judge communication for the purpose of exploring 
the optimum ways in which to manage a case in which the respective courts are 
actively engaged.
When the first initiatives in the convening of international colloquia for judges 
took place in the mid-nineteen nineties under the auspices of INSOL International 
and UNCITRAL, the first-hand testimonies of Justices Brozman and Hoffmann of 
their experience in the Maxwell case, and of their sense of frustration at the lack of 
any mechanism or precedent for a direct transatlantic contact to be made between 
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judges, made a powerful impression on those present.30 At that stage, a number 
of judges from other jurisdictions around the world expressed various degrees 
of misgivings about such inter- judicial communication, up to and including 
downright opposition to the very notion of such activity taking place. Yet within 
a few short years, many of the doubters had been won round and were actively 
championing the practice, and the UNCITRAL Model Law was well on its way to 
being concluded in record time.
Attitudes had been transformed, in considerable part, by the very experience of 
those judges in meeting their counterparts from other jurisdictions, and in coming 
to realise that they shared similar ideals and common objectives, and hence 
cooperation could be based on trust. But of course, the forging of such personal 
contacts is largely a matter of chance encounter through attendance at international 
conferences and colloquia. A more systematic programme of judicial training and 
confidence building is therefore required if the requisite “critical mass” of mutual 
trust and understanding is to be attained.
Within the European Union, just such a programme is currently being developed 
with the financial and moral support and of the European Commission together 
with the III. Once again, the central figure and moving force behind this venture 
is Professor Bob Wessels, who has conceived an innovative project aimed at 
promoting judicial cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases in the European 
Union. This project, whose abbreviated name is “the JudgeCo Project”, was 
conceived as a natural extension of the Global Principles and Guidelines Report 
previously mentioned,31 with the more targeted purpose of producing a purpose-
designed set of principles for judicial cooperation in cases falling within the scope 
of the soon-to-be revised EIR. The initial task of formulating the JudgeCo principles 
is being performed as a comparative exercise involving expert consultants from 
across the European Union and some outside states. When finalised, the principles 
themselves will become the subject of a training programme for insolvency judges 
drawn from all European Union states, expected to take place in 2014. If this 
venture is judged to be a success, it is hoped that the programme of training can be 
30 See the edited transcript of the proceedings of the Colloquium on Cross-Border Insolvency convened in Vienna 
on 17-19 April 1994, jointly organised by INSOL International and UNCITRAL. The transcript is published in 
the Special Conference Issue of the International Insolvency Review (Volume 4, 1995). The comments of Judge 
Brozman are reproduced at 16-29, and those of Hoffmann LJ at 97-102. Reports (including edited transcripts and 
supporting documentation) of two subsequent INSOL/UNCITRAL Judicial Colloquia, held in Toronto (22-23 
March 1995) and in New Orleans (23-24 March 1997) are respectively published in (1996) 5 International 
Insolvency Review, at 140-169 and in (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review, at 139-144 and 236-251.
31 See above. The coordinators for the JudgeCo Project, together with Professor Wessels, are Professor Jan 
Adriaanse, Leiden Law School and Professor Paul Omar, Nottingham Law School.
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placed on a permanent footing with financial support from the Member States as 
well as from the European Union centrally.
It may seem a distant prospect, but perhaps one day the European insolvency 
network will spawn an organisation comparable to the National Conference of 
Bankruptcy Judges which has flourished since 1926 in the United States.32 In 
the meantime, it is appropriate to acknowledge the achievements of both INSOL 
Europe and its international counterparts (INSOL International and III) in 
nurturing contacts and engagement with and between judges as an integral aspect 
of their activities.
Europe – Where do we go Next?
My concluding thoughts, formed in the light of the developments I have just 
outlined, are about the future: where should European insolvency law, and its 
insolvency practitioners, go next? The existing organisations, and their various 
programmes, will certainly continue to play a constructive part in the progressive 
improvement of the law in substance and in practice. But in my personal vision, 
the European level would also be the context in which a more transcendent 
venture could be undertaken. Once again, it must be conceded, the example and 
the precedent are taken from the United States. Very recently, in June 2011, we 
saw the foundation of the European Law Institute (“ELI”), modelled upon that 
distinguished American institution the ALI, and with a mission:
“…as an entirely independent organisation … to improve the quality 
of European law, understood in the broadest sense.”33
The ELI will undoubtedly involve itself from time to time in matters pertaining 
to insolvency, but that will be but one aspect of a far more extensive programme 
of activity. By no means all of the ELI’s membership at any given time will have 
a close interest in insolvency law. I believe that there is a need for a stand-alone 
organisation dedicated to the development of insolvency matters within Europe.
A European Insolvency Academy?
I therefore propose that serious consideration should be given to the formation of a 
separate, specialist organisation devoted exclusively to insolvency and insolvency-
related issues, constituted as an independent, self-sustaining organisation capable 
32 See the website of the NCBJ at: http://www.ncbj.org/ (last viewed 31 December 2014).
33 See the website of the European Law Institute at: http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/ (last viewed 31 December 
2014). The website of the American Law Institute can be viewed at: http://www.ali.org/ (last viewed 31 
December 2014).
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of formulating authoritative opinions and advice concerning the improvement of 
the insolvency laws of the European states, including their progressive convergence 
over time. The organisation should be independent of governmental or European 
Union official patronage, and should also be separately constituted from any 
professional organisations to which its members would, almost inevitably, 
simultaneously belong in their individual capacity.
Membership should be by elective process, and should be limited in number, so 
that election would be seen as a badge of distinction carrying corresponding duties 
to serve the general public good, rather than purely sectional, or partisan, interests. 
Its collective authority should be such as to make it the obvious point of reference 
for national legislators and policymakers, as well as being a source of expert advice 
for the European Union institutions. In the United States, such an organisation has 
existed since the 1930s in the form of the National Bankruptcy Conference, whose 
website describes it as:
“…a voluntary organisation composed of persons interested in 
the improvement of the bankruptcy laws of the United States and 
their administration.”34
For several years during the 1990s, I was privileged to observe the proceedings 
of the NBC at first hand, in the capacity of an invited international correspondent. 
I was particularly impressed by the exceptional level of expertise of those 
participating (some 60 or so in number), and by the diversity of their backgrounds 
– attorneys; academics; judges from all corners of the United States – all aspiring 
to the higher ideal of making a contribution to the improvement of the law for 
the benefit of their fellow citizens, based on objective, rational and non-partisan 
discussion concerning the topical issues of the moment. A maxim that was several 
times invoked in my hearing neatly sums up the philosophy of the organisation:
“When we enter the meeting, we check our clients at the door.”
Having originally come into existence as an ad hoc group invited to advise 
Congress and the Administration during the Depression years of the 1930s, the 
NBC evolved into an established, self-funding institution whose expertise was and 
is still regularly drawn upon in the process of law reform. It has had a distinguished 
consultative role in every major piece of bankruptcy legislation since the 1940s, 
including the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and subsequent revisions and reforms. 
My closing question – challenge even – is therefore: can Europe create a similar 
34 The website of the National Bankruptcy Conference can be viewed at: http://www.nationalbankruptcyconference.
org (last viewed 31 December 2014).
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institution, drawing its membership primarily from across the current 28 European 
Union states? I believe that the benefits could be significant, and the existence 
of such a body need not cut across the excellent work being done by existing 
organisations such as INSOL Europe.35 Let it be our mission, then, as practitioners 
of insolvency here in Europe, to consider how best to develop a suitable vehicle to 
harness the skills and experience of the leading members of our community, and 
to enable them to work together for the general good.
35 Possible names for such a body might be: the “European Academy of Insolvency Law” or (somewhat more 
modestly) the “European Insolvency Forum”.
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Chapter 7
Insolvency Specialists and Government 
Enquiries: A Unique Opportunity to Contribute 
to the Public Good
Professor Rosalind Mason
Introduction*
This lecture addresses the contribution of research by insolvency specialists to 
the development of insolvency law and practice, in particular to the (re-)design 
of insolvency systems. It draws on examples from Australia of government 
enquiries to reform insolvency law as well as other areas of law with which it 
intersects. It comments on the role that insolvency specialists can play in such 
policy debates – not only insolvency academics1 but also scholarly practitioners – 
for the public good.
Where governments seek to improve the laws affecting personal and corporate 
economic failure, insolvency academics can bring original insights they gain 
through their teaching. The process of regularly lecturing on insolvency law 
provides a valuable and deep understanding of its internal and external connections. 
This is a good foundation from which to analyse an area. Teaching also requires 
academics to maintain currency through identifying issues arising in practice. Such 
insights provide a perspective which places insolvency academics in a unique 
position, as “disinterested” observers, to contribute to the public good by way of 
commentary and submissions to improve the law.
This lecture will draw upon material that is publicly available on the internet for 
the benefit of an audience on the other side of the globe but who may be interested 
in comparative research on insolvency with an Australian dimension.2 In so doing, 
* This piece will be reprinted under the same title in Chapter 00 in R. Parry (ed), Designing Insolvency Systems 
(2015, INSOL Europe, Nottingham) (000-000) (forthcoming).
1 My focus has been on insolvency law academics, although in my review of government enquiries, it is encouraging 
to see that academics from a range of law sub-disciplines, as well as other disciplines, such as economics and 
social work, have contributed their expertise.
2 For that reason, the names of insolvency researchers (and where their names first appear, their university 
affiliations) are included in the text or footnotes. This is based on information on the web sites for the various 
enquiries – although it is possible that some submissions have been inadvertently missed.
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I am confident that there will be issues in common with the range of jurisdictions 
represented in this INSOL Europe audience, as well as points of difference that 
may be interesting and informative for future research.
My lecture will first provide some background on the Australian context for 
insolvency law and policy. Secondly, it will describe three broad categories of 
government enquiries to which insolvency specialists have contributed over the 
past few decades. They are:
(i) referrals to independent law reform commissions by the Attorney-General;
(ii) a range of departmental consultations by working parties or through discussion 
or options papers; and
(iii) enquiries undertaken by committees of parliamentarians.
Next I mention briefly some independent statutory bodies that have enquired 
into laws affecting insolvency. Finally, I draw together some themes about the 
contributions that insolvency specialists can make to government to improve 
insolvency systems and I encourage you to contribute your own unique expertise 
should similar opportunities arise.
The Australian Context
To begin, I provide some constitutional context for Australian law-making 
regarding insolvency. In 1901, the six Australian colonies federated to become 
the Commonwealth of Australia, comprising six States.3 Under the Australian 
Constitution, the new Federal Parliament was granted a specific power, to be 
exercised concurrently with the States, to make laws with respect to “bankruptcy 
and insolvency”.4 The colonies’ personal bankruptcy and insolvency laws 
continued in existence until comprehensive federal bankruptcy legislation came 
into effect in 1928. The main statute that currently applies to the insolvency of 
natural persons is the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
Although the grant of power to the Commonwealth to legislate on “insolvency” 
was wide enough to extend to the liquidation of companies,5 the then English 
approach of including the regulation of corporate insolvency in the general 
3 Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. There are also two 
internal Territories: the Australian Capital Territory, the seat of the national capital Canberra, and the Northern 
Territory.
4 Section 51(xvii), Australian Constitution. Australian statutes are available at: www.austlii.edu.au.
5 Justice R. French, “Federal Jurisdiction — An Insolvency Practitioner’s Guide to the Labyrinth” (2000) 8 
Insolvency Law Journal 128, at 129.
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corporations legislation was followed in Australia. Thus, the colonies - and later, 
the States - continued to legislate on the winding-up of trading companies and 
other associations in various Companies Acts.6
The Australian Constitution granted the Commonwealth concurrent law-making 
power with the States over corporations, in respect of:
“…foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed 
within the limits of the Commonwealth.”7
Despite the constitutional limitations imposed by the words “trading”, “financial” 
and “formed”, a move towards uniform corporate regulation in Australia 
began in the early 1960s and continued for a number of decades. However 
ongoing constitutional difficulties required the referral of state powers to the 
Commonwealth8 combined with the Commonwealth’s pre-existing constitutional 
powers to finally achieve a sound basis for comprehensive federal legislation in 
the form of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).9 Thus the parliament with responsibility 
for legislating on both personal and corporate insolvency is the Commonwealth or 
federal Parliament based in Canberra.
However, the bifurcation of insolvency law between individual (or natural person) 
debtors and corporate debtors has resulted in separate regulatory bodies for 
personal and corporate insolvency administrations and practitioners. Individual 
debtor administrations are regulated by the Australian Financial Security Authority 
(“AFSA”) established as an executive agency within the Attorney-General’s 
portfolio.10 Corporate insolvency administrations are regulated by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”).11 ASIC and AFSA have signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding to provide a framework for cooperation in the 
6 M. Gronow, McPherson’s The Law of Company Liquidation (2008, Lawbook Co, Sydney), at [1.400].
7 Section 51(xx), Australian Constitution.
8 Ibid., section 51(xxxvii).
9 The states agreed to refer the relevant powers for a period of five years that may be terminated earlier or may be 
extended by proclamation. The referral of powers has since been extended, most recently until 2016.
10 Until August 2013, it was known as the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (“ITSA”). For more information, 
refer to the Annual Report available at: www.afsa.gov.au.
11 See: www.asic.gov.au/.
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performance of their regulatory functions12 and both bodies are members of the 
International Association of Insolvency Regulators (“IAIR”).13
More significantly for present purposes, different government departments are 
responsible for policy and law reform for personal and corporate debtors.14 The 
Commonwealth Attorney-General has responsibility for bankruptcy policy, the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and AFSA. Within the Attorney-General’s Department, 
The Civil Law Division (within the Civil Justice and Legal Services Group) advises 
the Attorney-General on policy relating to bankruptcy and insolvency. As AFSA’s 
Portfolio Department, it also communicates with industry through the Bankruptcy 
Reform Consultative Forum.
Corporate insolvency law reform is the responsibility of The Treasury, which 
provides advice to government on company law and corporate governance issues, 
corporate insolvency, corporate financial reporting and oversight of portfolio 
agencies connected to corporate regulation and related financial issues. Corporate 
insolvency falls within the Financial Services and System Division which sits 
within the department’s Markets Group.
Using three categories, and beginning with law reform commission referrals, I 
now provide an overview of Australian government enquiries and the contribution 
of insolvency specialists to these to improve the design of the insolvency system 
over recent decades.
Law Reform Commission Enquiries
There have been few formal Australian law reform commission referrals that 
comprehensively enquire into insolvency. The most recent reports have their 
origins in 1976 when the Commonwealth Attorney-General issued terms of 
reference to the Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) to report upon 
whether the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) adequately provided for small or consumer 
debtors to discharge or compromise their debts from their present or future assets 
12 In September 2014, ASIC and AFSA signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (replacing a 2002 agreement) 
to facilitate liaison, cooperation, assistance and the exchange of information between the agencies in performing 
their regulatory functions, for which see: http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/AFSA-
MOU-published-1-October-2014.pdf/$file/AFSA-MOU-published-1-October-2014.pdf.
13 See: http://www.insolvencyreg.org/.
14 Until 1996, they were in different sections (ITSA and Companies and Business Law Section) within the Attorney 
General’s Department. However, the Companies and Business Law Section was moved to Treasury following 
the 1996 election and a change of government.
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or earnings and what legislative measures could be adopted to provide financial 
counselling facilities to small or consumer debtors.15
The reference resulted in ALRC Report 6 “Insolvency: The Regular Payment of 
Debts” (1977).16 The Commissioner in Charge, David Kelly,17 was assisted by 
consultants who included industry experts as well as three Australian academics.18 
It is noteworthy that the ALRC also consulted internationally – appointing an 
expert on bankruptcy law, Harvard Law Professor Vern Countryman.19 The 
Commission received written submissions from four Australian academics20 as 
well as a Canadian Professor.21
The final Report concluded that the existing systems were inadequate, as they did 
not meet the needs of a modern consumer credit based society and recommended 
a review of the entire law of bankruptcy.22 A substantial review of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1966 (Cth) was undertaken by the Department of Business and Consumer 
Affairs and the Act amended in 1980.23 An example of a recommendation which 
was taken up, albeit in an amended form was to introduce automatic discharge 
from bankruptcy.24 Some other recommendations were not implemented for 
many years.25
During its work on ALRC Report 6, the ALRC identified that judgment debt 
recovery procedures in the States and Territories could contribute to worsening 
insolvency. As a second stage of its response to the 1976 terms of reference, 
the ALRC investigated these procedures more fully in ALRC Report 36 “Debt 
15 In making its report, the ALRC was to have regard to “the community’s interest in the financial rehabilitation of 
small but honest debtors, and the need to ensure that creditors have an effective means of enforcing the payment 
of debts due to them.” (Insolvency: The Regular Payment of Debts [1977] ALRC 6, at v).
16 See: http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-6.
17 David Kelly was a foundation full time member of the Australian Law Reform Commission 1976-1980 and a 
Professor of Law at University of Adelaide 1980-1983.
18 Professor Colin Howard (University of Melbourne); Anthony Moore (University of Adelaide); John Willis (La 
Trobe University).
19 On Professor Countryman’s support for the rights of the debtor, see: http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/
backissues/fall99/article6.html.
20 Professor Bob Baxt (Monash University); Bruce Kercher (Macquarie University); C.W. O’Hare (Monash 
University); J. Neville Turner (Monash University).
21 Professor William Neilson (University of Victoria, British Columbia).
22 ALRC Report 6 concluded that the procedures provided under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for rearranging of 
debts were costly, cumbersome and inappropriate for the needs of non-business debtors. See: http://www.alrc.
gov.au/inquiries/insolvency-and-debt-recovery.
23 ALRC Report 36, Chapter 1 Introduction, at [2].
24 ALRC Report 6 recommended an automatic six-month discharge for non-business debtors unless creditors object. 
The 1980 amendments provided that a bankrupt should be automatically discharged from bankruptcy after three 
years although it also introduced procedures for objecting to the discharge.
25 For example, a system for the regular payment of debts for non-business debtors: “Part IX Debt Agreements”, 
was introduced in 1997.
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Recovery and Insolvency” (1987).26 Professor David Kelly continued as the 
Commissioner in Charge (1976–1985).27 Consultants were appointed once again 
and comprised industry experts and academics, from Australian and overseas law 
schools28 as well as from a department of social work.29 Submissions were received 
from two academics30 and an academic consultant, who also consulted on ALRC 
Report 6, made oral submissions during the public hearings.31
The ALRC acknowledged additional assistance was received from a large number 
of persons and organisations, including local32 and international33 academics. One 
of these was Professor Alan Fels, an Australian economist and lawyer,34 who had 
criticised the ALRC Report 6:
“…for its failure to analyse the costs and benefits of the reforms 
it proposed.”
It was said that:
“…the discussion of insolvency took place in an economic vacuum; 
overlooking considerations of demand and supply; with no attempt 
to assess whether the proposed reforms might have significant and 
adverse effects on the supply of credit.”35
The 1977 Report’s recommendation of a general insolvency inquiry was taken up 
in 1983 when the Attorney-General referred the law and practice relating to the 
insolvency of both individuals and bodies corporate to the ALRC. The consequent 
ALRC Report 45 “General Insolvency Inquiry” (1988)36 is commonly known as 
the “Harmer Report” after the Commissioner-in-Charge Ron Harmer, then a legal 
26 See: http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-36.
27 Ron Harmer was also appointed a Law Reform Commissioner during this period.
28 From Australia, A.J. Duggan (University of Melbourne, now of University of Toronto); Bruce Kercher; A.P. 
Moore (University of Melbourne) and J.E. Willis (La Trobe University). From overseas, Dr. C.G. Veljanovski 
(Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University).
29 Dr. T.C. Puckett (La Trobe University).
30 A.J. Duggan and Bruce Kercher.
31 J. Willis in Melbourne. Ron Harmer also made oral submissions at the public hearings in Perth.
32 These included Professor Maureen Brunt and Alan Fels, competition lawyers (Monash University); Martin Ryan 
(Department of Social Work, La Trobe University).
33 Professor C.R.B. Dunlop (a Canadian specialist in creditor and debtor law) and Professor R.M. Goode OBE LLD 
(an English specialist in corporate and insolvency law).
34 Professor Fels became chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1995–2003).
35 ALRC Report 36, above note 23, at [115].
36 See: http://www.alrc.gov.au/report-45.
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practitioner and subsequently a Professor at University College London.37 The 
part time Commissioners on this reference included another scholarly practitioner, 
Richard Fisher.38 Consultants included three Professors of Law39 as well as a 
Professor of Banking and Finance.40 The list of written submissions discloses 
significant Australian and international academic input.41 The public hearings did 
not appear to include academics.
ALRC Report 45 examined the developments of overseas jurisdictions in relation 
to insolvency, in particular in relation to voluntary arrangements with creditors. 
There were nine submissions from the United States including from Professors 
Thomas Jackson and Kenneth Klee. The ALRC also received submissions from 
Europe on cross-border insolvency - from Professor Ulrich Drobnig, Max Planck 
Institut, Hamburg and Professor Dr. Hans Hanisch, Switzerland.
The Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) implemented many of the 1988 
Report’s recommendations on corporate insolvency, including the introduction 
of the new Part 5.3A on voluntary administration, which was a significant 
development in Australian corporate rescue regulation. In 1993, legislative 
changes also implemented the Harmer Report’s recommendation to abolish the 
statutory priority of the Tax Commissioner over other creditors in bankruptcy and 
insolvency in relation to unremitted tax.42 This was well-received by insolvency 
specialists, although other legislative provisions have ensured taxation laws 
continue to have a significant impact on insolvency.43
So far I have referred to formal Law Reform Commission enquiries concerning 
insolvency that were referred to it by the government of the day. Now I will 
37 Ron Harmer was an internationally recognised insolvency expert who worked with many multilateral 
organisations, including INSOL International, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and UNCITRAL on improving the design of insolvency systems.
38 Richard Fisher AM was then a partner at Dawson Waldron and is now General Counsel and an Adjunct Professor, 
University of Sydney.
39 Professor Robert Baxt, who at the time was Chairman, Trade Practices Commission; Professor Harold Ford 
(University of Melbourne), Chairman of the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, which was 
established by the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities pursuant to the inter-governmental agreement 
between the Commonwealth and the States to assist the Ministerial Council by carrying out research into, and 
advising on, law reform relating to companies and the regulation of the securities industry; and Professor James 
O’Donovan (University of Western Australia).
40 Professor Tom Valentine (Macquarie University).
41 These included submissions by Professor Ford; A.P. Moore; Dr. O’Donovan.
42 The Insolvency (Tax Priorities) Legislation Amendment Act 1993 (Cth) amended the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 (Cth), the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and the Corporations Law.
43 For example, see C. Brown et al., “The Certainty of Tax in Insolvency: Where does the ATO fit?” (2011) 19(2) 
Insolvency Law Journal 108.
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provide a snapshot of some less formal ways in which the government gathers 
input on policy and law reform.
Governmental Working Parties, Options Papers and Discussion Papers
A recurrent theme of Australian enquiries has been government interest in the 
regulation of insolvency practitioners.44 In 1993, the government established 
the “Working Party on the Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency 
Practitioners”.45 This was a result of recommendations for changes to the 
regulation of insolvency practitioners made by the Harmer Report (1988) and the 
Trade Practices Commission in its “Study of the Professions” (1992).46 The only 
submission by an academic (the present author) was in respect of the importance of 
local regulation of corporate insolvency practitioners for cross-border insolvency 
practice. The Working Party Report was delivered in June 1997 and some ten 
years later it was referred to when the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 
proposals were introduced in 2007.
In recent years, the federal government has issued Discussion Papers and Options 
Papers, seeking input on specific law reform proposals. In June 2011, the Attorney-
General and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer released an Options 
Paper titled “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework 
Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia” (2011).47 It examined reforms 
to address concerns about misconduct in the insolvency profession and to improve 
the value for money for recipients of insolvency services.48 Of the 33 submissions 
44 That is, the specialist accounting professionals who are appointed as company liquidators, bankruptcy trustees 
etc.
45 It comprised departmental officers; a senior corporate regulator; accounting and legal practitioners specialising 
in insolvency as well as the President of the insolvency practitioners’ professional body.
46 Its mandate was to consider and make recommendations as to whether any changes should be made to the current 
system for the registration, appointment and remuneration of insolvency practitioners, as well as to the procedures 
for responding to complaints about the conduct of corporate insolvency administrations.
47 Both Ministers were involved as it covered practitioners appointed in both personal and corporate insolvency. 
See:
 http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2011/A%20
Modernisation%20and%20Harmonisation%20of%20the%20Regulatory%20Framework/Key%20Documents/
PDF/Options_Paper20110602.ashx.
48 Key reform areas in the paper include promoting a high level of professionalism and competence by practitioners, 
enhancing transparency and communication and promoting increased efficiency in insolvency administration. 
See: https://www.afsa.gov.au/practitioner/pir-newsletter/june-2011-pir-newsletter.
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received,49 one was from insolvency academics Associate Professors Chris Symes50 
and David Brown.51
Then, in December 2011, the government issued a Proposals Paper52 to which 
there were some 29 submissions,53 including from Associate Professors Colin 
Anderson54 and David Morrison55 as well as Associate Professors Christopher 
Symes and David Brown. Subsequently, draft laws on the regulation of insolvency 
professionals were released for public comment by March 2013.56 Of the 16 
submissions, none were by academics. At the time of writing, there is no further 
information on the progress of the Bill.57
A current wide-ranging enquiry, the “Financial System Inquiry” (“FSI”), has 
amongst other things requested input on insolvency laws in Australia.58 In 2013, 
the government initiated this inquiry following the 2012 release of a government 
Consultation Paper on strengthening the banking regulator’s crisis management 
powers.59 During the height of the global financial crisis which began in 2008, a 
few Australian banks did experience funding pressure to a limited extent, however 
there were no failures.60 Subsequently there has been some commentary about 
the possible need to review Australia’s crisis management tools because of the 
concentrated structure of its banking sector.61
49 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2011/A-Modernisation-and-
Harmonisation-of-the-Regulatory-Framework/Submissions.
50 University of Adelaide.
51 University of Adelaide.
52 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2011/
Reforms%20to%20Modernise%20and%20Harmonise%20Insolvency/Key%20Documents/PDF/Proposals_
Paper_insolvency.ashx. It acknowledged the work of the Senate Economics Reference Committee, Inquiry into 
Liquidators and Administrators (2010), discussed below.
53 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2011/Reforms-to-Modernise-and-
Harmonise-Insolvency/Submissions.
54 Queensland University of Technology.
55 University of Queensland.
56 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/Insolvency-Law-Reform-Bill.
57 On 7 November 2014, Treasury released a draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 which addresses some of 
same issues as the 2013 draft legislation although it differs in a number of respects. Significantly, it proposes new 
delegated legislation under the Insolvency Law Reform Bill, the Insolvency Practice Rules. If adopted, these will 
amongst other things align the registration and disciplinary frameworks that apply to registered liquidators (for 
companies) and registered trustees (in bankruptcy). Submissions on the exposure draft closed on 19 December 
2014.
58 See: http://fsi.gov.au/. This FSI material draws on joint research by the present author with Michael Murray, Legal 
Director ARITA and Visiting Fellow, QUT Faculty of Law, on the Australian approach to crisis management in 
the banking sector.
59 The Treasury, Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers (Consultation Paper, 2012), a copy of which is 
available at: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/APRA.
60 See: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/pdf/bu-1211-5.pdf.
61 International Monetary Fund, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment (IMF Country Report No 12/308, 
2012), at [51], a copy of which is available at: http://www.apra.gov.au.
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In July 2014, the FSI released an Interim Report in which it sought submissions 
on a wide range of issues, including whether there is evidence that Australia’s 
external administration regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail and, 
if so, what could be done to address this. The FSI has received over 6,500 
submissions in response to its Interim Report, some of which are by insolvency 
specialists and address the external administration issue.62 The final report is due 
in December 2014.63
Federal Statutory Authorities
Government has been assisted with respect to corporate insolvency laws through 
the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (“CAMAC”),64 a statutory 
body established in 1989 to provide independent advice to the responsible 
Minister on the administration of corporate and financial services laws or changes 
to them. However the federal government announced in its 2014-15 Budget that 
it would be abolishing CAMAC as a “smaller government” measure.65 While 
this announcement prompted academics and professional bodies66 to query the 
decision and to support an ongoing role for CAMAC, the government has released 
an exposure draft Bill and associated explanatory material to give effect to the 
decision and called for submissions.67
While CAMAC has undertaken work on its own initiative,68 most issues it has 
examined were referred by government Ministers. For example, in May 2007, 
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer referred a number of issues on 
insolvency law to CAMAC arising from its consultation on proposed changes to 
62 Submissions were made by academics on a broad range of the issues, for example by Professor Justin O’Brien; Dr. 
George Gilligan; Professor Ross Buckley; Ken Ooi; Professor Kingsford-Smith (University of New South Wales); 
Associate Professor Paul Latimer (Monash University) and Phillip Maume (Technische Universität München, 
Germany). The submission by Dr. Colin Anderson, Cath Brown and the present author (Commercial & Property 
Law Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology) addressed insolvency issues.
63 The Financial System Inquiry Final Report, at 265 recommended to government to “Consult on possible 
amendments to the external administration regime to provide additional flexibility for businesses in financial 
difficulty.” See: http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/.
64 See: http://www.camac.gov.au/CAMAC/camac.nsf. Its most recent report was on report on crowd sourced equity 
funding in May 2014.
65 See: http://www.budget.gov.au/2014-15/content/bp2/html/bp2_expense-07.htm. The committee’s advisory 
function is to be merged into Treasury.
66 The Law Council of Australia’s letter in June 2014 to the relevant Minister expressing concern at the proposal 
can be found at: http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/docs-2800-2899/2857_-_
Commonwealth_budget_proposal_to_abolish_corporations_and_markets_law_reform_body.pdf.
67 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/CAMAC.
68 Such as the “Members’ Schemes of Arrangement Report” (2009).
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the law through the Insolvency Bill (2007) referred to below. CAMAC issued a 
consultation paper to which it received submissions, including from academics.69
CAMAC’s role was only to make recommendations and there was no requirement 
for the Minister or government to act on its reports. Just one example of its impact 
has been the reference to its reports on “Corporate Voluntary Administration” 
(1998) and the “Rehabilitation of Large and Complex Enterprises” (2004) in 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) 
Bill 2007.70
Another federal statutory body is the Productivity Commission,71 the government’s 
independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and 
environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. In 2010, it undertook a 
“Regulatory Burdens on Business Review” (2010) and Associate Professors David 
Morrison and Colin Anderson made a submission regarding the duplication of 
laws around insolvency and the regulation of that profession.72
A further Productivity Commission enquiry that intersected with insolvency 
law was the “Inquiry into The Market for Retail Tenancy Leases in Australia” 
(2007). Associate Professor Jenny Buchan,73 an expert in franchising law, made 
a submission on the implications for franchisees occupying retail premises not 
being protected under some State legislation and as a result potentially being 
detrimentally affected if the franchisor becomes insolvent.74
Parliamentary Enquiries
Thus far, I have been addressing enquiries by the executive arm of government, 
Ministers and their Departments. I will now turn to the legislative arm of 
government, the Parliament. The Commonwealth Parliament itself also undertakes 
enquiries through its Parliamentary Committees and on occasions has done so in 
respect of insolvency law reform.
69 The submission by Professor Michael Adams (University of Western Sydney) and Dr. Marina Nehme was cited 
at 18 and that by Anil Hargovan (University of New South Wales) at 74. All are available under the rubric 
“Submissions” at: www.camac.gov.au.
70 Additional CAMAC publications include the “Report on External Administrations” (2008); “Shareholder Claims 
against Insolvent Companies: Implications of Sons of Gwalia Decision” (2008).
71 It is established under the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth): http://www.pc.gov.au/.
72 See: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/100606/subdr053.pdf.
73 University of New South Wales.
74 “For example, if the franchisor becomes insolvent, the head lease may be disclaimed by the franchisor’s liquidator... 
This leaves the franchisee who is a sub lessee, licensee, or casual tenant without a contract based right to remain in 
the premises unless a side agreement has been reached between the franchisee and the landlord.” Jenny Buchan’s 
Submission at 5, a copy of which is available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/70223/sub139.pdf.
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The Australian Parliament comprises a lower house (the House of Representatives) 
and an upper house (the Senate). Bills have to be passed by both houses and 
assented to by the Governor-General before they become Acts of Parliament.75 
More enquiries in the area of insolvency have been initiated either by the Senate, 
which is understandable as it is a house of review and seen as a “watchdog” of the 
executive branch of government, or by joint parliamentary committees comprising 
members of both houses of Parliament than by the House of Representatives.76
Senate Committees
The Senate has developed a comprehensive range of committees77 to investigate 
matters of public policy; examine government administration; and scrutinise 
proposed legislation. The Senate Committee that is most relevant for policy and 
regulation in the area of insolvency is the Senate Economics Committee, however 
other committees can be involved depending upon the department responsible 
for proposed legislation. I will now discuss three types of enquiries by Senate 
committees.
First, a Senate Committee may be asked to examine proposed legislation. A 
recent example relevant to insolvency is an inquiry by the Senate Education and 
Employment Legislation Committee into employee issues in insolvency. On 4 
September 2014, the Fair Entitlements Guarantee Amendment Bill 2014 was 
introduced into Parliament.78 This Bill proposes to amend the Fair Entitlements 
Guarantee Act 2012 (Cth) to cap the maximum amount of redundancy pay 
entitlement available under the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (“FEG”) scheme at 
16 weeks; and make technical amendments to clarify the operation of the scheme.79 
When the Bill came before the Senate later that day, it referred the Bill to the Senate 
Education and Employment Legislation Committee for inquiry and report. It called 
for submissions with a closing date of 12 September 2014 and reporting date of 
75 Bills can be introduced in either House, except for laws relating to revenue and taxation, which must be introduced 
in the House of Representatives: www.aph.gov.au.
76 The House of Representatives has a Standing Committee on Economics, which can inquire into and report 
on any annual reports referred to it by the House. In March 2014, it agreed to undertake an inquiry into the 
2013 Annual Report of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, an independent statutory authority 
which regulates banks, superannuation and insurance companies. This inquiry is relevant to insolvency because 
it concerns the regulatory settings for resolution of financial distress for banks. See: http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Economics/2013_APR_Annual_Report.
77 Senate Committees are either Select Committees, appointed by the Senate to inquire into some specific matter 
and to report back to the Senate within a set time, or Standing Committees, a permanent committee of the Senate 
for the life of the whole of any one Parliament.
78 See: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00186.
79 Hansard is available at: www.aph.gov.au.
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24 September 2014.80 Eleven submissions were received from industry bodies, 
trade unions and the Department of Employment, the responsible government 
department, as well as from a law firm that acts for employees seeking payment of 
entitlements where their employer is under administration in insolvency. A public 
hearing was held in Melbourne on 17 September.81 No submissions or appearances 
at the public hearing were made by academics, although the law firm’s submission 
referred to research on the FEG scheme published by practitioners and industry82 
and academics.83 Even though this was a relatively brief amendment bill, this 
was a remarkably short time for submissions. The Report handed down on 24 
September 2014 fell along party lines - with a majority of members, drawn from 
the government, supporting the legislation, and two dissenting reports delivered 
by the federal opposition party and one of the minor parties.84
Secondly, a Senate committee may undertake an enquiry in response to a current 
issue of public concern. An example from the Senate Economics Committee 
concerns a former liquidator, Mr Stuart Ariff, who was arrested on 19 criminal 
charges following an investigation by ASIC. The offences related to his conduct 
whilst he was the liquidator a company and in 2011, he was convicted and 
jailed for six years. Following the publicity surrounding this matter in 2010, 
the Senate Economics Committee undertook an “Inquiry into Liquidators and 
Administrators”.85 Among the 95 submissions, many of which were marked 
confidential (likely debtors and creditors affected by insolvency), there were 
submissions by academics from four universities.86 The Report referred extensively 
to academics’ written submissions as well as oral submissions at the public 
hearings in Adelaide, Newcastle and Canberra.87
80 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/
Fair_Entitlements.
81 Nine witnesses appeared representing the Australian Industry Group and Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (2) (employers); the Australian Council of Trade Unions and Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of 
Australia (4) (employees); and the Department of Employment (3) (government).
82 S. Whelan, L. Zwier and R. Campo.
83 Submission 11 by Slater & Gordon dated 15 September 2014 referred to research by Mark Wellard (Queensland 
University of Technology); David Morrison (University of Queensland); and Helen Anderson (University of 
Melbourne): http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/
Fair_Entitlements/Submissions.
84 At the time of writing, the Bill was still before the Senate.
85 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_
inquiries/2008-10/liquidators_09/index.
86 Written submissions by Jeffrey Fitzpatrick and Vivienne Brand (Flinders University); Christopher Symes 
(University of Adelaide); Colin Anderson (Queensland University of Technology); and David Morrison 
(University of Queensland).
87 Public hearings at Adelaide (Dr. Vivienne Brand, Associate Professors David Brown and Chris Symes); 
Newcastle (Professor Scott Holmes); and Canberra (Associate Professors Colin Anderson and David Morrison).
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The Senate Committee referred to the lack of adequate, publicly available data 
on the state of the corporate insolvency industry in Australia. (This has been 
a recurring theme in submissions to several inquiries.88) When the Senate 
Committee’s report discussed the need for better data on insolvencies, a whole 
subsection was devoted to the “Academics’ perspectives”. The Senate Committee 
noted it had received evidence from several legal academics based in Brisbane 
and Adelaide who were critical of the lack of public data on insolvency89 and who 
made international comparisons.90
The Report referred under “Academic Research” to academics’ frustration at the 
lack of adequate insolvency statistics. Dr. David Morrison was quoted as follows:
“…if you want data from ASIC, if you are an academic and you 
would like to look at something independently, unless it is a priority 
area that is presumably flagged between the government and ASIC, 
ASIC cannot provide it to you. If you want to pay to get data at ASIC, 
even if you can afford to pay for it—and most of us cannot, of course, 
because we are employees of the government and therefore paid 
small amounts of money— the records they have are based on paper 
and microfiche, so you have to pay a search fee every time you want 
something and you have to go into quite an archaic set of files. So, 
even if ASIC wanted to help people with independent information, 
they actually do not have the technology to do it, and that is a very 
stark contrast to ITSA, the bankruptcy regulator.”91
The Report also explored options proposed by academics on gathering statistics 
on insolvency matters.92 The Senate Committee concluded that it strongly agreed 
with the view that there needed to be a better system for collating and analysing 
corporate insolvency data in Australia. It specifically agreed with Associate 
Professors Colin Anderson and David Morrison that the lack of data is an issue that 
88 See the discussion below on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
“Corporate Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake Report” (2004).
89 “Inquiry into Liquidators and Administrators” (2010), at [9.17] referring to Associate Professors Colin Anderson, 
David Morrison and David Brown.
90 Associate Professor David Brown referred to the more developed data gathering mechanisms of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand governments and Associate Professor Colin Anderson to a large United States study 
on liquidators’ fees and returns to creditors.
91 “Inquiry into Liquidators and Administrators” (2010), at [9.24]. Mr Warren Day of ASIC responded to these 
comments and explained to the Committee the limitations placed upon ASIC, for example, that payments are 
required by law.
92 Ibid., at [9.26].
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needs to be addressed in a comprehensive way to ensure confidence in information 
about the perceived problems and the resulting policy.93
Thirdly, Senate committees also have a specific mandate to monitor the 
performance of departments and agencies. In 2013-2014, the Senate Economics 
Committee undertook an inquiry into the “Performance of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC)”.94 The committee examined many aspects 
of ASIC’s work, concentrating on two case studies in particular: consumer credit 
and misconduct by financial advisers. During its enquiry, the Committee called for 
submissions95 (including writing to academics and others with an interest in ASIC’s 
performance and inviting submissions) and also conducted public hearings.96 The 
Committee’s list of references included articles by academics.97
Once again, a Senate Report referred to the lack of access to information collected 
by ASIC. A number of witnesses were critical of ASIC’s failure to publish much 
of the information which it collects as a result of its regulatory activities.98 The 
Report referred to a submission from several Adelaide academics which expressed 
concern about:
“…the relative lack of statistics and data for researchers, stakeholders 
and the wider public.”99
Mr Jason Harris, University of Technology Sydney, submitted that the lack of data, 
particularly relating to enforcement and insolvencies, stifles debate as:
93 Ibid., at [9.31].
94 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC.
95 Many academics made written submissions including Jason Harris (University of Technology Sydney); Professors 
Dimity Kingsford Smith, Justin O’Brien, Dr. George Gilligan, Associate Professor Michael Legg, Dr. Marina 
Nehme (University of New South Wales); Dr. Suzanne Le Mire, Associate Professors David Brown, Christopher 
Symes and Ms Karen Gross (University of Adelaide); Dr. Vivienne Brand and Dr. Sulette Lombard, (Flinders 
University); Professor Robert Baxt AO; Professor AJ Brown (Griffith University).
96 Oral submissions were made by Associate Professor David Brown and Dr. Suzanne Le Mire (University of Adelaide); 
Professors Dimity Kingsford-Smith; Justin O’Brien (Sydney hearings); Professor Bob Baxt; Jason Harris; Dr. 
Vivienne Brand and, Dr. Sulette Lombard; Professor AJ Brown (Canberra hearings). President David Lombe, CEO 
Mr John Winter and Legal Director Mr Michael Murray, represented the insolvency professional body ARITA.
97 “Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission” (2014), Appendix 6. These included 
articles by Helen Anderson; Vicky Comino (University of Queensland); Aakash Desai and Ian Ramsay (University 
of Melbourne); Jason Harris and Michael Legg; Dimity Kingsford-Smith; and Roman Tomasic (University of 
South Australia).
98 “Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission” (2014), at [22.13].
99 Ibid., at [22.14].
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“…we are unable to determine exactly what it is that ASIC does aside 
from what it tells us; but, more importantly, we are unable to work out 
what it is ASIC is failing to do.”100
The insolvency practitioners’ professional body, the Australian Restructuring, 
Insolvency and Turnaround Association (“ARITA”)101 also drew attention to the 
amount of prescribed information that ASIC receives and stores under legislation 
and how little is published. While acknowledging ASIC had improved its collection 
and publication of data it indicated that it needed to do more. When appearing 
before the Committee, Michael Murray, ARITA’s Legal Director, compared 
ASIC’s statistics with those of AFSA who:
“…produce good statistics which inform the law reform process in 
bankruptcy. We do not have that sort of information in corporate 
insolvency.”102
ARITA’s President, David Lombe, gave an example of the limitations imposed on 
researchers, when he referred to work undertaken by an academic, Mark Wellard:103
“ARITA gives a research prize so that someone can do research. One 
of our prize-winners was looking at deeds of company arrangement. 
When you go into voluntary administration, there is a decision about 
whether you go into liquidation or a deed of company arrangement. 
He was trying to work out how many companies go into deeds of 
company arrangement and how successful those deeds of company 
arrangements are. He wanted to get access to information from 
ASIC to be able to do that very important research. It would have 
cost thousands of dollars and ASIC just said, “We can’t give that 
information to you.”104
The Senate Committee formally recommended that:
“ASIC promote ‘informed participation’ in the market by making 
information more accessible and presented in an informative way.”105
100 Ibid., at [22.15].
101 See: www.arita.org.au.
102 “Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission” (2014), at [22.19].
103 Visiting Fellow, Queensland University of Technology. See M. Wellard, “A Review of Deeds of Company 
Arrangement” (2014) 26(2) Australian Insolvency Law 12.
104 “Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission” (2014), at [22.20], referring to research 
undertaken by Mark Wellard, Visiting Fellow, QUT, and his research for the Terry Taylor Scholarship ARITA: 
http://www.arita.com.au/about-us/arita-terry-taylor-scholarship/past-recipients.
105 Ibid., at [22.28]. (Recommendation 39).
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Parliamentary Joint Committees 
Finally, Parliamentary Joint Committees (with members from the House of 
Representatives and Senate) are also established by resolution or legislation 
agreed to by both houses.106 In the area of insolvency, the most significant Joint 
Committee is the Parliamentary Joint Committee (“PJC”) on Corporations and 
Financial Services.
Its most recent and extensive enquiry in relation to insolvency was initiated 
in 2002, when it agreed to consider and report on the operation of Australia’s 
insolvency and voluntary administration laws – resulting in the Report, “Corporate 
Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake” (2004) (“Stocktake Report”). It invited submissions 
addressing the terms of reference and notified various academics, organisations 
and professionals of its inquiry.107 It then released an Insolvency Issues Paper 
providing background material and information on aspects of insolvency law that 
had been highlighted in submissions or in media and professional commentary 
on corporate insolvency law and practice. The Issues Paper also posed questions 
for consideration by both the Committee and witnesses in preparing for the series 
of public hearings. During 2003, the Joint Committee conducted public hearings 
in Toowoomba, Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney, including by teleconference 
to international academics, Professors Andrew Keay and Ron Harmer. Its report 
referred to submissions and research published by academics.108
Following publication of the “Stocktake Report”, the government announced 
in 2005 that it intended to reform Australia’s insolvency laws. Because of the 
specialised nature of insolvency, it appointed an Insolvency Law Advisory Group 
to provide technical advice on the draft legislation. It comprised senior accounting 
and legal practitioners, an academic (the present author) and representatives of 
the leading accounting, banking, insolvency practitioner and legal professional 
bodies.109 During 2006, tranches of draft legislation were discussed by the Advisory 
Group. In November 2006, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer released a 
106 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint.
107 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/ 
2002_04/ail/report/ail_pdf.ashx.
108 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/
Completed_inquiries/2002-04/ail/submissions/sublist. A list of the submissions is set out in Appendix 1. 
Submissions were made by the following academics: Mr Colin Anderson (then University of Southern 
Queensland) and Dr. David Morrison; as well as the present author.
109 Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Establishment of Insolvency Law Advisory Group (Media Release 6 
of 2006): http://parlsec.treasurer.gov.au/cjp/content/pressreleases/2006/006.asp. It included representatives from 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, CPA Australia, the National Institute of Accountants, the 
Australian Banking Association and the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia.
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draft Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007 and Corporations and ASIC 
Amendment Regulations 2007 for public comment.110
During the progress of the Bill through Parliament, the PJC on Corporations and 
Financial Services commenced a new inquiry - an “Inquiry into the Exposure 
Draft of the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007”.111 It narrowed 
this inquiry’s focus to those elements of the 2004 “Stocktake Report” which the 
Government had rejected, agreed with in principle or argued were matters falling 
under the jurisdiction of ASIC. It therefore sought the views of stakeholders on 
specific issues of continuing relevance.112 The 2007 Report referred to written113 and 
oral submissions114 by insolvency academics and once again the PJC commented 
on empirical research and review processes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, what are some of the themes indicated by this broad review of the 
contributions by insolvency specialists to some significant Australian government 
enquiries over recent decades? I would like to suggest some six or seven themes 
have emerged which apply to Australia and which are likely to resonate with many 
other jurisdictions as well.
First, it is apparent that the executive arm of government uses a wide range 
of approaches to gathering input from specialists on law reform and that there 
are many opportunities to contribute. While formal referrals to Law Reform 
Commissions on insolvency are relatively rare, academic researchers have many 
opportunities to contribute in response to government papers and inquiries as well 
as to independent statutory agency enquiries.
Second, the ways in which academics can contribute are by written (and, upon 
invitation, oral) submissions. In addition, even if they are not in a position to 
110 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Insolvency) Bill 2007 referred to suggestions for 
reform in the “Harmer Report” (1988) and the Trade Practices Commission’s “Study of the Professions” (1992); 
the Government Working Party Report on the “Review of Insolvency Practitioners” (1997); the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Report on “Corporate Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake” 
(2004); and the CAMAC reports on “Corporate Voluntary Administration” (1998) and the “Rehabilitation of 
Large and Complex Enterprises” (2004).
111 See: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/
Completed_inquiries/2004-07/insolvency/index.
112 They were under four broad categories: the regulation of the insolvency process; the role of administrators and 
directors; the treatment of employee entitlements; and the need for empirical research and review processes.
113 Appendix 1 refers to Submissions by David Morrison, Colin Anderson and Jenny Dickfos (Griffith University).
114 Professor Keay (University of Leeds) was interviewed and cited.
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make a formal submission, academics can usefully contribute by forwarding their 
published research on the topic under consideration to the enquiry.115
Third, because of the way in which insolvency law intersects with so many other 
areas of law that regulate business or society, insolvency specialists can make a 
unique contribution to the public good by highlighting intersections that would 
otherwise go unnoticed.116
Fourth, despite submissions and appearances by numerous academics as well 
as other stakeholders, no outcome or even a response may be forthcoming from 
government. Even where recommendations are accepted by government, it may still 
take many years before references to a Report appear in proposed law reforms.117
Fifth, and associated with the previous comment about lack of a government 
response, some issues keep recurring – even where there are many submissions 
and recommendations supporting a change. One particular example has been 
highlighted – the lack of data available to assist with empirical research into 
corporate insolvency. Most recently, the 2014 Senate Economics Committee report 
on the inquiry into the “Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission” endorsed previous recommendations that ASIC should provide and 
disseminate information it receives from a range of sources in order to keep the 
business and academic worlds better informed about developments and trends in 
corporate Australia.
Sixth, international dimensions are relevant to government enquiries into 
insolvency. Since the earliest law reform commission report to which I referred, 
overseas academics have made submissions and also acted as consultants and, in 
more recent times, been invited to participate in public hearings by teleconference.
My final theme is not necessarily drawn from the information collated for this 
paper. Rather it based on a story which I heard while investigating this topic – 
and which I have subsequently verified through Hansard. When Australia’s 
Personal Property Securities legislation was introduced into Parliament in 2009, 
Phillip Ruddock, a former Attorney-General who at that time was a member of the 
opposition party, was speaking in favour of the bill, which had bipartisan support:
115 For example, Jeffrey Fitzpatrick and Vivienne Brand (Flinders University) with Christopher Symes (University 
of Adelaide) submitted their conference paper “Fit and Proper: An Integrity Requirement for Liquidators in the 
Australian Corporate Legal Framework” to the Senate Economics Committee “Inquiry into Liquidators and 
Administrators” (2010).
116 A good example is Jenny Buchan’s submission regarding the impact on franchisees of franchisor insolvency.
117 The Working Party Report on the “Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners” (1997) was 
finally mentioned when the bill to amend corporate insolvency laws was introduced in 2007.
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“What I can say is that this issue became an issue largely by accident. 
I was attending a regional bar association and law society conference 
on the Sunshine Coast at Coolum. My wife said to me: ‘Look, there 
is this session on personal property security. If you can’t see anything 
else in the program that you want to do, you might as well go along.’ 
I went along and I heard a presentation from the late Professor David 
Allan from Bond University on measures that had been taken in some 
states of the United States and Canada to simplify personal property 
securities and, equally, the measures to codify arrangements that had 
been put in place by New Zealand. I heard from a very distinguished 
legal practitioner at that time about the very considerable business 
that he as a legal practitioner had in advising on variations in 
personal property security in different jurisdictions. The point that 
he was making was that if you are a legal practitioner you can spend 
a lot of time and you can generate very considerable costs, which 
clients have to pay, offering advice on differences that are in fact 
totally unnecessary.
I have also spent a bit of time with people in business, people who you 
might think would not be interested in these matters. … It reinforced 
my view that this was an absolutely essential reform. We did take 
it to SCAG [Standing Committee of Attorneys-General for the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories] and we got the states to agree 
there. We did take it to COAG [Council of Australian Governments] 
and, I might say, it was not an easy path to get the department of 
finance and the Treasury to agree to meet some of the costs of getting 
the states up to the barrier in relation to this. I might also say that if 
you did not drive it, it was not going to happen.”118
Professor David Allan who gave the speech which the government Minister heard 
had spent a professional life time, commencing in New Zealand in 1964, pursuing 
law reform to acknowledge the value of personal property and bring it into line 
with the contemporary needs of society, especially in light of globalisation and the 
problem of “fugitive assets”. If you wish to read an account of a dedicated academic 
118 See: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr
%2F2009-09-16%2F0220%22.
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being proactive and making submissions, even when there was no enquiry in place, 
then I refer you to two articles written by the late Professor Allan.119
This proactive, rather than reactive, stance is to be applauded. It puts me in mind of 
an insight by Professor Ian Fletcher shared in last year’s Edwin Coe Lecture about:
“…the vital need for those who possess a technical understanding 
of the law and its actual working to establish effective channels 
of communication with legislators and with policy-makers in 
government, to ensure that there is a proper appreciation of the 
vital impact that this complex and much-misunderstood area of 
law has upon the totality of social well-being in a modern, credit-
based, mercantile society. Therefore it is an important aspect of the 
“mission” of insolvency practitioners to improve awareness, both on 
the part of the wider public and within the corridors of government, 
of the realities of insolvency law and practice, and to do so in a way 
that earns public confidence and respect rather than functioning 
merely as special pleading on behalf of the vested interests of those 
“in the business”.”
Such a quote seems an appropriate place to conclude this brief examination of 
the contribution by insolvency specialists seeking to improve the design of the 
Australian insolvency system. Insolvency specialists can play an important, even 
unique, role in such policy debates – and in so doing, promote the public good.
119 D. Allan, “Personal Property Security - A Long Long Trail A-Winding” [1999] Bond Law Review 12, available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/BondLawRw/1999/12.html; D. Allan, “Uniform Personal Property Security 
Legislation for Australia: Introduction to the Workshop on Personal Property Security Law Reform” [2002] Bond 
Law Review 1, available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/BondLawRw/2002/1.html.
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